

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES  
8 September 1974

## C.I.A. Chief Tells House Of \$8-Million Campaign Against Allende in '70-'73

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 7—The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told Congress that the Nixon Administration authorized more than \$8-million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern.

The goal of the clandestine C.I.A. activities, the director, William E. Colby, testified at a top-secret hearing last April, was to "destabilize" the Marxist Government of President Allende, who was elected in 1970.

The Allende Government was overthrown in a violent coup d'état last Sept. 11 in which the President died. The military junta that seized power say he committed suicide but his supporters maintain that he was slain by the soldiers who attacked the presidential palace in Santiago.

### Intervention in '64

In his House testimony, Mr. Colby also disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency first intervened against Dr. Allende in 1964, when he was a presidential candidate running against Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic party, which had the support of the United States.

The agency's operations, Mr. Colby testified, were considered a test of the technique of using heavy cash payments to bring down a government viewed as antagonistic toward the United States. However, there have been many allegations that the C.I.A. was involved in similar activities in other countries before the election of Dr. Allende.

Mr. Colby also maintained that all of the agency's operations against the Allende Government were approved in advance by the 40 Committee in Washington, a secret high-level intelligence panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger. The 40 Committee was set up by President Kennedy in an attempt to provide Administration control over C.I.A. activities after Cuban exiles trained and equipped by the agency failed in their invasion of Cuba in 1961.

Details of the agency's involvement in Chile were first provided by Mr. Colby to the House Armed Services Subcommittee of Intelligence, headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, at a special one-day hearing last April 22. The testimony was later made available to Representative Michael J. Harrington, a liberal Massachusetts Democrat who has long been a critic of the C.I.A. Harrington wrote other members of Congress six weeks ago to protest both the agency's clandestine activities and the failure of the Nixon Administration to acknowledge them despite repeated inquiries from Congress. A copy of a confidential seven-page letter sent by Mr. Harrington to Representative Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was made available to The New York Times.

The testimony of Mr. Colby indicates that high officials in the State Department and White House repeatedly and deliberately misled the public and the Congress about the extent of United States involvement in the internal affairs of Chile during the three-year government of Dr. Allende.

Shortly after Dr. Allende won a plurality in the presidential elections in September, 1970, high Chilean officials told newsmen, as a dispatch in The New York Times reported then, that the "United States lacks political, economic or military leverage to change the course of events in Chile, even if the Administration wished to do so."

However, Mr. Colby testified that \$500,000 was secretly authorized by the 40 Committee in 1970 to help the anti-Allende forces. Another \$500,000 had been provided to the same forces in 1969, Mr. Colby said.

Mr. Allende's victory was ratified by the Chilean Congress in October, 1970, and the State Department later declared that the Administration had "firmly rejected" any attempt to block his inauguration.

But Mr. Colby testified that \$350,000 had been authorized by the 40 Committee in an unsuccessful effort to bribe members of the Chilean Congress. The bribe was part of a much more complicated scheme intended to overturn the results of the election, Mr. Colby testified, but the over-all plan, although initially approved by the 40 Committee, was later

rejected as unworkable.

While the Central Intelligence Agency was conducting these clandestine operations, there were reductions in United States foreign-aid grants to Chile in development bank loans and in lines of credit from American commercial banks. Commodity credits for vitally needed grain purchases also were restricted.

United States officials have declared that there was no over-all Administration program designed to limit economic aid to the Allende Government, but critics have noted that large-scale loans and aid are now going to Chile.

President Allende repeatedly complained about what he told the United Nations in December: "external pressure to cut us off our economy and paralyze trade from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze trade and to deprive us of access to sources of international financing."

### Colby Declines Comment

Mr. Colby acknowledged in a brief telephone conversation this week that he had testified before the Nedzi intelligence subcommittee about the C.I.A.'s involvement in Chile, but he refused to comment on the Harrington letter.

Mr. Nedzi, contacted in Munich, West Germany, where he is on an inspection trip with other members of the House Armed Services Committee, also declined to comment.

Mr. Harrington noted in his letter that he had been permitted to read the 48-page transcript of Mr. Colby's testimony two times, apparently without taking notes. "My memory must serve here as the only source for the substance of the testimony," he wrote.

A number of high-ranking Government officials subsequently confirmed the details of the C.I.A.'s involvement as summarized by the Massachusetts Representative, a liberal who has long been a critic of the agency's policies.

In 1964, Mr. Colby testified, some American corporations in Chile volunteered to serve as conduits for anti-Allende funds, but the proposal was rejected. A similar proposal in 1970 led to a widely publicized Senate hearing last year.

The C.I.A. director also said that after Dr. Allende's election, \$5-million was authorized by the 40 Committee for more "destabilization" efforts in 1971, 1972 and 1973. An additional \$1.5-million was provided to aid anti-Allende candidates in municipal elections last year.

Some of these funds, Mr. Colby testified, were provided to an unidentified influential, anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago.

In his summary of the Colby testimony, Mr. Harrington noted that "funding was provided to individuals, political parties, and media outlets in Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe."

"Mr. Colby's description of

these operations was direct, though not to the point of identifying actual contacts and conduits," Mr. Harrington added.

One fully informed official, told of The New York Times's intention to publish an account of the clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile, declared, "This thing calls for balanced reporting to put the blame where it should be laid."

"The agency didn't do anything without the knowledge and consent of the 40 committee," he said, pointedly adding that the committee was headed by Mr. Kissinger, who was then serving as President Richard M. Nixon's National Security Adviser.

### Secrecy Called Necessary

Another Government official similarly defended the C.I.A.'s role in funneling funds into Chile and the agency's subsequent denials of any such activities. "You have a straight out policy that the United States conducts covert action on an officially authorized basis," he said. "If you do such things, obviously you're not going to say anything about it."

"On this kind of covert action," the official added, "it's up to those asked to do it to do it secretly."

Mr. Kissinger, although fully informed of The Times's account through an aide, did not respond.

A number of officials whose information about such activities has been accurate in the past declared in interviews this week that there was a sharp split between some State Department officials and Mr. Kissinger over the 40 Committee's Chile policy.

### Kissinger's Comment

In his only public comment on the Allende coup, Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year: "The C.I.A. had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I only put in that qualification in case some madman appears down there who without instructions talked to somebody. I have absolutely no reason to suppose it."

In his July 18, 1974, letter to Representative Morgan, Mr. Harrington quoted Mr. Colby as testifying that the 40 Committee authorized an expenditure of \$1-million for "further political destabilization" activities in August, 1973, one month before the military junta seized control in Santiago.

"The full plan authorized in August was called off when the military coup occurred less than one month later," Mr. Harrington wrote. He added, however that Mr. Colby had testified that \$34,000 of the funds had been spent—including a payment of \$25,000 to one person to buy a radio station.

A specific request earlier in the summer of 1973 for \$50,000 to support a nationwide truckers' strike that was crippling the Chilean Government was turned down by the 40 Committee, Mr. Harrington further testified, Mr. Colby as testifying.

In the period before the coup," one official said, "there

WASHINGTON POST

09 September 1974

# CIA News Causes No Stir in Chile

By Joseph Novitski

Special to The Washington Post

was a pretty firm view on the part of the 40 Committee—which is Kissinger and nobody else—that the Allende Government was bound to come to destruction and had to be thoroughly discredited.”

“The State Department supported this, but in a different way,” the official recalled. “It wanted to stretch out any clandestine activities to permit the regime to come to a political end.”

“The argument was between those who wanted to use force and end it quickly rather than to play it out. Henry was on the side of the former—he was for considerable obstruction.”

All of the officials interviewed emphasized that the Central Intelligence Agency was not authorized to play any direct role in the coup that overthrew Dr. Allende. It was also noted that most of the subsequent denials of agency involvement in the internal affairs of Chile were made in the context of a direct United States role in the overthrow.

“On most of those you have to look at the language very carefully,” one official said of the denials.

Shortly after President Allende's overthrow there were unconfirmed reports that the truckers' strike, which was a key element in the social chaos that preceded the coup, had been financed, at least in part, by the C.I.A.

At a closed hearing on Chile before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee last October, Mr. Colby refused to rule out the possibility that some anti-Allende demonstrations in Chile may have been assisted through subsidiaries of United States corporations in Brazil or other Latin-American countries.

He was sharply questioned about that possibility by Mr. Harrington, who emerged during Congressional debate as a leading critic of the Administration's Chilean policies.

Representative Harrington, reached yesterday at his Massachusetts office, refused to discuss his letter to Mr. Morgan, which he termed confidential. Nor would he discuss other aspects of the possible American involvement in the fall of President Allende.

In his letter, Mr. Harrington complained about the “inherent limitations facing members of Congress in uncovering the facts of covert activities such as those in Chile.”

He also expressed dismay that the Administration had authorized the covert expenditure of \$1-million in August, 1973, “without any apparent deterrent being posed by the recently completed hearings into I.T.T. [International Telephone & Telegraph] involvement in Chile and the Senate Watergate committee's disclosure of C.I.A. activities related to Watergate.”

A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee concluded hearings last April into what I.T.T. officials acknowledged was an

attempt to contribute \$1-million to the United States Government for use by the Central Intelligence Agency to create economic chaos in Chile. Testimony showed that the offer was rejected after discussions that apparently involved Mr. Kissinger and Richard M. Helms, then director of the agency.

A number of high State Department officials testified under oath at those hearings that the United States was not making any attempts to interfere with Chile's internal politics.

Edward M. Korry, former Ambassador to Chile, declared: “The United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress at any time in the entire four years of my stay. No hard line toward Chile was carried out at any time.”

Charles A. Meyer, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, similarly testified that the United States scrupulously adhered to a policy of nonintervention. “We bought no votes, we funded no candidates, we promoted no coups,” he said.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, could not be reached for comment. The subcommittee's chief counsel, Jerome I. Levinson, expressed anger today on hearing of Mr. Colby's testimony. “For me,” he said, “the fundamental issue now is who makes foreign policy in a democracy and by what standards and by what criteria?”

Mr. Levinson said that the subcommittee had been “deliberately deceived” during its public hearings last year.

In his letter to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Harrington said that he had turned to the Foreign Affairs Committee chairman “as a last resort, having despaired of the likelihood of anything productive occurring as a result of the avenues I have already pursued.”

Mr. Harrington noted that the subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs had held five hearings on human rights in Chile since the junta came to power, with testimony from only one State Department witness with full knowledge of the clandestine C.I.A. activity.

And that witness, Harry W. Shlaudeman, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, refused to testify about agency activities, Mr. Harrington wrote.

He urged Mr. Morgan to call for a full-scale public investigation of the Nixon Administration's involvement in Chile. Mr. Morgan could not be reached for comment, nor could it be learned whether he had responded to Mr. Harrington's letter.

The Foreign Affairs Committee will begin sessions next week on the Administration's foreign military-aid requests, committee aides said. Amendments have been offered calling

SANTIAGO, Sept. 8—The report from Washington that the Central Intelligence Agency had allocated \$11 million between 1964 and 1973 to support anti-leftist political action in Chile caused no excitement here today.

Reports of CIA financial involvement in Chilean politics have been so persistent in the past 10 years that they were accepted as fact by many politically aware Chileans long before a military coup deposed leftist President Salvador Allende last year.

On this warm, sunny Sunday, no government official could be located to comment on the report.

Radio stations did not mention the report in their news broadcasts, although international news agencies sent the news to their Chilean subscribers.

There was no certainty that Santiago's government-controlled newspapers would publish news of the report, printed today in the United States on the basis of secret testimony before a congressional committee by William Colby, the director of the CIA.

As long ago as 1970, just after Allende was elected president as the candidate of a leftist coalition, Chileans in the upper levels of several political parties believed that foreign funds had come into their country at campaign time from several sources.

Christian Democrats, then at the end of six years in power under President Eduardo Frei, admitted that their party had been supported by Christian Democratic parties in Germany and Italy. The conservative National Party claimed that the left had received funds from Communist and Socialist parties abroad.

An executive of an American copper company in Santiago said privately that his company had contributed campaign funds to non-leftist candidates in the campaign just ended.

There was little evidence to connect the CIA with Allende's political opposition until the disclosure in 1972 that the ITT conglomerate had of-

fered \$1 million to the CIA for use against Allende. The Chilean government printed a paperback translation of all the ITT documents released by Washington columnist Jack Anderson and later brought out a comic book version of the ITT conspiracy.

According to the transcript of Colby's testimony cited by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) in his request for a congressional investigation of CIA involvement in Chile, \$5 million for “political destabilization efforts” and \$500,000 for opposition politicians had been authorized between Allende's election and 1972. In Chile, rumors that CIA funds were being channeled to the opposition grew that year.

After the nationalization of American copper companies, large Chilean companies and banks, Allende's economic policies began affecting the middle class in 1972. First shopkeepers and truck owners, then bureaucrats and professional men reacted with the first of two waves of strikes that were to spread civil unrest and economic disorder through the country.

The strike leaders denied, then, and again during the strikes that preceded Allende's downfall last year, accusations from the left that they were being financed by the CIA. However, this year, one of the men involved in organizing both series of strikes indicated that CIA funds had been available.

“We never used them, we never got any,” said Vicente Kovacevic, an officer of the Chilean small businessmen's federation, in an interview in April. Kovacevic, an anti-Communist Yugoslav emigre to Chile, had helped to guide the shopkeepers' group through the 1972 and 1973 strikes.

“Friends I had from other organizations came back from abroad and asked us if we had got our share,” he added. “They said the money had been allocated by the CIA for all the unions in the strike, and some of it should have gone to us.”

Washington Star-News

Monday, September 9, 1974

# Kissinger Supervised Anti-Allende Moves

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Star-News Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger presided over every meeting of the "40 Committee" when the covert arm of the National Security Council authorized expenditure of millions of dollars from 1970 to 1973 against the election and rule of Chile's late Marxist president Salvador Allende, U.S. officials said today.

Kissinger was President Nixon's national security adviser in the period from 1969 until late summer 1973 when the "40 Committee" authorized funds for individuals, anti-Allende political parties and news media in Chile, these officials said. From 1964 until 1973, the total authorization for clandestine operations against the Marxist leader and his coalition of parties was more than \$8 million.

"He chaired every meeting of the committee from the moment he came to town," an official said, adding that the Central Intelligence Agency did nothing in Chile that the "40 Committee" had not authorized.

Spokesmen for Kissinger, who became secretary of state last September 26 just 15 days after the Chilean military overthrew Allende, said the secretary was aware of the new disclosures but no comment was expected until today.

**THE INFORMED** sources available to the Star-News said not all of the money authorized for

expenditure was used. The funds used to support anti-Allende politicians, press and radio during the presidential election of 1970, the congressional bi-election of 1972 and to "destabilize" the Allende regime were cut off when it appeared in mid-1973 that a military coup d'etat was imminent.

These sources claimed that the CIA and the money made available to it played no role in supporting the armed forces uprising on Sept. 11, 1973, in which Allende allegedly committed suicide when his La Moneda palace was attacked by the military rebels. Kissinger was testifying at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the height of the Sept. 11 fighting before collapse of the Allende government.

The anti-Allende decisions of the "40 Committee" and the CIA's role in carrying them out were disclosed by CIA Director William E. Colby in secret testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence last April 22. The tenor of Colby's testimony, made public over the weekend by the New York Times and Washington Post, was that the "40 Committee" targeted the funds to prevent Allende's election in 1964 and 1970 and to "destabilize" his government after 1970.

It is believed that the bulk of the money went to subsidize Christian Democratic President Eduardo

Frei in 1964, the campaign of conservative National Party leader Arturo Alessandri in 1970 and subsequent "destabilization" efforts. Frei won the 1964 campaign but Allende led a three-man race in 1970 with less than two percentage points, or 36 percent of the vote, over Alessandri. Subsequently, Allende was named president by the Chilean Congress in a runoff vote in which the CIA funds were liberally employed among Chilean politicians and press and radio outlets.

**MANY DETAILS** of Colby's testimony appear in a letter written by Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D-Mass., to House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Thomas E. Morgan, D-Pa. Harrington's letter appeals for further hearings on the CIA role against Allende. CIA spokesmen said the agency had nothing to do with the revolution.

But Colby's candid testimony to the House committee was taking place last April while the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations was hearing sworn declarations from U.S. officials that Washington's 1970 election policy in Chile was one of non-intervention.

Both former Ambassador Edwin M. Korry and Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer swore that the United States did nothing to pressure politicians or buy anti-Allende votes. The Senate hearing brought testimony that the

International Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the CIA discussed plans for expenditure of \$1 million in the 1970 election but denials that the plan was ever carried out.

The general posture of the State Department in the 1969-1973 period was that it would be better for the United States to adopt a hands-off attitude toward Chile on the theory that Allende and his Marxist coalition would be so destructive of the national economy as to preclude any chance of another electoral victory there. Kissinger was quoted in this period as observing ironically that, "Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica."

**KISSINGER** testified at his confirmation hearing that the CIA had nothing to do with the coup last September. Other sources independent of Kissinger have supported the claim that the coup was launched by the Chilean military without cooperation or prior knowledge of the U.S. government or the CIA.

But before the coup, officials say there was a strong division between Kissinger in the White House and the State Department on what ought to be done about Chile.

Kissinger was portrayed by sources close to the affair as having consistently taken a harder line against Chile than the State Department in deliberations of the "40 Committee".

## THE ECONOMIST

31 AUG 1974

## Crying wolf

FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT

If it's a really different holiday you are looking for this summer, try the north-west corner of Spain. But bring a shotgun. For the big news there, in General Franco's native Galicia, is of wolves. Since the beginning of July, Gallego villagers have shot about 40 of them. Every day brings fresh accounts of sheep, calves and dogs being devoured and farmers chased up trees. The papers tell of panic and even "psychosis" in some areas.

Zoologists are baffled. It's against all the rules, they say, for wolves to approach human settlements in summer. Perhaps, say local farmers, a new wolf generation is emerging that doesn't respect rules. Some people suspect a publicity stunt for one of those English horror-films. Strangely, no one has yet blamed the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some silly-season newspaper articles here, however, have been trying to link the

CIA with a mysterious sea-wolf—the 3,000-ton yacht *Apollo*, which potters around the coasts of Spain, Portugal and Morocco heavily laden with communications gadgetry. It flies a Panamanian flag and belongs to something called the Operation Transport Corporation.

The *Apollo* was anchored off Lisbon during Portugal's coup in April, and subsequently the liberal Portuguese weekly *Expresso* alleged that the yacht was in the service of the CIA. The Spanish monarchist daily *ABC* then revealed that the Spaniards have been watching the boat closely since 1969, when it allegedly strayed into Spanish "naval waters". Another Spanish paper reported that the *Apollo* called at a port in Andalusia the day after Admiral Carrero Blanco was assassinated. It coupled this with the coincidental and unconfirmed information that Spanish security men had discovered clues suggesting that the prime minister's assassination was part of the country.

The *Apollo's* captain admits being in

Lisbon during the coup but denies the allegation about Andalusia. In Tenerife last week he allowed two Spanish journalists to look over the yacht. Crestfallen, they admitted to having encountered nothing abnormal—no false beards, no James Bond devices, not even a bugged cabaret girl. The well-heeled passengers spotted on board were following a floating management course, according to a friendly neighbourhood CIA man.

It is unlikely, however, that we have heard the last of the *Apollo*. Although one paper has reported that the yacht spent a fortnight off Galicia at the beginning of the summer, nobody has remarked on the intriguing coincidence of this visit and the beginning of the wolf upsurge. But suspicions are bound to be aroused by another sinister news item from Galicia: a truck driver who reported running into two strange animals. He killed one—it was nearly six feet long and weighed 150 lbs. The Guardia Civil in Ponferrada, where it was identified, provisionally, as an American jackal.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974

# Hearings Urged on C.I.A.'s Role in Chile

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

BEVERLY, Mass., Sept. 8—Representative Michael J. Harrington called today for full-scale public hearings into the central intelligence agency's clandestine operations against the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile.

In an interview at his home here, Mr. Harrington said he would formally request the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which he is a member, to summon Secretary of State Kissinger and William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify about the Chilean policy of the United States.

The New York Times reported today that Mr. Colby told a House committee in April that the C.I.A. was authorized to spend more than \$8-million clandestinely from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for President Allende to govern. The Allende Government was overthrown in a violent military coup on Sept. 11, 1973, in which the Chilean leader died.

## Kissinger's Role

In calling for hearings, Mr. Harrington declared that one reason senior officials in Congress were reluctant to investigate Chilean policy was what he termed a "disinclination" to turn up facts that might reflect adversely on Mr. Kissinger.

"Without knowing anything at all about Mr. Kissinger's role in all of this," Mr. Harrington said, "Congress is hesitating because of fear that they'll run into Kissinger."

"It's obvious to me," he added, "that the role played by Kissinger is going to be of significance in the evaluation of how the policy toward Chile evolved. But there's a disinclination in Congress to even get into some areas that might peripherally damage or embarrass Kissinger."

In his testimony before a House subcommittee on intelligence last April 22, Mr. Colby noted that all of the C.I.A.'s efforts against President Allende were directly approved by the 40 committee, a high-level intelligence review committee that has been headed by Mr. Kissinger since the beginning of the Nixon Administration in early 1969.

"We're not going to undo what happened in Chile," Mr. Harrington said today, "but we must examine the role of the intelligence community in foreign policy."

"When you look at the Colby testimony, you'll see that the notion of Congressional oversight of the C.I.A. is passive, bystandish, totally ineffective."

Mr. Harrington's public call today for hearings was his latest in a series of attempts, most of them in private, to force senior members of the Senate and House to begin a review of the Central Intelligence Agency's Chilean policy.

The C.I.A. report published today was based in part on a confidential seven-page letter Mr. Harrington wrote in mid-July to Representative Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which Mr. Colby's testimony was summarized. The Times received a copy of the letter from an outside source.

Mr. Harrington said today that he had sent a similar letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In his letter to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Harrington complained that he had discussed Mr. Colby's testimony with other members of the committee and concluded that there would be no "further investigations or hearings into the broader policy questions that such activities pose."

So far, Mr. Harrington said today, Mr. Morgan has refused to permit such hearings, arguing that the Foreign Affairs Committee does not have the authority to pursue questions of C.I.A. activities.

"Kissinger and Colby should testify," Mr. Harrington maintained. "It's just insane to suggest that a foreign affairs committee has no authority to conduct such hearings."

Mr. Harrington refused to characterize Mr. Fulbright's response to his letter, but a Senate source said later today that the Arkansas Democrat had told the Congressman that he could see "no useful purpose" in reopening the Foreign Relations Committee hearings into Chile.

"What this really means," the Senate source said, "is that he doesn't want to take Kissinger on head on because it could mean exposing the fact that Kissinger himself was the man who controlled and directed the policy of using covert action to make it impossible for Allende to govern."

Mr. Harrington, a liberal Democrat who was first elected to Congress in 1969, praised Mr. Colby's testimony as "The most direct, unambiguous and to the point I've ever seen." He was permitted to review the still classified 48-page Chilean transcript in June by Representative Lucien M. Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence.

Mr. Harrington recalled today that his initial reaction after reading the account was one of "profound shock."

"I did not expect to see the documentation of theories I hadn't held myself," he said. "I'd never subscribed to the conspiracy theories 'about the United States' involvement in the disintegration of the Allende Government."

"Colby's testimony may have been matter-of-fact," Mr. Harrington added, "but it also was almost clinical—as if you had a well-trained surgeon called in to describe procedures. You didn't get the feeling that there was any element of right or wrong that went into the decisions about what to do."

WASHINGTON STAR  
10 September 1974

# Hill to Investigate CIA Acts in Chile Against Allende

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Star-News Staff Writer

Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations, is expected to reopen hearings on U.S. clandestine operations in Chile following disclosure that the so-called "40 Committee" of the National Security Council authorized expenditure of millions of dollars against the late Marxist Salvador Allende between 1964 and 1973.

Church is expected by Capitol Hill sources to confer with other subcommittee members and staff to decide what to do about discrepancies in the testimony given before several committees on Chile by officials of the State Department and the CIA.

One Senate source said, "Someone obviously has been lying about the U.S. role in Chile." Several officials indicated Church is virtually certain to order an immediate investigation by the subcommittee staff and follow that up by reopening the hearings. Church could not be reached for comment.

CIA DIRECTOR William E. Colby testified last April that the "40 Committee," chaired by Henry A. Kissinger, who is now secretary of state, authorized expenditure of nearly \$11 million by the CIA to subsidize news media and politicians against Allende in 1964 and again in the 1970 election period to bar his ascendancy to the presidency.

Colby also testified in secret session before a House Armed Services Committee that funds were authorized as late as the summer of 1973 to "destabilize" the regime of Allende.

But at the same time last April, then-Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer told the Church subcommittee under oath that the

United States pursued a policy of nonintervention in Chilean affairs during the Allende period. His successor, Jack B. Kubisch, now ambassador to Greece, and Deputy Asst. Secretary Harry Shlaudeman gave similar testimony to House committees.

(An official familiar with Meyer's testimony told the Star-News the former assistant secretary attended some meetings of the "40 Committee" but that the State Department's representative was U. Alexis Johnson. This official said Meyer gave "scrupulously honest" answers at the Church subcommittee hearings but was not asked questions that would have required replies acknowledging what the United States was doing in Chile in the 1970 electoral period. Neither did he volunteer information which would have brought the matter to light.

(The U.S. funds were used to support anti-Allende political parties and the anti-Allende newspaper, El Mercurio. But Meyer was not asked specifically about these enterprises, the official said. Meyer's statement that the United States "bought no votes, funded no candidates and promoted no coups" was literally accurate.)

KISSINGER'S only known testimony on intervention in Chile was given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last September during his confirmation hearings. He denied that the United States played any role in the coup d'etat of last Sept. 11 but apparently was not asked about previous covert activities against Allende. However, U.S. sources said yesterday Kissinger presided over every meeting of the "40 Committee" from the moment he became President Nixon's national security adviser in 1969.

State Department spokes-

WASHINGTON POST  
10 September 1974

# U.S. Again Denies Anti-Allende Policy

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

man Robert Anderson did not directly answer a question yesterday as to whether Kissinger saw any inconsistency in his role as chairman of the "40 Committee" and as secretary of state in charge of overt foreign policy. Anderson gave reporters a list of the membership of the "40 Committee" and said that all decisions of the committee are unanimous. Further, he said, all "40 Committee" decisions are approved by the President and there is "a regular procedure to convey these decisions" on intelligence activities to the appropriate congressional committees.

WASHINGTON POST  
11 September 1974

## W. C. Regan, Senior CIA Officer, 52

William Charles Regan, 52, a senior officer with the Central Intelligence Agency, died Saturday of a heart attack while visiting in New Market, Va.

Born in New York City, Mr. Regan graduated from Regis Preparatory School there and from Fordham University.

He served as a captain in the U.S. Army in World War II and was attached to the Office of Strategic Services on duty in the China-Burma-India theater. He received the Bronze Star for participation in two hazardous missions.

Mr. Regan attended the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth and was a colonel in the Army Reserve at the time of his death.

He had been with the CIA and its predecessors since 1946.

He is survived by his wife, Lorraine, and five daughters, Kathleen, Susan, Anne, Ellen and Mary Elizabeth, all of the home, 6707 Dean Dr., McLean; his mother, Florence C. Regan, of Merrick, Long Island; a brother, Thomas, and a sister, Gertrude, of Massachusetts, and another sister, Eileen, of New York.

The State Department found itself in the center of a growing congressional furor yesterday over the disclosure that some \$11 million in U.S. funds had been authorized for covert political action against the late Chilean president, Salvador Allende.

In the face of new charges that it misled Congress on the issue of U.S. intervention in Chile, a State Department spokesman yesterday stood by sworn testimony of officials on Capitol Hill that the United States pursued a policy of non-intervention during the Allende period.

The new round of controversy over U.S. policy on Chile was triggered by the disclosure Sunday that CIA Director William E. Colby acknowledged to a House Armed Services subcommittee last April 22 that \$3 million in covert funds was targeted against Allende's candidacy in 1964 and more than \$8 million was authorized to block his 1970 election and "destabilize" his government between 1970 and September, 1973, when he was overthrown.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), chairman of a Senate Refugee subcommittee which is investigating human rights violations in Chile, said yesterday that the disclosure of CIA funding of Allende's opposition "represents not only a flagrant violation of our alleged policy of non-intervention in Chilean affairs but also an appalling lack of forthrightness with the Congress."

He noted that covert political funding, such as was acknowledged by Colby, "has been denied time and time again by high officials of the Nixon and now Ford administration."

Kennedy called for full congressional investigation of the discrepancies in the official versions of what the United States did in Chile during the Allende period.

Jerome Levinson, counsel for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's multinational corporations subcommittee, said "there is no doubt that we were misled" by State Department witnesses who testified last year that the United States had not undertaken covert activities against Allende.

Levinson said he will raise the issue of whether the subcommittee's hearings on Chile should be reopened when chairman Frank Church re-

turns from campaigning in Idaho. It will be up to the subcommittee to decide whether it wants to extend the inquiry to investigate sharp public discrepancies in the testimony.

The former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Charles A. Meyer, gave sworn testimony to the subcommittee March 29, 1973, that "the policy of the government... was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile.... We financed no candidates, no political parties...."

Last June 12 Acting Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee: "Despite pressures to the contrary the U.S. government adhered to a policy of non-intervention in Chile's affairs during the Allende period. That policy remains in force today...."

When pressed by Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.) on whether "you are prepared today to deny an assertion that the U.S. funneled money covertly to opposition parties following the 1970 election in Chile," Shlaudeman responded: "I am not...."

Fraser, chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on international organizations, charged yesterday that "the executive branch had deceived the Congress as well as the public with respect to its involvement in the overthrow of the Allende regime."

Yesterday State Department spokesman Robert Anderson said that "we stand by the statements that have been made in the past." He declined to confirm or deny the report of Colby's testimony published Sunday in The Washington Post.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger similarly declined yesterday through a spokesman to respond to Colby's testimony, which was recounted in a confidential letter from Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) appealing for further congressional inquiry into covert operations in Chile.

Kissinger was chairman of a meeting of the "Forty Committee" on June 27, 1970 when the question of covert political action against Allende was taken up. Kissinger, according to records of the proceeding, favored a limited and thoroughly concealed program of intervention.

cording to sources with access to inter-departmental records of the deliberations, opposed CIA intervention in the Allende election but abandoned its opposition when President Nixon ratified a limited program of intervention for which some \$350,000 to \$400,000 was authorized by the Forty Committee.

Kissinger was quoted in minutes of the June 27 top-secret meeting at the White House as having said: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

A spokesman for the Secretary said yesterday that Mr. Kissinger had no recollection of having made such an observation and would not comment on his role in the deliberations.

Colby's closed testimony to the House Armed Service subcommittee, as recounted in the Harrington letter, was that the CIA's role in the 1970 Chilean election was that of a "spoiler" engaged in "general attempts to politically destabilize the country and discredit Allende to improve the likelihood that an opposition candidate would win."

The Forty Committee, which is an inter-departmental White House panel supervising all U.S. covert operations, authorized a steady outpouring of funds into Chile through individuals, political parties and news media through Latin American and European channels during the anti-Allende effort, according to the summary of Colby's testimony.

Kissinger had, on various occasions, expressed personal reservations about the emergence of the Allende government, which was committed to a program of nationalization and income redistribution.

After Allende's popular election in September, 1970, but before the congressional run-off, Kissinger told a group of editors at the White House that "it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government...."

"So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and pro-U.S. forces in Latin America...."

But Kissinger added that the situation was not one "in which our capacity for influence is very great at this par-



NEW YORK TIMES  
10 September 1974

# State Department Backs Reports of a Hands-Off Policy on Chile

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 9—In a dispute that could lead to further hearings, the State Department declared today that it was standing by the testimony of senior officials who previously had asserted at Congressional hearings that the United States had not intervened in the internal affairs of Chile after the election of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

The challenged testimony was officially endorsed by the State Department spokesman, Robert Anderson, at a news briefing. His statement came two days after it was reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had been authorized to spend more than \$8-million from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for President Allende to govern. The Allende Government was overthrown last September in a military coup d'état.

In the last two days, a Massachusetts Representative and a Senate aide have attacked the credibility of testimony given under oath by Charles A. Meyer, former Assistant Secretary of State; Edward M. Korry, former Ambassador to Chile, and Harry W. Shlaudeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry both maintained at a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing last year into the International Telephone & Telegraph Company's involvement in Chile that the Nixon Administration had scrupulously adhered to a policy of nonintervention. Mr. Shlaudeman similarly told a House Foreign

Affairs subcommittee in June that the United States "had nothing to do with the political destabilization in Chile."

Jerome L. Levinson, chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which conducted the I.T.T. hearings, last week accused Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry of having deliberately deceived the Senate. Representative Michael J. Harrington, a Democratic member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, charged that Mr. Shlaudeman was evading questions and, in effect, dissembling by refusing to testify about C.I.A. activities against the Allende Government.

Asked about those criticisms today, Mr. Anderson said, "With regard to the testimony that was given on the Hill by Mr. Shlaudeman and Mr. Meyer and others, we stand by that."

"I realize there have been allegations to the contrary," Mr. Anderson added, "and if any such allegations are presented, obviously we will be very pleased to review the testimony. But we are unaware of any misstatements by the officers that you referred to."

Mr. Levinson, reached later today in his Senate office, asserted that he would "stand on what I said."

## New Hearings Possible

"A reading of the record by any fair-minded person has to lead one to the conclusion that they were not candid with the subcommittee," he said.

The words used by Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry were artful in terms of dodging, but

in substance and spirit the intent was to deceive."

The subcommittee counsel said he was planning to confer tomorrow with Senator Frank Church, chairman of the subcommittee, to determine whether further hearings would be necessary. Mr. Church, who is up for re-election this fall, was said to be campaigning in Idaho today and could not be reached for comment.

In testimony before the Church subcommittee last year, Mr. Meyer and Mr. Korry repeatedly asserted that the United States policy was one of nonintervention, although both men claimed executive privilege in refusing to discuss confidential State Department and White House communications.

Mr. Korry, who was Ambassador at the time Dr. Allende won the presidency in 1970, testified as follows in response to a question from Mr. Levinson about his instructions:

"It was obvious from the historical record that we did not act in any manner that reflected a hard line; that the United States had maintained the most total hands-off the military policy from 1969 to 1971 conceivable; that the United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress at any time in the entire four years of my stay."

However, according to still-secret testimony supplied for Congress earlier this year by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, the United States authorized \$1-million in clandestine funds in 1969 and

1970 in an attempt to keep Dr. Allende from winning the general elections, and then spent an additional \$350,000 in the fall of 1970 in an attempt to bribe members of the Chilean Congress not to ratify his election.

Mr. Meyer, who was in charge of Latin-American affairs in the State Department at the time of the coup d'état, similarly testified a few days later that "we were religiously and scrupulously adhering to the policy of the Government of the United States . . . of nonintervention. We bought no votes, we funded no candidates, we promoted no coups."

Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyer could not be reached for comment today.

Mr. Shlaudeman, while refusing to discuss C.I.A. activities in public testimony, also emphasized the United States' "policy of nonintervention"

during his appearance June 12 before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.

In that testimony, Mr. Shlaudeman quoted Secretary of State Kissinger as having declared that "we prefer democratic governments and attempt to exercise our influence to that end; but we also know we cannot impose our political and legal structures on others."

Mr. Shlaudeman, who spent four years in Chile before being reassigned to Washington last year, said "I certainly do" late this afternoon when asked whether he stood by his House testimony.

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 September 1974

## Censored Matter in Book About C.I.A. Said to Have Related Chile Activities

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 10—The Central Intelligence Agency, citing national security, censored the first printed account of some of the agency's clandestine activities against President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile from a recently published exposé of the intelligence establishment, well-informed sources said today.

The sources said that the book, "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence," written by two former Government intelligence officials, initially included a detailed description of the internal debates in 1970 before the Nixon Administration reportedly tried covertly to prevent Mr. Allende's victory in the Chilean national elections of September, 1970.

After a lengthy battle in Federal Courts, over prior censorship, the 434-page book was

published in June by Alfred A. Knopf with blank space where 168 passages were deleted. Much of the chapter dealing with Chile, titled "the Clandestine theory", was heavily censored in that manner.

The C.I.A. had argued that those deletions and 177 other passages it unsuccessfully sought to censor would "cause grave and irreparable damage to the U.S." if published.

As initially written, the sources said, the book's chapter on Chile began with the following quote from Henry Kissinger, who was then serving as adviser on national security to President Richard M. Nixon:

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

According to the book, Mr. Kissinger made the comment while chairman of a meeting of the secret "40 Committee," the high-level review panel that

oversees and authorizes clandestine C.I.A. activities. The meeting took place on June 27, 1970, according to the sources, a few months before the Marxist leader won the Presidential election.

Thus far Secretary of State Kissinger has refused to comment publicly on the reports published Sunday that the Central Intelligence Agency, acting at the specific direction of the Nixon Administration, was authorized to spend more than \$8-million between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for President Allende to govern. The Allende Government was overthrown last September in a military coup d'état in which the Chilean leader died.

Shortly after the coup, Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the coup to the best of my knowledge and belief." Other Government officials, in their

particular moment now that matters have reached this particular point."

It was during this period that the CIA and International Telephone and Telegraph Co. sought actively to undermine Allende's prospects for election, according to testimony that emerged last year before the Senate Foreign Relations multinational subcommittee and most recently corroborated in far greater detail by CIA Director Colby.

Harrington, whose letter reviewed the controversy over U.S. policy in Chile, said he would renew his requests to Morgan and other congressional chairmen for a full inquiry into the extent of CIA intervention against Allende's elected government.

"I strongly support the broad initiatives of the Nixon and Kissinger foreign policy," he said. "But I do not think we should tolerate the standard of international conduct we displayed in Chile whether it was approved by Henry Kissinger or anyone else."

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 September 1974

## Senator Church to Press C.I.A. Issue

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11—

Declaring that deception of Congress has become "a habit," Senator Frank Church said today he would turn over any misleading testimony in the hearings on policy toward Chile to the Justice Department for investigation into possible perjury.

"I'm not going to let this matter slide by," Mr. Church said in a telephone interview today. "I'm very much incensed by this."

### 2 High Aides Testified

It was the Idaho Democrat's first public comment on the subject since it was reported Sunday that the Central Intelligence Agency had been secretly authorized to spend more than \$8-million between 1970 and 1973 in a covert attempt to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern in Chile.

Mr. Church is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which held highly publicized hearing last year into the International Telephone & Telegraph Company's attempts to urge United States intervention against the Allende regime. Mr. Allende was overthrown by a military junta in a bloody coup d'état one year ago today.

During those hearings, the

State Department officials, Charles A. Meyer, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, and Edward M. Korry, a former Ambassador to Chile, testified that the United States had maintained a policy of nonintervention toward Chile.

The two officials also refused on a number of occasions during their testimony to answer specific questions about what they said were privileged communications on United States policy toward Dr. Allende.

Mr. Church, who returned late yesterday from a lengthy campaign trip to Idaho, said he had authorized the subcommittee staff to review testimony of Government witnesses who knew of the intelligence agency's clandestine activities.

If the staff review determines that there were contradictions in their testimony, the Senator said, "in my judgment the action that would be called for would be to refer the testimony to the Justice Department for investigation of possible perjury."

That's the reason we swear in witnesses," he said.

### Details Given by Colby

To aid in the staff review, Mr. Church said, he will formally request a copy of the testimony on the agency's Chilean involvement given to a House of Representatives Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee in April by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence.

Government officials have confirmed that the still-secret testimony includes a detailed discussion of the C.I.A.'s goals and strategy in alloting the \$8-million cash payments.

"Apart from the question of whether perjury was committed in a legal sense," Mr. Church added, "there's no question but what the committee was given to believe that our policy was one of nonintervention."

"This is clearly what they [the witnesses] wanted us to believe, even though the truth was a very different matter," he said.

### 'Vietnam Syndrome' Seen

Mr. Church, a liberal who was one of the early critics of the Vietnam war, characterized the misleading testimony as "part of the Vietnam syndrome."

"There's become a pattern of deceiving the Congress that I think began cropping up during the Vietnam war," he said. "It became a habit with testimony on all sensitive matters. If so, it's a habit the Congress is going to have to break."

Along with the study of possible perjury, Mr. Church said he would formally request the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator J. W. Fulbright, now in China, to review "the propriety" of clandestine activities against constitutionally elected leaders such as Mr. Allende.

appearances before Congressional committees, have gone further, insisting that the Administration followed a policy of nonintervention toward the Allende regime.

Mr. Kissinger has been described by a number of officials with first-hand knowledge as having been among those most alarmed in the Nixon Administration about Mr. Allende's rise to power.

At a background meeting with newsmen in Chicago on Sept. 16, 1970, shortly after the election of Mr. Allende, Mr. Kissinger declared that "an Allende take-over in Chile would present massive problems for us, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere."

If the Chilean Congress were to ratify the election, Mr. Kissinger added, "in a major Latin American country you would have a Communist government, joining, for example, Argentina, which is already deeply divided along a long frontier, joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more left, anti-U. S. direction."

### 'A Close Look'

He told the newsmen then: "We are taking a close look at the situation. It is not one in which our capacity for influence is very great."

According to still-classified House testimony last April by the Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby, the intelligence agency was authorized by the 40 Committee to spend \$500,000 in 1970 to head off Mr. Allende's popular election, and was later provided with \$350,000 to bribe members of the Chilean Congress who nonetheless voted in October to ratify the election.

A number of officials cautioned in interviews today that the C.I.A.'s efforts against Mr. Allende were—as one source put it—"much more passive than you'd think" from the published newspaper accounts.

"We were just trying to bail out people who were under the gun from Allende and his supporters," one, well-informed source said.

### Most Backed Frei

Most of those who were aided, the source added, had been supporters of the former President, Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had received heavy C.I.A. subsidies while running for office in 1964 against Mr. Allende.

"Don't forget," the source added, "the whole idea in the nineteen sixties was what we called 'nation building' and it worked. Frei would have won re-election easily."

"It's a shame their Constitution prevented his re-election," the source added. Under Chilean law, Mr. Frei could not be a candidate for re-election in 1970.

According to another well-informed source who received "The C.I.A. and the Cult of Intelligence" before it appeared, a somewhat similar

account of the decision to intervene in Chile was presented the two authors, Victor Marchetti, a former C.I.A. official and John D. Marks, a former State Department intelligence analyst.

The C.I.A. later censored a part of the book in which, a source said, the C.I.A. was depicted as having been divided about the proposals to invest funds secretly against Mr. Allende. Officials at C.I.A. headquarters were said by Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to be concerned because of the possibility that a sudden spurt in spending against Mr. Allende would be traceable to Washington.

In addition, the source said, the original Marchetti-Marks manuscript described what was depicted as a serious dispute over the Chilean policy between Edward M. Korry, who served as Ambassador to Chile from 1967 until 1971, and Charles A. Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Affairs. The book depicted Mr. Korry as having been concerned that he would be considered after Mr. Allende's election as the ambassador who permitted Chile to be taken over by a Castro-type figure, the source added.

Mr. Meyer, an official with Sears, Roebuck & Co., in Chicago, could not be reached today for comment.

Mr. Korry, contacted today at his home in Briarcliff Manor, N. Y., declared that he was standing by his testimony last year to a Senate subcommittee in which he stated that the United States maintained a policy of nonintervention toward the Allende Government.

"I'm not ducking anybody on this," Mr. Korry said. "I stand on all the statements I have given." He added that he had sent a lengthy letter to The New York Times explaining his position and said he would prefer not to comment further pending receipt of the letter.

Although Mr. Kissinger has not spoken publicly on the Chilean issue, he did authorize to newsmen yesterday the fact that the 40 Committee only acted upon the unanimous approval of its five members.

They include Mr. Kissinger, the Central Intelligence Director, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Anderson said.

All 40 Committee decisions must be approved by the President before being put into effect, Mr. Anderson said.



11 SEP 1974

# Chilean generals unfazed by report of CIA aid in Allende ouster

## But disclosure causes furore in Washington

By James Nelson Goodsell  
Latin America correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

One year after seizing power, Chile's military leaders have settled in for a long stay.

But they celebrate their first anniversary in office Sept. 11 amid a sudden mushrooming of evidence that the United States Central Intelligence Agency, contrary to previous denials, spent millions of dollars from 1970 to 1973 to "destabilize" the government they ousted.

One of the reasons they cited for the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens was the escalating political and economic chaos in Chile that Dr. Allende seemed unable to cope with.

Now, it appears that at least part of that chaos was sponsored by the CIA.

### Authorization reported

CIA director William Colby, in testimony to a House subcommittee, reportedly confirmed that his agency had been authorized to spend as much as \$8 million in an effort to make it impossible for Dr. Allende to govern.

The Colby testimony went counter to sworn testimony of senior State Department officials, and spokesman Robert Anderson reiterated Tuesday denials that the department was involved in attempts to subvert the Allende regime. But there have been no denials of CIA involvement.

Suspicious of such involvement have made the rounds over the years.

Although the Colby testimony made hardly a ripple in Chile after its disclosure Sunday, it is causing a furor in Washington.

There is a feeling that the testimony may only be the tip of the iceberg — that more disclosures will be forthcoming and that they may well implicate a variety of Nixon administration officials.

Already, there is question over Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's role in the CIA activities. As a key member of the National Security Council and the head of its "Forty Committee," he apparently played a role in approving the use of funds for the "destabilization" program in Chile.

Yet, in various statements, Dr. Kissinger has over the years been quoted as saying, in connection with Chile, that "we prefer democratic governments and attempt to exercise our influence to that end; but we also know we cannot impose our political and legal structures on others."

It is precisely this point that is put in doubt by the disclosures of CIA involvement in Chile.

Until the Colby testimony was disclosed over the weekend, the only confirmed anti-Allende activity by Washington was a United States-sponsored credit squeeze on the part of both Washington and international and hemisphere lending agencies.

That squeeze made it hard for Dr. Allende's Marxist-leaning government to obtain credit. But in a way, Washington could argue effectively that credits to Chile had dropped significantly in the last two years of the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva, which immediately preceded that of Dr. Allende, due to a feeling on the part of President Frei and the international lenders that Chile needed to expend already granted credits and begin repayments before a large new influx of credit was granted.

The Colby disclosures came in a confidential seven-page letter from Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D) of Massachusetts asking further congressional hearings on the CIA's role in the Sept. 11, 1973, military coup that toppled Dr. Allende's government.

That coup ended Dr. Allende's efforts to nudge Chile along the road to socialism and also ended Chile's long tradition of democratic government. Moreover, it was accompanied by a massive roundup of Allende supporters, escalating reports of the murder of thousands of Chileans, and imposition of a broad military dictatorship.

On the eve of the first anniversary of the military take-over, for example, Amnesty International, the London-based human rights organization, alleged that widespread torture and executions were continuing in Chile.

"The death roll of victims is unprecedented in recent Latin American history," the organization

charged. Moreover, it said, "there is little indication that the situation is improving or that a return to normality is intended."

Amnesty International estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 political prisoners were still being detained without trial in Chile. It added that they represented every sector of society from former Allende ministers to doctors, lawyers, trade unionists, and actors.

Worldwide reaction to events in Chile, as mirrored in the Amnesty International report, has been largely negative, prompting the military leaders headed by President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte to claim that a leftist public opinion campaign has been mounted against Chile.

But General Pinochet and his fellow military officers have indicated that they are worried about their image. And it is reported that the Chilean Government has hired the J. Walter Thompson agency in New York to start a public relations campaign designed to improve Chile's image.

That image may be hard to improve, however, until the military relax some of the curbs placed on Chile and Chileans in the past year — dissolution of Congress, ban on Marxist parties and the shutting down of all other political activity, the censorship of the press, and the abrogation of many civil rights.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Sept. 12, 1974

# CIA Chief Colby Facing Confrontation on Chile

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, the nation's pre-eminent spy, will come out of the cold into the heat of almost certain confrontation Friday over the issue of covert U.S. political operations in Chile.

Colby has agreed to appear at an unusual two-day conference of former agents, government officials and journalists on the subject of "The Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Actions."

The CIA director's appearance was scheduled before the disclosure Sunday of his executive session testimony on Congress last April that some \$11 million in covert action funds were authorized by the "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council and targeted against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) cranked up the Chile controversy another

turn yesterday with a letter to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger asking on what authorization the programs were carried out without notification to Congress. Kennedy also called State Department testimony denying U.S. intervention against the Allende government "misleading" and "deceptive" in the letter to Kissinger.

Colby, who rose through the ranks of the CIA's covert operations service to command of the agency, undertakes a daring public relations gamble in facing the audience of specialists on intelligence practices—most of them critical of the covert programs with which Colby has been associated through his professional lifetime.

During his year-and-a-half tenure as director, Colby has sought to improve contacts with Congress and the press in the aftermath of the battering the agency took during the unfolding of the Watergate scandal.

But the two day conference, sponsored by the Center for National Security

Studies, will subject Colby to one of the most informed and critical audiences to which he has been so far exposed.

Covert operations are carried out under general policy guidelines approved by the Forty Committee, a senior inter-departmental committee over which the President's national security adviser, Kissinger, presides. Colby is a member of the powerful but informal committee which meets under the auspices of the White House.

In recent statements the CIA director has emphasized the agency's subordinate role to the White House and the senior policy group whose name, until last year, was never in print and unknown to members of the agency's oversight committees on Capitol Hill.

The existence of the Forty Committee surfaced in connection with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Multinational Subcommittee in connection with the role of the CIA and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. in Chile.

Aside from the Chile case,

## Operations

the CIA faces the prospects of new revelations on the scope of covert U.S. operations under the management of the Forty Committee.

Former New York Times correspondent Tad Szulc, writing in the new issue of Esquire, gives an account of the CIA's role in support of South Africa's white supremacist regime. The New Yorker Magazine is coming out with an account of the CIA role in supporting the ousting of Cheddi Jagan, leader of Guyana's independence movement.

In England, former CIA operations officer Philip B.F. Agee has completed a manuscript detailing his day-to-day operations as a clandestine operative in three Latin-American countries—Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico. Agee's book is under contract with British Penguin and is expected to be published early next year.

LONDON TIMES

10 September 1974

## THE CIA LIVES UP TO ITS BAD NAME

The revelations about the CIA's activities in Chile under the Allende regime will come as no surprise to the many leftists and nationalists all over the world for whom the role of "imperialism" in Allende's downfall was always a foregone conclusion. But they are a bitter draught for those of us who cling to the notion of the "free world", and who still regard the United States as an irreplaceable ally—sometimes clumsy, often misunderstood, but fundamentally honourable in its conduct of international affairs.

Must it be believed? Unfortunately it seems that there is little alternative. The story appears in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and has already been confirmed by Representative Michael Harrington who has read the Secret testimony of the CIA director Mr Colby, and on whose letter to the chairman of the House foreign affairs committee the original story was based.

The question posed is not that of the merits of the Allende regime, which were on the whole outweighed by its demerits. Nor is it the much more debatable question whether those demerits were such as to justify the intervention by the CIA a year ago. The question is

not even whether the CIA's activities were a determining factor in bringing about Allende's downfall. Very probably they were not. The government's exaltation of the class struggle, its repeated circumvention or defiance of parliament and the courts, its connivance at the arms procurement and training activities of its supporters, its attempt to politicize the high command of the armed forces—these things against a background of three-figure inflation produced by its economic policies were probably bound to provoke a military response of some kind.

If United States policy did contribute to Allende's downfall, it did so more effectively by blocking loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank in reprisal for Chile's failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. This certainly accentuated Allende's economic problems, though it was by no means their sole cause. But one is not obliged to lend money to a regime that one dislikes, and if shortage of foreign credit is to be blamed for Chinese and East European

friends must share the blame, for they did little to help him.

But if the CIA's "destabilizing" activities were not even necessary, they merit Talleyrand's double condemnation: *pire qu'un crime, une faute*. Possibly the CIA foresaw that Allende's experiment would end in a military takeover, and was trying to strengthen the democratic opposition to him. If so, it failed. But whatever it thought, it was interfering in a matter which was none of its business: the internal politics of an independent state. It may be a proper function of American foreign policy to defend the interests of the Kennecott copper company, or to encourage foreign countries' attachment to democracy. But covert activity to "destabilize" the government of a foreign country in time of peace is not a proper method for achieving either of those ends. Its use can only detract from the credibility of American policy throughout the world and strengthen suspicions that would otherwise seem fantastic—such as that of American involvement in the coup against Archbishop Makarios. Dr Kissinger now has some very unpleasant questions to answer.

WASHINGTON STAR  
12 September 1974

# Plot to Beat Allende Laid to CIA

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Star-News Staff Writer

Rep. Michael J. Harrington, D-Mass., has charged that CIA activities in Chile against the government of President Salvador Allende were viewed by the agency as a "prototype or laboratory experiment" to test techniques of heavy financial investment to discredit and bring down a government.

The charge is contained in a letter to Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations committee two months ago and which was released today by Harrington.

In a press conference Harrington made public exchanges or correspondence between himself, Fulbright and other members of Congress about his concern over activities of CIA and the U.S. Treasury Department in Chile and the "quite limited" congressional review of CIA activities. Harrington charged these reviews are perfunctory and come after the fact.

IN HIS LETTER to Fulbright, Harrington described how the "40 Committee" headed by Henry A. Kissinger authorized expenditure of \$11 million from 1962 to 1973 to help prevent the election of Allende. He said CIA Director William

Colby's words in testimony before a House Armed Services subcommittee on the CIA disclose the CIA's intention was to "destabilize" the Allende government so as to precipitate its downfall.

Harrington wrote that, "funding was provided to individuals, political parties and media outlets in Chile through channels in other countries and in both Latin America and Europe. Mr. Colby's description of these operations was direct, though not to the point of identifying actual contacts and conduits."

Harrington charged the Colby testimony indicated the agency role in 1970 was viewed as that of the "spoiler" involving general attempts to politically destabilize the country and discredit Allende to improve the likelihood that an opposition candidate would win. Following the election of Allende, \$5 million was authorized by the 40 committee for more destabilization efforts from 1971 to 1973. An additional \$1.5 million was spent for the 1973 (Chilean) municipal elections. Some of these funds were used to support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper." (The Star-News has learned that this newspaper was El Mercurio, largest daily in Chile and the property of wealthy businessman

Augustin Edwards.)

IN A SEPARATE letter to Chairman Lucien Nedzi of the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence, Harrington charged that Colby indicated in testimony last April that the CIA "counselled the White House to rebuff attempts of President Allende to settle his differences with the United States. These and other related activities suggest that the agency departed from its proper role of intelligence gathering and, instead, participated in formulation of policies and events both in the United States and Chile which it was supposed to objectively analyze and report."

Fulbright responded on July 26, with a letter to Harrington in which the Arkansas Democrat said he shared Harrington's frustration.

"This has been going on in places other than Chile for many years," Fulbright wrote. "The Senate at least has been unwilling to exercise serious control of the CIA and apparently approves of the activities to which you refer in Chile and which I believe to be a procedure which the CIA has followed in other countries."

FULBRIGHT wrote that he believed creation of a Joint Committee with full authority to examine the

CIA and control it is the only practical answer.

"The Foreign Relations Committee," Fulbright wrote, "in a showdown never has sufficient votes to overcome the opposition of the forces led by the Armed Services Committee in the Senate but a Joint Committee I think would have sufficient prestige to exercise control."

Fulbright said he would be glad to join Harrington in sponsoring a renewed effort to create a Joint Committee on the Intelligence Community.

Harrington said it is indicative of his frustrations that in five meetings of the House subcommittee on inter-American affairs this year on human rights in Chile, only one government witness with knowledge of U.S. activities in Chile appeared.

That witness, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman indicated, Harrington said "some knowledge on his part of CIA activities that he was unwilling to discuss before a duly-constituted committee of the House."

Harrington added there are inherent limitations for members of Congress in trying to uncover covert activities such as those in Chile and he said the existing oversight machinery is illusory.

WASHINGTON POST  
16 September 1974

## CIA's Daily Reports Go Directly to Ford Now

By Michael Getler  
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a move that pleases U.S. intelligence officials, President Ford has reversed a policy of his predecessor and is now receiving his daily written report on global intelligence matters directly from the Central Intelligence Agency.

During the Nixon years, according to White House sources, the daily CIA current intelligence report for the President was generally received in the Oval Office either via Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who also serves as the President's national security adviser, or senior White House aides.

One result of this procedure, sources say, was that the

CIA was never sure precisely how much the President saw or read and what, if any, questions or comments he raised.

Though the switch under Mr. Ford may not bring any more information to the President's attention than in the past, many officials view the change as important in terms of assuring full access to the presidency for various important elements within the federal bureaucracy.

Mr. Ford began receiving his reports directly from the CIA during the period when he was Vice President, and

asked that the practice be continued after he assumed the presidency.

The intelligence report is said to be delivered by a middle-level CIA official. Sources say Kissinger's White House deputy on the National Security Council staff, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, is frequently present in the President's office when the CIA report is presented.

The CIA prepares a secret current intelligence report daily which gets fairly wide distribution throughout the government.

BALTIMORE SUN  
13 September 1974

# Study looks for U.S. lies about Allende

By DEAN MILLS

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Senator Frank Church, the most influential administration critic on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, initiated a study yesterday to determine whether State Department officials lied to various congressional committees about American involvement in the overthrow of the Chilean regime of Salvador Allende.

Aides to the Idaho Democrat said yesterday the senator instructed his staff to make the study.

They said it will be completed within a day or two, and the senator will then decide whether to call for new testimony on the question.

Meanwhile, at a press conference yesterday, Representative Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.), proposed that the Sen-

ate Foreign Relations Committee hold open hearings on the role of the United States in Chile during the Allende period.

He said that Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, should be called before the panel to give a public explanation of the role of the so-called "Forty Committee" in the overthrow of the Allende regime.

In his capacity as director of the National Security Council, Dr. Kissinger chaired the committee, which has responsibility for covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Harrington, citing secret testimony by William E. Colby, the CIA director, before a House Armed Services subcommittee in July, has charged that the CIA poured \$11 million into Chile from 1962 to 1973 to support Allende opponents and to "destabilize" the Allende government after it came to power.

In public testimony, State Department officials repeatedly have denied any American involvement in the overthrow of Dr. Allende.

In a letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright, (D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, released at the press conference, Mr. Harrington said that the Senate panel should study the possibility of lodging perjury charges against the officials.

"It is no longer acceptable," he said, "for the Congress to acquiesce in State Department officials' coming before congressional committees and making statements, which, if not outright lies, are at least evasions of the truth."

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) said at least three times in the last year State Department officials made "misleading and deceptive" statements to Congress about the American role in Chile, it was

disclosed.

In a letter to Dr. Kissinger, Senator Kennedy described the statements as "contrary to my understanding of the dual responsibility of Congress and the President in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations."

The Colby disclosures were the highlight of the opening of a conference on covert activities and the CIA, sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies.

Senator Phillip A. Hart (D., Mich.) opened the conference yesterday by urging Congress to explore the CIA role in Chile.

"We haven't done a damn thing . . . to prevent the President from waging secret wars," Senator Hart said. He said the Colby testimony "has more profound implications for our foreign policy than many international issues in which Congress has shown interest."

WASHINGTON POST  
11 September 1974

## Chile and Cuba

THE UNITED STATES has consistently denied using the CIA to fight leftist Salvador Allende in Chile. Yet, it now turns out, CIA director William E. Colby told a House committee last April that: The CIA gave \$3 million to the Allende political opposition in 1964 and \$500,000 more to "anti-Allende forces" in 1969. It authorized \$350,000 to bribe the Chilean congress against him in 1970, the year he won. It contributed \$5 million for "more destabilization efforts" in 1971-73 and \$1.5 million in by-elections in 1973. In August of that year, it authorized \$1 million for "further political destabilization activities." A coup ousted him, and he was killed, a year ago today.

The Colby revelations do not answer once and for all the question of whether, as the Latin left already believes, the United States destroyed Allende; some part of his difficulties were of his own making. Nor do the revelations demonstrate that the CIA had a direct hand in the coup. They prove beyond dispute, however, that the United States acted in a way to aggravate Mr. Allende's problems, and played into the hands of those who made the coup. We did so, moreover, deliberately: According to Mr. Colby, the anti-Allende acts were not the work of a mindless uncontrolled agency but of a CIA operating at the instructions of the appropriate White House review panel, the "Forty Committee," headed by Henry Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon, one gathers, had decided there were to be "no more Cubas": no more Marxist states in the western hemisphere. Any means, apparently, would do. Would it not be better, Dr. Kissin-

ger was asked at his confirmation hearing as Secretary of State a year ago, to take the CIA out of such clandestine efforts as overturning Latin governments? "There are certain types of these activities, difficult to describe here," the Secretary-designate replied, "that it would be dangerous to abolish."

This information comes to light now through the surfacing of a confidential letter from Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.), in which Mr. Harrington asks for a deeper investigation. Dr. Morgan, like his Senate counterpart, J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), has been reluctant to press such a probe. But it is laughable for Congress to assert a larger foreign-policy role if it is to shy away from this outrageous instance of hemispheric realpolitik. Last year, for instance, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on multinational corporations investigated charges that in 1970 ITT had sought to induce the CIA to block Allende. The subcommittee found that the CIA had not followed ITT's bidding. But now it turns out that—before, during and after the ITT episode—the CIA was intervening in Chilean politics.

Since the 1960s, the United States has used its influence to keep Cuba a hemispheric pariah. And why? A principal stated reason has been Cuba's ostensible support of subversion in Latin America: putting guerrillas ashore here and there, sounding the revolutionary trumpet, and the like. But whatever Cuba has allegedly done in the past is peanuts next to what the United States has admittedly done in Chile. To bar Cuba from hemispheric society on the basis of a test we fail ourselves is absurd.

LONDON TIMES  
11 September 1974  
Gung-ho

Victor Marchetti was an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency for 14 years, and a book of which he is co-author, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, is a *cause célèbre* in the American courts. Because the courts ruled that Marchetti was still bound by the oath of secrecy he made when he joined the CIA in 1955, the book has been published with about 5 per cent of its contents missing because of 168 deletions which the CIA still insist upon.

Marchetti was on a 24-hour visit to London yesterday. It is his first travel abroad since he left the Agency. "I knew the CIA would do anything they could to discredit me when I surfaced so I had to be purer than the driven snow. I have been followed, my telephone has been tapped, my mail has been tampered with, and there have been certain efforts toward entrapment. Foreigners have been put in my path, whom I have had to take care not to get involved with."

Marchetti does not believe the CIA masterminded the deaths of John Kennedy or Martin Luther King, and says he has no first-hand knowledge of any assassination attempts, though he has heard rumours. "During training we were told that anything like that would have to be approved at the highest level, and it would be a black mark against you. You would have to be a pretty lousy case officer if you could not find any way of terminating your agent without killing him."

Marchetti says he never liked his job much. "I always thought it was basically sort of silly. I could never quite get with the gung-ho aspects of it. When I did training they were very strong on paramilitary stuff as well as standard trade craft like how to open letters undetectably and how to plant bugs. I did not like a lot of the people I met."

Honesty is not a CIA characteristic. "They denied being involved in Chile, but it is now revealed that they did pour millions of dollars in to prevent Allende coming to power and then to destabilize his government. They consistently denied being involved in Greece, but Greece is a major station for many area programmes and they clearly backed the junta. Now they are moving assets out of Athens and on to Teheran where they have a safer station. The ambassador is the former director of the CIA, and the Shah owes his throne to the CIA."

PHS

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
11 SEP 1974

## CIA and Chile

Now the facts are coming to light. The Central Intelligence Agency was not the innocent bystander in Chile that the United States Government tried to imply it was at the time of the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

The CIA, it turns out, engaged for years in clandestine activities against the late Chilean President. CIA director William Colby acknowledged in secret testimony to the Congress that some \$8 million had been authorized by a high-level intelligence committee headed by Henry Kissinger to "destabilize" Allende's Marxist government and bring about its downfall after 1970.

The disclosures are shocking and dictate the urgent need for a public scrutiny of national security policies, a reform of CIA functions, and a system of strict accountability for CIA actions. They also point again to the deception practiced by previous administrations.

The State Department sticks by its guns. It stated this week it backs the testimony of high officials who previously told Congress that the U.S. had not intervened in the domestic affairs of Chile after Allende's election.

Clearly the full story has yet to be told. In light of the developing dispute we favor full-scale public hearings into the CIA's role in Chile, as called for by Congressman Michael Harrington.

This is not the first time the CIA has been involved in questionable covert operations against foreign states. Its record includes the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, the secret war in Laos, and efforts to overthrow governments in Iran and Guatemala. More recently, on the domestic front, it furnished the White House "plumbers" with technical aid and a psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg — acts that violated its mandate.

The record is disturbing.

However distasteful, clandestine operations sometimes are necessary. If a foreign power, for instance, is engaged in activities in a country that could impair American interests, it stands to reason the U.S. must know what it is up to. But gathering information and exposing Communist subversion, say, are one thing. Attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments are quite another.

A distressing aspect of all this is the double standard which the U.S. has set for its international conduct. It apparently is permissible for the CIA to maneuver against local governments which Washington does not like — this is deemed in the national interest. But when the U.S. declines to use its influence to dissuade repressive regimes from antidemocratic excesses — as in South Korea or Greece — this is justified as "non-interference" in another country's internal affairs.

If the CIA is permitted to abet the disintegration of constitutionally elected governments — however unpalatable their ideology — does not the U.S. lose its moral authority to condemn similar subversive action by a Communist power?

The Allende regime was hardly a model for Latin America. But the late President did carry on his Marxist experiment within the constitutional framework. If Washington chose not to render help — except to the Chilean military — that at least was an overt, if debatable, position.

But by colluding in the effort to undermine the Chilean Government by covert means, Washington has only helped destroy the credibility of the argument that Communists should participate in the democratic process rather than seek power through violent means.

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 September 1974

# Secret War on Chile

IN THE NATION

By Tom Wicker

On the very day that President Ford extended preventive pardon to Richard Nixon, another high crime of the Nixon Administration was being disclosed in The New York Times. Public outrage because of the pardon must not be allowed to obscure this sordid story of indefensible American intervention in the internal affairs of Chile, in the years just before the violent overthrow of the Allende Government and the death of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger appears to have been a principal force in this covert intervention, and is being charged once again with not having told the whole truth to a Senate committee. Demands are being heard for a reopening of the hearings which recommended his confirmation as Secretary.

The Times story, by Seymour Hersh, was based on a letter from Representative Michael Harrington of Massachusetts to Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Harrington letter gave an account, from memory, of testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee by William E. Colby, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Harrington said he had twice read a transcript of the Colby testimony. As he described it to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Colby said that the Nixon Administration had authorized about \$8 million to be spent covertly to make it impossible for President Allende to govern. Specifically, \$500,000 was authorized in both 1969 and 1970 to help Mr. Allende's election opponents, and \$350,000 was later authorized for bribing members of the Chilean Congress to vote against ratifying Mr. Allende's election.

Later \$5 million was authorized for clandestine "destabilization" efforts in Chile; and in 1973, \$1.5 million was provided to help anti-Allende candidates in municipal elections. The authorizing body for all this C.I.A. activity was the so-called "40 Committee" of the Nixon Administration—a committee chaired by Henry Kissinger.

But Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings that "the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the coup, to the best of my knowledge and belief." While that may have been true in the narrowest sense, it was at best one of those tortuous non-lies in which governments specialize and at worst a concealment of the true nature of U.S. policy toward the Allende Government and the scope of American activities to undermine that Government.

Similarly, Edward M. Korry, ambassador to Chile during most of the period in question, denied under oath to a Senate subcommittee that there had been American attempts to "pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress." Charles A. Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American affairs, also swore that the United States had scrupulously followed a policy of non-intervention in Chile.

No wonder, then, that Senator Frank Church, to whose subcommittee this sworn testimony was offered, was reported to be outraged upon learning of the Colby testimony. He has properly raised not only the possibility of perjury charges but the question of comprehensive hearings by the full Foreign Relations Committee on the intervention in Chile.

If such hearings are held, or if Mr. Kissinger's confirmation hearings should be reopened—as they already have been once, to inquire into charges that he did not tell the whole truth about wiretaps on reporters and some of his associates—the inquiry should press much further than the candor of official testimony, important as that question is.

But as one Government official pointed out to Mr. Hersh, if covert activities against another country are authorized, Government officials—sometimes including Secretaries of State and Presidents—have to lie about them. Lies are part of the business. The real questions are whether this supposedly peace-loving and democratic nation has any legal or moral right to conduct covert operations abroad, and whether any Administration of either party has the constitutional authority to order taxpayers' money spent for clandestine warfare against the legitimate government of a sovereign country.

These questions are long overdue for full and open debate; the Colby testimony, for example, said the first intervention against Mr. Allende was ordered by Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Congress, the press, Presidential candidates—all have consistently shied away from this subject. Supposed liberals have pled the supposed need to be "hard-nosed." The real need is to face the fact that gangster schemes of bribery, violence and even assassination are being carried out, in the name of the great American people.

The C.I.A. may be only an instrument, but it seems to have its own sinister vitality. The Chilean efforts, in fact, were authorized by the lineal descendant of a body set up by the Kennedy Administration to "control" the C.I.A. Isn't it clear at last that such "control" can be achieved only by a Government with the political will to cut the C.I.A. in half, or kill it altogether?

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 September 1974

# CONCERN BY INDIA ON C.I.A. RELATED

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 12—Daniel P. Moynihan, ambassador to India, has privately warned Secretary of State Kissinger that recent reports of Central Intelligence Agency activities in Chile have confirmed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions and genuine fears" about American policy toward India.

In a stinging rebuke of such clandestine activities, Mr. Moynihan noted in a confidential letter to his embassy formally denied last year to the Indian Government that the United States had intervened against the Marxist President of Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens. Mr. Allende died in a bloody coup d'etat last September.

Writing of Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Moynihan said:

"Her concern is whether the United States accepts the Indian regime. She is not sure but that we would be content to see others like her overthrown. She knows full well that we have done our share and more of bloody and dishonorable deeds."

## Not Worried About Ouster

The ambassador said Mrs. Gandhi was not worried about being overthrown, and added:

"It is precisely because she is not innocent, not squeamish and not a moralizer that her concern about American intentions is real and immediate."

"And of course the news from the United States, as printed in the Indian press, repeatedly confirms her worst suspicions and genuine fears."

"Nothing will change her unless she is satisfied that the United States accepts her India. She does not now think we do. She thinks we are a profoundly selfish and cynical counter-revolutionary power."

Because of that belief, Mr. Moynihan noted, "she will accordingly proceed to develop nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system preaching non-violence all the way."

State Department officials said that the cablegram had been personally reviewed by Mr. Kissinger, but his reaction could not be learned.

There was no official comment from the State Department about the ambassador's cable. One well-informed official acknowledged that Mr. Moynihan was still in good standing with the Ford Administration.

"Pat's always indignant," the official added. "He writes beautifully and his cables are a delight to read, but he's always indignant."

Other officials said that, as far as they knew, Mr. Moynihan was still in good standing with the Ford Administration.

Representative Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts



WASHINGTON POST  
13 September 1974

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# Chile, the CIA and Kissinger

To go barking after the CIA because of its secret operations in Chile is beside the point. The agency, in subverting the late Socialist President Salvador Allende, was carrying out established national policy — White House policy. The CIA's director, William Colby, who was in the position of reporting to Congress about actions taken under earlier directors, deserves praise for his candor.

The real need is to fathom why Henry Kissinger, then (1970-73) Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, felt it was essential to get rid of one particular leader of a country which, by its region, size and general importance, plays almost no part in the global balance of power, on which Kissinger's strategy supposedly is based.

Interestingly, Allende and Chile are not mentioned once in the absorbing new book, "Kissinger," by Bernard and Marvin Kalb. The only public clue to his thinking is pretty insubstantial. An Allende "takeover," Kissinger said in 1970 of Allende's electoral victory, could produce over time "some sort of Communist government" which could pose "massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and pro-U.S. forces in Latin America."

What were those "massive problems" which the United States set out to help defer by covert means?

No doubt Kissinger and Nixon wanted, if possible, to limit leftist movements throughout Latin America: "No more Cubas." But in view of Washington's moves then toward Moscow, and its tentative move now toward Havana, this hardly seems an adequate rationale.

Nor can a very persuasive case be made that the defense of the United States' then-embattled corporate interests in Chile — and by extension, else-

where in the third world — required measures so extreme. You have to be a Marxist, or to think Kissinger and Nixon were pretty stupid, to believe that was a dominant factor.

For what it's worth, I suspect Kissinger feared that the example of a successful popular front government in Chile — Communists and Socialists working together — might have a contagious effect in France and Italy and other places where, in the 1970s, popular fronts have a real chance of coming to power. Kissinger voiced this fear in discussing his Chile policy privately at the time.

The election of a Socialist-Communist coalition in Chile had, after all, aroused global attention. Communist parties were widely being made respectable, in part by the example of Richard Nixon in dealing with Moscow and Peking. Their "natural" political partners were and are the democratic socialist parties of the left. It was not far-fetched — not then, not now — to imagine popular fronts taking power and, degree by degree, removing their countries from the "West," as the area of postwar American dominance is commonly known.

It is suggestive that CIA Director Colby apparently ranked the Chile operation in importance with postwar Greece and Guatemala and described it as a "prototype" for bringing foreign governments down with money. In postwar Greece, the United States helped Athens defeat a Communist insurgency launched across a national frontier. In Guatemala in 1954, the CIA sponsored a military coup against a Communist government. In Chile it provided financial support to help local elements thwart an elected Marxist who was expected to take Chile toward communism by a parliamentary route.

Kissinger, using wit as a cloak, has quipped that Chile is "a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." His implication: How can anyone think he was uptight about Chile? But perhaps he was uptight about Chile.

Temperamentally, what Kissinger seems to fear most in the current international scene is the flux, the uncertainty, the difficulty of convincing the American public to deal with international challenges less evident — but in his mind, hardly less ominous — than military attack.

Kissinger is a child of Weimar Germany: He has seen democracy destroyed. He has some of the European intellectual's characteristic ambivalence about popular democracy, for whose putative weaknesses he attempts to compensate by diplomatic manipulation, elitism, secrecy, personal virtuosity. This is of a piece with his scarcely concealed contempt for Europe's cravenness — an attitude of which the public saw traces after the Mideast war last year.

It is the conventional wisdom that Vietnam taught the United States that it could no longer play the "policeman" of the world. But perhaps it taught Kissinger, whose view of history is long and dark and extends much beyond Vietnam, that the United States must play the policeman in a particular way — a way that fends off feared foreign dangers but does not bring down the domestic public's wrath on the government's or one's own head.

There is something undeniably valiant about Kissinger's purposes, but there can be something undeniably vicious about his means. Is there no other way for the values and the interests of the United States to thrive?

Democrat whose concern over Chile policy led to the C.I.A. disclosures, urged at a news conference that Mr. Kissinger publicly be called upon by Congress to account for that policy. He said that if the agency did not cease its clandestine activities, it might jeopardize all of its overt intelligence-gathering work.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, made public a letter to Mr. Kissinger in which he sought an explanation for the legal basis of the agency's involvement in Chile as well as an explanation of why State Department officials misled Congress during sworn testimony about the United States policy toward Cuba.

William E. Colby, director of the C.I.A., testified in secret about the Chile operations before the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence. The hearing was led by Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi and chair-

man of the full committee.

A two-day conference on "the C.I.A. and covert actions" opened in a Senate hearing room, with Senator Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan, declaring that if Congress did not fully investigate the agency's role in Chile, "it will be sending the executive branch a clear signal that it is not really serious about reasserting all its powers and its right to participate in the foreign policy area."

## Adverse Effect Is Seen

Mrs. Ghandi's anger and fears, as reported by Mr. Moynihan, could have an adverse effect on the continuing United States attempt to improve relations with India in the aftermath of Mr. Kissinger's tilt to-

ward Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan war.

The Secretary of State was known to be planning a visit to India next month and was expected to set up a number of joint United States-Indian commissions to work out economic and technical aid agreements.

Mr. Moynihan reported that Indian newspapers had given wide circulation to dispatches about C.I.A. activities against Mr. Allende that were authorized by Mr. Kissinger as director of the 40 Committee, a high-level intelligence review group that meets in the White House. Mr. Moynihan also noted that the Indian newspapers had reprinted Mr. Kissinger's denials last year about United States involvement in Chile.

BALTIMORE SUN  
14 September 1974

## CIA head defends covert plans

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The director of central intelligence said yesterday cancellation of secret operations abroad would not gravely endanger the nation in the present world situation. But he warned that imperative needs could arise in the future.

William E. Colby, the director, also denied any CIA "connection" to the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile.

With a measured defense of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby drew a careful distinction between what is desirable and what is imperative. In the end he came down against ending covert operations — which may range from support of assassination to eroding governments — in the interest of national security.

He acknowledged that the mandate of the CIA in this area was not crystal clear under the National Security Act of 1947, which created the agency. Instead, he said, the mandate had been developed under the act by the executive and Congress. If they changed it, he emphasized, the agency would act accordingly.

Mr. Colby appeared before a largely hostile audience. It was a conference on the CIA and its covert activity, conducted by the Center for National Security Studies under the sponsorship of Senator Philip A. Hart (D., Mich.) and Senator Edward W. Brooke (D., Mass.).

It was an audience that generally applauded critics of the agency and hissed its defenders, including Mr. Colby.

It also was an audience that came to the hearing room in the Senate Office Building armed with fresh evidence against the CIA. The material was leaked secret testimony by Mr. Colby that United States had spent about \$8 million to undermine the government of the late President Allende in Chile. Opposition to Mr. Allende, a Marxist who was elected, finally culminated last year in a coup during which he was shot to death.

Mr. Colby said all covert operations of the CIA were approved by the so-called "40 Committee" of the National Security Council. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, is chairman of the council. Dr. Kissinger and other State Department officials have told Congress the U.S. had no part in the coup.

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Sept. 13, 1974

## Disclosure of CIA Chile Role 'Surprises' Overseers on Hill

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

One of the Senate's most senior congressional overseers of the Central Intelligence Agency's operations said yesterday that he was not informed of the extent of U.S. covert political operations in Chile.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) made this admission in a telephone interview after CIA Director William E. Colby was called into a two-hour executive session of the Senate Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee in the aftermath of disclosures Sunday that \$11 million in covert action funds had been targeted against the late Chilean president, Salvador Allende.

"You can say that I was surprised," said Symington, a loyal supporter of the agency in the past.

Symington's surprise, it was understood, was shared by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), who also presides over the CIA oversight subcommittee.

Symington's statement seriously clouds the credibility of the oft-repeated assertion by Colby and other top CIA officials that the agency's congressional oversight committees have been fully briefed on all major covert programs carried out by the agency under the authority of the National Security Council.

The disclosure of secret funding for anti-Allende activities, made by Colby in executive testimony to a House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee last April 22, was also in direct conflict with sworn testimony by high-ranking State Department officials that the United States pursued a policy of non-intervention during the Allende period.

So serious were these conflicts that Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), said he would refer to the Justice Department for perjury in-

vestigation previous sworn testimony before his Multinational Corporations Subcommittee that appears to be misleading.

Rep. Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Latin America subcommittee, was also reported by aides yesterday to be "deeply concerned" by discrepancies in official testimony over covert U.S. action in Chile.

The issue was given further impetus yesterday with the release by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) before television cameras of his summary of the top-secret Colby testimony on Chile as well as his until now futile efforts by letter to generate further congressional inquiry into the subject.

Harrington's dossier disclosed that last June 12—the day he examined Colby's testimony detailing the \$11 million in covert authorizations for a second time—a State Department witness testified under oath that there was no CIA funding of efforts to upset the Allende government.

The witness was Harry Shlaudeman, then acting assistant secretary of state for inter-american affairs and second in command of the U.S. embassy in Chile during the Allende administration.

Shlaudeman, former Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer Jr., all testified under oath before various congressional committees that no money was spent and no covert programs were carried out to subvert the Allende government.

Harrington said any congressional inquiries growing out of the Chile disclosures should include testimony by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As chairman of

the National Security Council's senior panel on secret operations, the so-called Forty Committee, Kissinger was a principal decision-maker on the funds and programs targeted against Allende.

The CIA was the subject of a three-ring whirl of developments on Capitol Hill yesterday: the Armed Services Committee meeting, the Harrington press conference and an unusual conference on the agency's covert operations attended by former government officials, ex-agents and specialists on intelligence.

The conference produced a mountain of special reports on covert programs and a consensus that the agency's covert operating programs were, on the whole, contrary to national interest.

CIA Director Colby will appear before the conference at 3 p.m. today to speak on "The View from Langley," the suburban Virginia headquarters of the CIA.

Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), in opening the conference, urged that Congress further explore the CIA role in Chile and protested that "we haven't done a damn thing . . . to prevent the President from waging secret wars."

One of the principal points of criticism in the conference and in Harrington's press conference was the ineffectiveness of congressional oversight of the CIA's operations — principally those targeted against governments or foreign political leaders considered "unfriendly" to U.S. interests.

Symington's admission of surprise upon learning from press reports Sunday and from Colby yesterday of the scope of the Chile programs was an example of what the critics were talking about.

countries vital information that was made public as a matter of course here.

Did the agency use methods that were illegal in those countries and would be illegal in the United States? He was asked. "Of course," he said.

It was important, he said, that the president of the United States have available to him measures that provided options between "a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."

He could envision situations, he went on, in which the States might need to conduct covert action in the

The intelligence director took the same position yesterday. The agency, he said, "had no connection with the military coup in 1973," nor with its leaders. It was aware, he acknowledged, of sentiment for a coup, and as far as he knew no one had informed Mr. Allende.

Mr. Colby refused to say, however, what actions the CIA might have taken to encourage that sentiment. He also refused to discuss specifics of any other covert CIA operation except congressional committees

charged with watching over the agency.

Responsible members of Congress knew generally of the CIA's role in Chile, he said, but he could not say they knew precisely where every dollar was being spent.

"We did look forward to a change in government," he continued, to skeptical laughter, "but through the democratic processes in 1976."

Mr. Colby suggested it was ironic that the United States methods to obtain from other

WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1974

# Colby Coolly Confronts Chile.

## Critics

By Laurence Stern  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby stepped coolly into a public confrontation yesterday over his agency's covert activities in Chile, took the boos and hisses with equanimity, and gave little in return.

Appearing in a crowded Capitol Hill hearing which was heavy in political theater but short in substance, Colby declined to discuss publicly details of the reported \$11 million in secret U.S. activities targeted against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende before and after he came to power.

He did not deny the reports, which stemmed from secret testimony he gave a House subcommittee last April 22. There was only the most oblique hint of confirmation when he deplored the leak of his testimony as raising the "dilemma of how we can provide Congress delicate information without adverse effects."

Colby reiterated his longstanding position that "the CIA had no connection with the military coup [in Chile] in 1973." He acknowledged, however, that "we did look forward to a change in government" in the 1976 elections.

Colby weathered with imperturbability the cross-examination of congressional questioners, the needling and oratory of Pentagon Papers martyr Daniel Ellsberg and heckling inquiries from the floor.

"How many people have you killed?" someone shouted from the audience. Colby launched into a calm and numbing exposition of the Phoenix program in Vietnam, which he directed and which has become a focus of public criticism of his tenure as head of the U.S. pacification team there between 1968 and 1971.

Colby's chief interrogator on the Chile question was Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) who inadvertently touched off the controversy in a confidential letter to House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman

face of "a new threat that developed in the world."

He also defended his role as director of the so-called Phoenix program in Vietnam, a pacification campaign that ranged from economic development to assassination.

Rep. Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) detailing Colby's April 22 testimony on secret CIA activities there.

Colby told Harrington that the CIA had briefed its congressional oversight subcommittees on all major covert activities undertaken abroad. He said also that he would discuss details only "before the appropriate subcommittees."

Making the case for respectability of covert operations, Colby cited participation of feminist Gloria Steinheim in CIA subsidized youth festival activities during the late 1960s. He recited a published testimonial by Ms. Steinheim that she and fellow participants were free to say what they pleased during their travels.

The forum before which Colby spoke was a conference on "the Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Action" sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies. Participants included former national security officials, ex-CIA agents, intelligence scholars and journalists.

In his prepared statement, Colby took note of proposals that the CIA abandon its covert action programs carried out by the directorate for clandestine services, colloquially known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks."

"This is a legitimate question," Colby said. "... In light of current American policy, as I have indicated, it would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States." This was a strong hint that covert operations abroad have been reduced to a negligible level.

But, the CIA director added, "a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances. I can envisage situations in which the United States might well need to conduct covert action in the face of some new threat that developed in the world."

But it was the consensus of most of the panelists, as stated yesterday by Herbert Scoville Jr., former CIA deputy director for science and technology, that covert operations consistently "interfere with legitimate intelligence collection" by the agency. He urged that the function, if it were necessary at all, should be spun off to a separate agency.

Other participants, Ellsberg and former National

Security Council staffer Morton Halperin, objected on grounds that the covert programs abroad institutionalize illegal actions against foreign governments or political movements. Author David Wise also objected that the secret activities also required a policy of "plausible deniability" on the part of U.S. officials when publicly questioned about them.

Colby told Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.), chairman of yesterday's session, that he has proscribed the phrase "plausible denial" from use at CIA headquarters.

"I do not feel that I can tell the American people an untruth," said the CIA director, his face composed behind neutral-shaded shell eyeglasses as guffaws echoed through the hearing chamber.

When Abourezk asked Colby about an article appearing in last Sunday edition of The Washington Post alluding to a \$350,000 National Security Council authorization for bribery of the Chilean Congress in 1970, Colby responded:

"Those are details I'm not going to talk about."

Asked whether his agency undertakes action abroad which would be deemed criminal in the United States, Colby said quietly, "Of course. Espionage is a crime in the United States."

Colby was also pressed on whether he could provide assurances that corporations controlled by Vice Presidential nominee Nelson A. Rockefeller and his family would not be used as CIA "covers" in the future. "This would not be a useful subject for me to discuss," he answered.

The major piece of theater was provided by Ellsberg, who announced to Colby that he had just learned from testimony gathered by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) that CIA officials had evidence—long before they admitted it—of the burglary of his psychiatrist's office.

"You have much to answer for," Ellsberg said in his peroration. "Not very much to me—very little."

Colby answered with the only touch of heat he brought to the room. He challenged Ellsberg to support his accusation that "I do not support the constitution and do not understand it."

"I understand it," said Colby to Ellsberg, "as well as you do."

As yesterday's session wound to its close a young woman in a red dress leaped to her feet and shouted, "You are not only a liar, you are a Nazi, too." Colby peered back expressionlessly and replied, "I deny that."

NEW YORK TIMES  
14 September 1974

## C.I.A. Chief Says Covert Activities Aren't Vital

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13—William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, said today that there would be no "major impact" on the nation's security if the United States ceased all cloak-and-dagger operations against foreign countries.

"The current status of the world is such that we do not appear to be threatened at this time," Mr. Colby told a conference on the Central Intelligence Agency and covert activity. "The Capitol will still stand whether any particular action does or does not take place."

The C.I.A. director spent more than three hours making a speech and answering often hostile questions from the panelists and audience at the two-day conference, sponsored by the newly formed Center for National Security Studies.

### Against Curtailment

He made it clear, both in his prepared address and during the question-and-answer session, that he did not wish to see the agency's clandestine operations curtailed. Those operations, officially known as covert actions, have been the focus of dispute this week in Congress because of the disclosure that the C.I.A. was authorized to spend more than \$8-million from 1970 to 1973 in an effort to make it difficult for President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile to govern.

More than \$7-million of the authorized funds was spent. "I think it would be mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines," Mr. Colby said in his prepared address.

Later, in response to a question Mr. Colby declared that "these days, in view of the world situation and our policies, we're not spending much effort" on clandestine activities. "We're keeping our powder and musket dry," he said.

Mr. Colby's statements acknowledging that clandestine operations were not vital to the nation's security did not seem to indicate any impending change in the Ford Administration's approach to such activities. The C.I.A. director was apparently giving a candid assessment of the value of such activities—as viewed by him today.

When a panelist, Richard J. Barnet, author and former Kennedy Administration aide, asked whether he could envision any national security threats that would justify covert activity in Latin America, Asia or Africa, Mr. Colby said, "There are some, yes."

"By security of the United States," he repeated, "I do not mean that the Capitol will fall by night. There are certain things that today are not an immediate danger to the United States but could become so."

Discussing Chile, Mr. Colby again denied that the C.I.A. played any direct role in the overthrow of the late President Allende. "We did look forward to a change in government," he said to caustic laughter from the crowded Senate hearing room, "but by elections in 1976."

Although he had announced that he would not discuss any specific details concerning the C.I.A.'s clandestine involvement in Chile, Mr. Colby all but specifically confirmed that the agency had been heavily involved.

Insisting that Congress had been kept informed about the clandestine activities there, Mr. Colby declared, "I can't say that every dollar the C.I.A.

spent in Chile was individually approved [by intelligence committees], but there was a series of discussions."

He took note of a letter, published last week, describing the agency's activities in Chile between 1964 and 1973 that had been written earlier this year by Representative Michael J. Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts. "At various times during that period," Mr. Colby said, "the major steps were brought to the attention of the chairman or various members of those committees."

His account of the congressional overview was challenged by Mr. Harrington and another member of Congress attending the conference, Senator James Abourezk, Democrat of South Dakota. Mr. Abourezk questioned whether the C.I.A. was providing up-to-date briefings about current clandestine operations to the Congress; Mr. Harrington urged a broader, and more critical, Congressional overview of C.I.A. activities.

In an obvious rebuke to those who advocated more C.I.A. disclosure to Congressional committees, Mr. Colby complained that what he termed "the leak" about the Chilean involvement "raises the dilemma of how we're going to supply the Congress with such delicate information without its disclosure."

"This is a matter, of course, for the Congress to decide," he added.

Throughout his long appearance today, Mr. Colby expressed little emotion and remained calm, even when confronted with personal denunciations and accusations that he had lied. The sharpest response from the audience came during a series of questions about his participation in the Vietnam pacification program and his direct role with Operation Phoenix, a C.I.A.-involved program designed "to

root out the Vietcong infrastructure" that has been widely criticized. It has been charged that the program resulted in the deaths of more than 20,000 Vietnamese.

"How many did you kill?" one youth shouted from the audience.

"I didn't kill any," Mr. Colby responded.

At one point, panelist Daniel Ellsberg, who has said he was responsible for turning over the Pentagon Papers to the press in 1971, delivered a lengthy summary of the C.I.A.'s involvement in Watergate, provoking an exchange with Mr. Colby that provided no new information about the known involvement of the agency in the break-in at the office of Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Earlier, in response to a question from Dr. Ellsberg, Mr. Colby had acknowledged that the C.I.A. may have had advance information about the impending coup d'état in Chile that was not forwarded to the Allende Government.

Mr. Colby, who had agreed to attend the two-day conference before the press disclosures of the covert activities in Chile, pointedly noted in his prepared remarks that such activities were conducted "only when specifically authorized by the National Security Council." "Thus," he added, "C.I.A. covert actions reflect national policy."

A number of high officials have told The New York Times this week that much of the impetus for the clandestine policy against the Allende Government was supplied by Secretary of State Kissinger, who was serving as former President Nixon's national security adviser in 1970.

Arguing today in favor of covert actions, Mr. Colby said that "a sovereign nation must look ahead to changing circumstances."

NEW YORK POST  
9 Sept. 1974

## 'Dirty Tricks' in Chile

According to apparently well-founded reports, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby has privately told a Congressional committee that the Nixon Administration authorized more than \$8 million for clandestine disruption of the Allende regime in Chile between 1970 and 1973. These operations, designed to "destabilize" that country and make it impossible for Allende to

govern, are said to have been approved by a panel headed by Henry Kissinger.

These reports indicate that the business of "dirty tricks" was conducted throughout a period when U.S. officials were solemnly denying to Congress and the country charges of hostile operations against the Chilean government.

A full-scale Congressional reexamination of the story is urgently needed.

NEW YORK TIMES  
15 September 1974

# Allende's Fall, Washington's Push

By Laurence R. Birns

The disclosure that the United States had directly participated in the economic and political undermining of the Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile between 1970 and 1973 is only part of the dismal tale of what took place between Washington and Santiago during the three years he held office.

Viewed in its entirety, this tale reveals the poverty of this nation's Latin-American policy, the staggering immorality of the policy's architects and the ineffectuality and irrelevance of most scholars, journalists and Congressional leaders, whose professional obligation it was to oversee executive policies toward Chile during this period.

Now we know that William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, in secret testimony last April, told Congress that the Nixon Administration had authorized more than \$8 million for covert Central Intelligence Agency activities between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for Dr. Allende to govern.

Those of us who had watched United States policy at the time felt in our bones that this country was intent on establishing the climate for the overthrow of the democratically elected President—Dr. Allende died in a violent coup d'état Sept. 11, 1973—but we lacked the proof. Our dilemma was plain in that we did not have the data to support our instincts, when such evidence would have been of most use in attempting, if futilely, to influence Washington's policy. But we knew that the workings of what we considered Washington's invisible government would be revealed only long after the events had become the raw material for footnotes in history books and the people involved had minced off to some new assignment.

Still, in spite of our incredulity, of our skepticism, we were reluctant to believe that the former Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry; the former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, Charles A. Meyer; and our respected Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, would practice such professional duplicity and such public deception.

After all, they were as one in repeatedly saying that the United States had played no role in the violent ending of Chile's constitutional regime or had not carried out any other previous form of intervention, and when they did hint at the truth in Congressional inquiries after the coup they were always heard in the secrecy of executive session, as if the public was too immature to know, or the officials too embarrassed to tell.

Even before this, it was known that this nation had maintained a calculated campaign to strangle Chile economically. Richard M. Nixon as President, and his Treasury Secretary at the time, John B. Connally, had in 1971 initiated a policy of economic

denial in United States lending agencies, as well as in the regional and international aid organizations, and Chile became a fiscally besieged island.

This was done though international law (that historic handmaiden of the Western trading nations) had not been fully served in that Chilean administrative procedures had not been exhausted when the United States policy of retribution for the legal nationalization of Kennecott Copper Corporation's mines had begun.

Leading United States apologists of the fall of the Allende Government previously have tended to give an economic justification for it. The scenario was a rather plain one. The economic policies of the President, a Marxist, polarized the population. The opposition political parties that supported the coup did so when Dr. Allende closed the political road. In any event, Dr. Allende was a minority President and did not have the necessary consensus to undertake such radical changes. Thus, it was not United States policy that cut Dr. Allende off from the possibilities of surviving, but rather the result of his own haphazard domestic policies.

The apologists neglected to mention that only once in this century has Chile had a majority President—from 1964 to 1970—and that some two-thirds of the population had voted in 1970 for candidates espousing policies of nationalization and reform.

The apologists' view was upheld by Prof. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, director of the Center for Latin American Development Studies of Boston University, in a lengthy contribution to this newspaper recently in which he asserted that "Allende died not because he was a socialist, but because he was an incompetent."

But apparently now, in his view, things have improved. Dr. Rosenstein-Rodan stated in a report to an agency for the Alliance for Progress, Chile has a "strong and intelligent" economic policy and a "Jean Monnet" directing it. This, as the people starve.

Professor Rosenstein-Rodan has had little to say about the civic decencies that Dr. Allende had strived to maintain, which the military now has cruelly destroyed, or the contribution that the Opposition Christian Democratic party had made to the "polarization" and "chaos" of Chile's national life. He thinks of himself as dispassionate, but by his choice of themes, elimination of untidy evidence and priorities, he is ideological to the marrow.

For a host of other academics, editorial writers and some leading United States intellectuals, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the thin reed of their case that Dr. Allende had brought "it" upon himself has all but vanished in the disclosure of the C.I.A.'s role.

It would be more accurate to have said that it was the intent of our nation's policy to bring "it" upon him because our goal was to "destabilize" Chile by pouring millions of dollars into vulnerable corners of that nation's national life, not to heal but to kill.

Americans who earlier in the year witnessed the effects of the United States national truckers' strike and the breakdown of petroleum supplies in our own nation could well imagine the frailties of the infinitely weaker economy of the intended victim.

It would seem that Dr. Allende's sole crime was that he felt that foreign control of Chilean copper resources was intolerable, just as Mr. Nixon felt that the United States could not allow a continuing dependence on foreign oil supplies.

For Chile, the United States Government had two possible roads to travel: one of correct diplomatic relations (perhaps even favored treatment, since Chile's was one of the few remaining representative governments in the region) or political chicanery. Regrettably, Mr. Kissinger, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, systematically chose the latter—a course that helped to bring on a brutal military takeover that cost thousands of lives, with Chile now being dragged into the Stone Age.

Present conditions in Chile have been carefully noted by a number of impartial investigative teams that have traveled to that nation, as well as by repeated utterances of church groups inside and outside Chile. The jails are crammed with political prisoners, military law operates and the civil courts are defunct, total press censorship exists, the political parties of all persuasions are banished, and trade union activity has been terminated. The nation is now a barrack, and freedom of expression has been sent to the wall.

During his administration, Dr. Allende was scrupulously correct in maintaining unimpaired, under unrelieved internal and external pressure, all the nation's institutions. Not a single political prisoner could be found in jail, not a single newspaper was censored by the civilian authorities and opposition political parties could rage at will against the Government.

Why does Mr. Kissinger prefer the present over the past? Chile now over Chile then? Why was this clever and capable man so simplistic in conceiving of Chile as an allegedly "Communist" nation that must be suborned and so sophisticated in treating with such self-identified Communist nations as China, the Soviet Union and, most recently, East Germany?

In retrospect, his sins are more than the lies and deceptions; he has traduced the meager remains of our international reputation and the honor of this nation by espousing a plan of action that was not only vulgarly cruel, but amateurishly and patently ineffective given the current state of Chile's economy.

If, in the recent chaotic past, he felt moved to offer the nation his resignation on an issue of personal honor in the Watergate wiretap affair, surely our nation has the obligation to solicit and, if refused, to demand his resignation over this far more

NEW YORK TIMES  
16 September 1974

## The C.I.A. in Chile

Disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency authorized more than \$8 million for covert activities aimed first at preventing Salvador Allende's election as President of Chile and then at "destabilizing" his Marxist Government would be appalling enough by itself. It is doubly so when stacked against flat denials of any such United States intervention or policy to intervene, some of it in sworn testimony before committees of Congress, by former and present Government officials.

In secret testimony before a House subcommittee last April, C.I.A. Director William E. Colby said his agency authorized \$500,000 to aid Dr. Allende's opponents in the 1970 election; \$350,000 to bribe Chilean legislators to vote against him when the election was thrown into the Congress, and \$6.5 million for subsequent "destabilization" activities and for helping anti-Allende candidates in the 1971 municipal elections.

This conflicts directly with testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee by former Ambassador Edward M. Korry that "the United States did not seek to pressure, subvert, influence a single member of the Chilean Congress" during his four years in Chile, and by former Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer that "we bought no votes, we funded no candidates, we promoted no coups."

During part of the period when Mr. Colby says the C.I.A. was financing "destabilizing" activities, Ambassador Korry says he was carrying on secret negotiations with President Allende, looking toward uninterrupted American cooperation and financial aid, provided Chile did not act with undue hostility toward the United States. These efforts, he says, were undermined by extremists in Dr. Allende's Popular Unity coalition.

Are we to believe that Ambassador Korry and the State Department were endeavoring to stabilize Dr. Allende's Government while the C.I.A. was trying to "destabilize" it? Could the American Ambassador in Santiago and the

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs have been ignorant of what the C.I.A. was doing—or was the C.I.A. in truth a law unto itself?

And what of the role of Henry A. Kissinger in this sordid affair? Throughout the period he headed the so-called Forty Committee which supervises C.I.A. operations and, according to Mr. Colby, approved in advance the covert activities in Chile. Yet, Mr. Korry says that on a trip to Washington in 1971 he got approval from both Mr. Kissinger at the National Security Council and Secretary of State William P. Rogers for his proposal of cooperation with Chile in a compensated take-over of American copper interests. Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "to the best of my knowledge and belief," the C.I.A. "had nothing to do" with the military coup that overthrew Dr. Allende.

It is now up to President Ford to find out who is actually in charge of United States foreign policy in sensitive areas of the world, and, whether anyone in fact controls the operations of the C.I.A.

Of far greater importance than the bizarre spectacle of two United States agencies trying simultaneously to stabilize and "destabilize" an elected Government is that fact that an inadequately controlled C.I.A. badly served the American national interest by its dirty work in Chile. It matters not that the Soviet Union does far worse, that Fidel Castro intervened far more outrageously in Chile than did the United States, or that extremists in Dr. Allende's camp would in any event have destroyed the Chilean democracy on their own.

Clearly, the so-called C.I.A. "oversight" committees in Senate and House are failing to do their job. Representative Harrington of Massachusetts has asked the House Foreign Affairs Committee for hearings on the C.I.A.'s role in Chile. Senator Church of Idaho will ask similar action from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

If this enormously powerful agency is ever to be brought under effective oversight, Congress must rise to this distasteful but imperative responsibility.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 Sept. 1974

## Chile and the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

Your Sept. 16 editorial "The C.I.A. in Chile" places major emphasis on an alleged quotation of my use of the word "destabilization." This word appears in Representative Harrington's letter which discussed my testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

When this story first appeared, I reexamined the transcript of the testimony and determined that the word "destabilize," in whatever grammatical form, does not appear.

I so informed your representative at that time, and I so stated publicly on Sept. 13 at a public meeting, at-

tended by Representative Harrington, which was fully covered by your representative. To insure that no mere difference in semantics is involved, I added that "this term especially is not a fair description of our national policy from 1971 on of encouraging the continued existence of democratic forces looking toward future elections." Your editorial views on this matter are, of course, a matter for you alone to determine; I do protest, however, your assertion that I said something which I had taken pains to deny saying without giving any indication of such denial.

W. E. COLBY  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, Sept. 16, 1974

sobering matter of not only attempting to bribe Chile's democratically elected Congress to withhold ratification of Dr. Allende's taking office, and fomenting civic disorder, but denying it in sworn testimony as well. If a resignation is not forthcoming, an honorable United States Congress must move to impeach.

America and certain Americans bear a heavy hand in the unjustified torment that has been visited upon Chile. That lovely little land and its good people deserved a more benign fate, and, for that matter, so did we.

Laurence R. Birns, who teaches Latin-American studies at the New School for Social Research, has been a senior economic affairs officer with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, in Santiago.



WASHINGTON POST  
17 September 1974

# Perjury Inquiry Urged on Chile Data

## Panel Gets Report

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

A Senate staff report recommends that a perjury investigation be initiated against former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms and accuses Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger of having "deceived" the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in sworn testimony.

The report, which centers on testimony given by high-ranking officials on U.S. covert intervention in Chile's internal political affairs, also recommends perjury and contempt investigations of three other government witnesses in the Chile inquiry.

Prepared by Jerome Levinson, chief counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the confidential report will be taken up for possible action today at an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The committee has the option of endorsing or rejecting the report in whole or in part.

The targets of the proposed investigations are former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles E. Meyer, former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry, and William Broe, former chief of the CIA's Latin American Division.

The report, submitted to subcommittee chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), also asks that the record of Kissinger's confirmation hearing be reopened in public session to question the secretary on the "rationale" for U.S. covert political actions in Chile after 1969.

It further recommended that Kissinger be asked to testify generally on U.S. policy toward "duly elected governments which may be anticipated not to follow policies to the liking of the United States."

The staff recommendations reflected rising concern in Congress over major discrepancies in the sworn testimony of high State Department witnesses and the disclosure of secret testimony last April 22 by CIA Director William E. Colby that the agency spent \$3 million in Chile to foil the late Salvadore Allende's candidacy in 1964 and \$8 million attempting to block his election and undermine his government after 1969.

The report cites previously secret testimony by Kissinger, delivered at an executive session of his confirmation hearing on Sept. 17, 1973, minimizing the role of the CIA in the 1970 Allende election.

It quotes Kissinger as saying:

"The CIA was heavily involved in 1964 in the election, was in a very minor way involved in the 1970 election and since then we have absolutely stayed away from any coups. Our efforts in Chile were to strengthen the democratic political parties and give them a

basis for winning the election in 1976, which we expressed our hope was that Allende could be defeated in a free democratic election."

At the time Kissinger gave his testimony, the report noted, "the Forty Committee [the National Security Council's senior covert action panel] had already authorized the expenditure of . . . \$8 million for the purpose of destabilizing the Allende government so as to precipitate its downfall."

Only a month before Kissinger testified, the report further noted, the Forty Committee—which he chaired—authorized the expenditure of \$1 million of this amount for "further political destabilization."

The basis for these assertions was the Colby testimony as recounted by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The CIA's only comment on the Harrington disclosure was to question whether Colby has used the word "destabilization" in his April 22 testimony to a House CIA oversight committee chaired by Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.).

Colby's only personal comment on the Harrington report was that he would neither confirm nor deny its authenticity since it was given in executive session. Last Friday Colby commented that the disclosure of his testimony through a confidential letter by Harrington to his chairman, Rep. Thomas Morgan (D-Pa.) raised questions about the ability of government witnesses to testify on "delicate" matters.

The report described as "disingenuous" Kissinger's testimony that since 1970 "we have absolutely stayed away from any coups" in Chile. Kissinger, wrote Levinson, "must have known that expending funds for the express purpose of creating political destabilization had to enhance the possibility, indeed the probability, of the coup which, in fact, took place."

In the case of Helms, the report cited an exchange between the former CIA director and one of his leading senatorial defenders, Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), during an executive hearing on the Helms nomination as ambassador to Iran on Feb. 7, 1973.

Symington: Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

Helms: No, sir.

Symington: So that the stories that you were involved in that are wrong entirely?

Helms: Yes sir . . .

But Colby's testimony, as reported in the Harrington letter, was that the CIA expended \$500,000 in 1969 to fund anti-Allende forces and

during the 1970 election \$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel. After the Sept. 4 popular election in which Allende won a plurality, the account continued, \$350,000 was authorized "to bribe the Chilean Congress" in an effort to "overturn" the results of the popular election in an ensuing congressional run-off.

The staff report alluded, for the first time, to the existence of a National Security Council Decision Memorandum prior to Allende's election which served as the "umbrella" under which the Forty Committee authorized clandestine activities designed to destabilize the Allende government.

Such a policy document would have been drafted under the direction of Kissinger who also chaired the Forty Committee meetings at which the anti-Allende action programs were authorized.

The report was also critical of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John M. Hennessy, who assisted in coordinating U.S. economic policy toward the Allende government that leaned heavily toward withdrawal of lines of credit by such international lending bodies as the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and Export-Import Bank.

Hennessy, said the Levinson report, "either perjured himself or seriously misled the subcommittee in stating that the primary consideration in U.S. economic policy toward the Allende government was Chile's credit-worthiness."

Broe, the CIA's highest-ranking operative for Latin America, was quoted in the report as having testified that there was no U.S. policy to intervene in the 1970 Chilean election. Broe's answers, however, are "technically shy of perjury," the report, concluded, though they were "intended to convey the impression of a policy of non-intervention."

The testimony of Nathaniel Davis, U.S. ambassador to Chile during last year's anti-Allende coup, conformed to the "overall pattern of State Department witnesses dissembling and deceiving the committee and subcommittee with respect to the true scope of U.S. government activities designed to undermine the Allende regime," the Levinson report added. No action, however, was recommended against Davis.

Kissinger and Meyer were not available for comment. Korry, reached in New York, said he was "gratified that Mr. Levinson, after deliberately spreading the word that I have committed perjury, now reached the conclusion that I have not."

NEW YORK TIMES  
17 September 1974

## COVERT C.I.A. ROLE AGAINST ALLENDE DEFENDED BY FORD

Asserts Activities in Chile  
Were 'in Best Interests'  
of Chileans and U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 16—President Ford strongly defended tonight the clandestine use of the Central Intelligence Agency to assist anti-Allende forces in Chile, but he denied that the United States Government had any involvement in the bloody coup there last year.

The President, in his news conference, contended that the C.I.A. activities were authorized because "there was an effort being made by the Government of Salvador Allende to destroy opposition news media and to destroy opposition political parties." He said this was something all governments did and he defended it in principle.

Earlier, The New York Times learned that the staff of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee had recommended that charges of contempt of Congress be placed against Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, and three retired Nixon Administration officials on the ground of misleading testimony on the clandestine activities in Chile.

### 'Certain Actions' Cited

Mr. Ford's statements on Chile were the first by a high Administration official since newspaper reports a week ago that the C.I.A. was authorized to spend more than \$8-million from 1970 to 1973 to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile to govern.

Asked about those reports, the President made what amounted to a broad defense of such clandestine operations. "Our Government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security," Mr. Ford said. [Question 7, Page 22.]

He added that he had been "reliably" informed that "Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purpose."

The C.I.A. effort in Chile, the President said, "was made in this case to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition

political parties."

"I think this is in the best interests of the people in Chile and certainly in our best interest," he added.

Mr. Ford's account of the type and purpose of the intervention in Chile differed in part, at least, with that provided to Congress last April by William E. Colby, the present head of the C.I.A.

Mr. Colby testified that \$350,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee, the secret high-level intelligence review panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger, to bribe members of the Chilean Parliament in late 1970, shortly before the Parliament ratified Mr. Allende's election.

The report by the staff of a Senate subcommittee report involved a different aspect of the dispute over Chile—allegations that high-ranking officials of the Nixon Administration deliberately misled the Senate.

The sources said that, besides Mr. Helms, the report cited Charles A. Meyer, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward M. Korry, Ambassador to Chile from 1957 to 1971, and William V. Broe, former director of clandestine activities for the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America.

Mr. Helms, Mr. Meyer and John M. Hennessey, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, the report said, might have committed perjury in testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in the spring of 1973.

None of the men named in the subcommittee report could be reached immediately for comment.

In his news conference tonight, President Ford defended the Nixon Administration's decision to intervene clandestinely in 1970 in Chile, declaring that the newly elected Marxist Government there made an "effort to destroy the opposition media and to destroy opposition political parties."

Such intervention was needed, Mr. Ford said, because the Communist nations spend vast amounts of money in similar activities.

The staff report, written by Jerome I. Levinson, chief counsel of the subcommittee, was prepared last week at the request of Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the subcommittee. Details of Mr. Levinson's report, which was distributed to subcommittee members over the weekend, were provided to The New York Times by a Senator's office.

At issue is the discrepancy between the testimony presented to the subcommittee last year about the clandestine role of the C.I.A. in Chile and recent news reports indicating that the intelligence agency had been authorized to spend more than \$8-million from 1970 to 1973 in a covert attempt to make it impossible for the Chilean President, Salvador Allende Gossens, to

In addition, sources said, the subcommittee staff report cited Mr. Hennessey's sworn testimony that the Nixon Administration's economic sanctions against Chile were based exclusively on lower credit rating after Dr. Allende's election. It was reported yesterday that Secretary of State Kissinger, then President Nixon's adviser for national security affairs, had personally headed an interagency panel that decided shortly after Dr. Allende's election in 1970 to attempt to cut off all economic aid and international credits.

The allegations against the five Nixon Administration officials stem from their testimony at highly publicized hearings into a reported attempt by officials of the International Telephone & Telegraph Company to seek to interfere in Chile's domestic politics.

Mr. Korry and Mr. Meyer both testified that the United States had continued its policy of nonintervention toward Chile after Dr. Allende's elections. It was that testimony, sources said, that led to the staff recommendation that contempt and—in the case of Mr. Meyer—possible perjury charges be considered.

The testimony that led to the recommendation that Mr. Helms be charged with contempt and possibly perjury and Mr. Broe with contempt was apparently provided to the subcommittee at classified briefings, sources said.

Mr. Church, in an interview last week, said he had authorized a staff review to determine if the testimony should be turned over to the Justice Department for possible prosecution.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a closed executive session tomorrow to discuss, among other matters, what to do about apparently misleading testimony provided to the Church subcommittee.

In an interview, Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey and a ranking minority member of the committee, declared, "There'll be a serious question as to what the committee ought to do."

Mr. Case refused to discuss specifically his personal reaction to the staff report.

"I certainly will press for appropriate action," he said. "No matter what, if a guy is caught lying to a Congressional hearing, there has to be some kind of action."

Other Foreign Relations Committee sources said, however, that it was unlikely that the full committee would immediately agree to press for contempt of Congress or perjury citations against the witnesses. Far more important, the sources said, will be an attempt to determine who in the Nixon Administration influenced the various officials, including Mr. Helms, to be less than candid before the Church subcommittee.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 September 1974

## SENATORS ORDER INQUIRY ON CHILE

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17—

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, amid Congressional protests over President Ford's defense of clandestine intelligence operations, today authorized its staff to study available evidence that official testimony had been misleading about the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in Chile.

Committee sources later cautioned that the Senators' decision, announced by Chairman J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, called only for a preliminary "pulling together" of testimony and not yet a full-fledged investigation into the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration.

"This is a very old problem," Senator Fulbright told reporters after the long closed-door committee meeting this morning. "The involvement of the C.I.A. in other countries has been well-known for years. There's not much news in that."

"In my view," he added, "it's very questionable practice to go beyond the collection of intelligence. I personally have always thought they should be confined to intelligence gathering."

### 'Outrage' Over Reports

Some Senators later suggested that the committee's reluctance to proceed more directly stemmed from what was depicted as "outrage" over the publication today in The New York Times and The Washington Post of the gist of a private subcommittee staff report recommending possible perjury and contempt-of-Congress charges against five government officials as failing to testify fully about the C.I.A. role in Chile.

The staff report, prepared by Jerome I. Levinson, chief counsel of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, was rejected today.

"The commotion over the leaks almost wiped the whole thing off but they are going ahead," one source who attended the committee meeting said later.

The disagreement inside the committee over how to proceed with the inquiry was made clear by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho and chairman of the Subcommittee on the Multinational Corporations, which heard the apparently misleading testimony during hearings into the International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation's involvement in Chile in early 1973.

"Our policy in Chile was unsavory and unprincipled," Mr. Church told reporters today. "It can't possibly be justified unless we take the view that our methods and objectives are the same as those in the Soviet

"The Chilean affair warrants

a full investigation by the Senate," Senator Church added.

#### Fulbright Noncommittal

Mr. Fulbright was noncommittal, however, when asked whether he expected the staff investigation to lead to a review of the Nixon Administration's foreign policies as well as the involvement of Secretary of State Kissinger in the Chilean decision-making.

In his staff report, Mr. Levinson recommended that the Senate committee reopen its confirmation hearings on Mr. Kissinger, saying he "deceived" the committee about Chile.

"We'll have to wait for the report," Mr. Fulbright said. "I don't know whether we should have further hearings or not."

Mr. Fulbright, who reportedly has been offered the ambassadorship to Britain after he leaves the Senate, depicted the publication of the Levinson report as "regrettable" and added that "the staff has no business putting out a memorandum of that sort."

A similar view was expressed by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, as he left the closed hearing. Asked whether there was committee concern over the C.I.A. involvement in Chile, Mr. Pell said that "the concern was more that statements should be made by Senators, and not by staff."

Committee sources said that the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, directed by Pat M. Holt, was requested to complete its preliminary review of the evidence by next week. These persons said that the new study would incorporate some of the findings of the Levinson report.

Mr. Levinson, in his memorandum, called for possible perjury and contempt of Congress proceedings against Richard Helms, former director of Central Intelligence, William V. Broe, a former C.I.A. official, Charles A. Korry, who was Ambassador to Chile from 1967 to 1971.

## State of the nations

# The CIA problem

By Joseph C. Harsch

Three recent events in the news suggest fairly strongly that the role of the Central Intelligence Agency needs some pretty serious rethinking.

First was the discovery that President Nixon attempted with some preliminary and partial success to use the CIA for domestic partisan political ends. We trust this will not happen again soon, but it is unthinkable that the CIA should become an instrument of domestic factionalism. More safeguards are desirable.

Second is the strong suspicion that the CIA gave too much comfort for far too long to the now thoroughly discredited former regime of the colonels in Athens. That regime caused a lot of trouble. The worst thing it did was to unleash the coup d'etat on Cyprus against Archbishop Makarios which brought down his regime, unleashed a wave of terror, brought in a massive Turkish Army to Cyprus, and undid a generation of patient effort to produce peaceful coexistence between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus.

The national interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean are best served by good relations between Greeks and Turks. Anything that embitters rather than improves Greek-Turkish relations deserves the United States. Insofar as the CIA supported and encouraged the colonels it injured the best interests of its own country. The evidence seems pretty clear that the colonels did get some CIA aid. The whole matter ought to be brought into the open as a first step toward changes which can prevent a repetition of such counterproductive activity.

Third, the evidence is now impressive that the CIA sought deliberately to prevent Salvador Allende from becoming President of Chile and when he did, in 1970, spent more money in an attempt to "destabilize" that regime.

The official policy of the Government of the United States toward the Allende regime was one of tolerance and noninterference. The State Department insists that it refrained from any interference in Chile's internal affairs which, so far as the State Department itself is concerned, may well be true. The State Department isn't supposed to know what the covert side of CIA is up to. Sometimes it actually doesn't, although Henry Kissinger, then at the White House,

sat on a special subcommittee of the National Security Council which approved the project of "destabilizing" the Allende experiment in Chile.

The point here is that the bringing down of the Allende regime was an act of clandestine war against a theoretically friendly government. It was authorized covertly by a covert branch of the executive establishment. This infringed upon the constitutional right of the Congress to declare war. It was the waging of covert and undeclared war by a branch of the government which has no constitutional right to do such things.

Granted the Soviets do precisely such things. And it often boomerangs against them.

The lesson surely is that bringing down a supposedly friendly government is much too serious a business to be entrusted to clandestine operators. If the Congress chooses to declare war on a foreign country, it then becomes the duty of the executive establishment to implement that policy. But it's time to get the initiative in such matters back into the public domain.

Perhaps it did seem desirable back in 1964 to try to keep Senor Allende out of office in Chile. And undoubtedly it seemed desirable to a lot of people in high places in Washington to keep him out of office in 1970. And after 1970 many wanted to see his experiment ended as quickly as possible. But he was installed as President by constitutional means. He was forced out of office in a bloody revolution which has put a military dictatorship into the most democratic and formerly most prosperous country in South America.

The results of clandestine interference in the internal affairs of Chile would certainly seem to suggest that this is a poor way of doing the national business.

The CIA has had an excellent record in gathering and weighing intelligence about other countries in the world. Its record of clandestine activities has been marked by less success, the Bay of Pigs being the classic example. Covert subversion is a highly dubious activity. If it must be done, surely it must be more subject to congressional supervision and control than in the past.

BALTIMORE SUN

17 September 1974

## Secret '40 Committee' steers CIA

## Five men sabotaged Allende

By JOHN J. FARMER

The Philadelphia Bulletin

Washington—On a warm Saturday morning, June 27, 1970, Henry A. Kissinger, addressing the most secret committee of the United States government, laid down in highly personal terms what was to become official U.S. policy toward Chile.

"I don't see why we should have to stand by and let a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people," he reportedly declared.

That statement, according to government intelligence sources, was made to the 40 Committee, a five-member group so secret that its existence was unknown at the time to the vast majority of Congress, the press, and even the White House staff.

Dr. Kissinger, through a State Department spokesman, said he could not recall making the statement but, in any case, could not comment on 40 Committee activities.

The 40 Committee is elected by no one and responsible to no one except the President, who appoints its members.

Serious students of foreign-policy making have questioned whether, in a democracy, such a five-person directorate should have this kind of unbridled power, whether the five are really in touch with American public opinion, and whether Congress should not have tighter reins on their covert programs.

As a consequence of the 40 committee's action, however, large sums of Central Intelligence Agency money were poured vainly into Chile to avert the election of leftist Salvador Allende. That money was followed in later years by even larger sums to "destabilize" the Chilean economy and topple the Allende regime.

With the Chilean military uprising in 1973 and Dr. Allende's violent death, the policy ultimately succeeded.

But it has produced in recent days several developments certain to provoke a new national debate on the role of the CIA and even of

Dr. Kissinger himself.

It has:

- Focused attention, at last, on the 40 Committee, dominated by military and intelligence professionals of the World War II-cold war vintage, as the real overseer, even operator, of the CIA's covert activities and responsible only to the President.

- Made clear the emergence of Dr. Kissinger as the most powerful nonelected official in the nation's history, standing astride the intelligence, covert operations and foreign policy apparatus as secretary of state, chairman of the National Security Council, national security adviser to the President and chairman of the 40 Committee.

- Destroyed what was left of the belief that at least a few members of Congress have knowledge of and a veto over the Cloak-and-dagger aspects of the CIA.

"The CIA is the tool of the President and it works today for Kissinger," according to one government source.

The history of the U.S. government's Chilean adventure dates to 1964 when Dr. Allende, a proclaimed Marxist, first sought the presidency. CIA funds helped his Christian Democratic opponent, Eduardo Frei, capture the presidency that year.

But Mr. Frei could not succeed himself and the Allende threat was seen by Washington as greater than ever. This time even more money was funneled by CIA into anti-Allende efforts.

In all, according to secret testimony April 22 by the CIA director, William E. Colby, as revealed by Representative Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.) the agency pumped \$11 million into anti-Allende efforts in Chile between 1964 and 1973. It was spent as follows:

- About \$500,000 was advanced in 1963 to help Chilean individuals and organizations gear up to oppose Dr. Allende the next year.

- Another \$500,000 went to opposition party personnel during the 1970 campaign.

- Following Dr. Allende's election, \$5 million was authorized to disrupt the Chilean economy from 1971 to 1973, and \$1.5 million more was spent to influence

1973. Some of these funds helped finance an influential Chilean newspaper.

- Finally, in August, 1973, just one month before President Allende's downfall, another \$1 million was authorized to press home the effort to wreck the Chilean economy, already in trouble because of Dr. Allende's own misguided policies.

In each case, the effort and the expenditure were approved by the 40 Committee, or by the same committee operating under an alias.

"No more mysterious group exists within the government than the 40 Committee," David Wise, a journalist who has long been a student of the U.S. intelligence community, said.

"Its operations are so secret that in an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director Colby was even reluctant to identify the chairman."

The Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala—each of these was a CIA covert operation approved by the 40 Committee, or its predecessors.

In most cases, it appears, Congress was kept in the dark, at least until after the operations were completed, and sometimes beyond that.

The Chilean intervention is an example of how this blindfolding of Congress works.

On March 29 this year, Charles A. Meyers, the former assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, told a Senate subcommittee that "the policy of the government ... was that there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile ... We financed no candidates, no political parties ..."

As late as June 12—two months after Mr. Colby's secret admission—Harry Schlaudeman, No. 2 person in the American Embassy in Chile from 1969 to 1973, denied that any such U.S. effort was made.

"There was no funding, of that I am quite sure," Mr. Schlaudeman told a closed hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Colby emphasizes when questioned that the agency makes full secret reports to the "appropriate" congressional committees, the so-called CIA "oversight" subcommittees of the House and Senate.

But what they are told, according to a former top official of the CIA, depends on what questions they ask—and frequently they do not ask the right questions.

"The CIA deals with Congress in the way that Congress requests it to," the official, who requested anonymity, said "Often they don't know enough to ask the right questions. But it's their fault."

Among the subjects that have escaped close congressional questioning has been the operations of the 40 Committee.

Despite its anonymity, the committee appears to have existed since before 1954, under several different names.

The names have been deliberately designed to provide no clue as to its function. Its members communicate mostly by word of mouth, with little paperwork and a staff of one man, believed to be a CIA employee.

"You can look all you want but you won't find any document with the title '40 Committee' on it," a former intelligence officer said. "It's like, officially, at least, it didn't exist."

From its pre-1954 origins as a loose group of top State and Defense department officials, the group has evolved a fixed membership based on title and formalized in a directive of the National Security Council. The name 40 Committee is believed to refer to a National Security Council directive No. 40.

Dr. Kissinger, as national security adviser, took charge of the 40 Committee under President Nixon and retains the chairmanship today.

The other members are Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; William P. Clements, Jr., deputy secretary of defense; Joseph J. Sisco, under secretary of state for political affairs and Mr. Colby, the CIA director.

They are men in their 50's,

veterans of the World War II and cold war periods.

Mr. Colby's membership, according to critics, is the classic story of the "fox in the chicken coop"—the CIA director, in effect sitting in judgment on plans and proposals of his own agency.

At times, other officials have sat in; John N. Mitchell, as Mr. Nixon's attorney general, was a 40 Committee member, and there is some dispute over whether the late Robert F. Kennedy, in his turn as attorney general, also was a member.

It is believed that Mr. Nixon's controversial assistants, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, also attended meetings, but evidently not as members.

Each 40 Committee, according to past and present intelligence officers, has tended to become an extension of the chairman chiefly because he alone has access directly to the President.

Dr. Kissinger has come to dominate the 40 Committee and to an extent some intelligence specialists here believe is dangerous.

In the past, for example, the 40 Committee met

weekly, but as Dr. Kissinger's own responsibilities have expanded, he has convened the committee less frequently, intelligence specialists here say.

Much of the time, according to several sources, Dr. Kissinger merely confers with the other members by telephone, dealing with them individually rather than as a group, and passing on to the President the consensus that he alone has had a real—and in fashioning.

The result, according to specialists who have served in both the CIA and State Department, has been to concentrate decision-making in fewer hands, mostly Dr. Kissinger's hands.

"A lot of the consultation and argument that went on is missing now," one official said.

The controversy over Dr. Kissinger's role extends to the Chilean adventure and who really initiated it.

The CIA clearly has taken most of the heat to date, but at least one official highly placed in the State Department from 1970 to 1973, the years of the most ambitious

anti-Allende effort, believes the "CIA may be getting a bum rap."

The idea for intervention, he said, appears to have come from the White House—"from Nixon to Kissinger."

It was then farmed out to the CIA to develop a plan and provide funds and routed routinely back to the 40 Committee, where Dr. Kissinger, as chairman, approved what may have been his own plan, this source said.

The agenda of the 40 Committee includes some of the most delicate foreign policy decisions of the government. Besides the CIA's covert projects, it also reviews and approves monthly a joint reconnaissance schedule that involves, among other things, the use of spy satellites around the world.

Outside the intelligence community there is criticism of the secrecy that shrouds the CIA and hands over its operations to a non-elected elite such as the 40 Committee.

But within the intelligence community here—people sympathetic to the need for

clandestine policy alternatives in a divided world—the concern is that there is not enough control of the CIA by institutions such as the 40 Committee.

For example, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, former U.S. intelligence officers and authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," maintain that covert operations account for only \$440 million of CIA's estimated budget of more than \$750 million a year. The actual figures are a closely held secret.

By far the larger, more important operation—world-wide espionage—is subject to no review by the 40 Committee.

This is true even if the espionage involves an operation as sensitive as hiring a key official of a foreign government—as has been done in Latin America, at the risk of a serious diplomatic incident.

Even covert operations approved by the 40 Committee have some history of generating capers never envisioned by the 40 Committee. The Soviet sugar case is an example.

WASHINGTON STAR  
17 September 1974

## William F. Buckley: *The CIA and Allende*

Two questions have been raised on the CIA-in-Chile front. The first is whether State Department officials deceived congressional committees by reporting that the United States government had taken no action to frustrate the inauguration or success of Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The second is whether the United States government should have done so.

Needless to say the second question, which is more important than the first, is receiving practically no attention. The first absorbs the front page.

FRANKLY, I DO NOT know what is the correct prescription for State Department officials appearing before congressional committees that ask deeply sensitive questions.

The routine answer is to demur, on the grounds of executive privilege. But that privilege, as we all know, is in high disrepute these days, so that congressional interrogators tend to press on, where yesterday, they'd have let things lie.

How, for instance, would

you, if you served as an ambassador, say, to Hitler's Germany, and you were collusively intriguing with the resistance movement, answer such a question as: "Mr. Ambassador, is the State Department engaged in any contacts whatever with the opposition to the official government of the Third Reich?" You could say: "No"—which would be a lie. You could say: "Yes"—which would be the truth, and would blow the operation. Or you could say: "I can't discuss that."

In which case the press—yes, the press, because as we have just seen with the supposedly secret testimony of CIA chief William Colby before a congressional committee, in due course we all end up reading what he said—is invited to draw inferences, namely that in fact you are in touch with the resistance.

To this dilemma there is no easy solution.

BUT RETURNING now to Chile. It is alleged that the CIA was authorized by the

Nixon administration to spend up to \$8 million over a three-year period to prevent if possible, and if not possible then to frustrate, the government of Salvador Allende. This is accepted prima facie as appalling.

One wonders: what in the world is the Central Intelligence Agency supposed to do?

We have been formally committed since the days of President Monroe to the doctrine that no foreign country would be permitted to colonize a country in the Western Hemisphere. Granted, we backed away from that doctrine *pari passu* with our retreat from the Bay of Pigs. But the altogether official rhetoric of the United States in its dealings with Latin America has been to incline towards freedom and sovereignty.

The assertion that Allende was "democratically" elected, and that therefore we had no business opposing him, begs questions procedural and substantive.

For one thing, Allende's percentage of the vote was less than Sen. Goldwater's in 1964. But more important, Allende

was the outspoken friend of socialist tyranny, and the notion that we should deny to his opponents such help as we gave them suggests that the United States should be totally indifferent to the growth within Latin America of a government dominated by a man whose idol was Fidel Castro.

IT MAY BE that interference of any kind in the affairs of another country should be discouraged. But is it really a purely Chilean "affair" if it is contemplated that hundreds of millions of dollars of American investments are to be confiscated? Is it purely a Chilean affair if the country becomes a base for revolutionary activities against its neighbors?

Are we in fact prepared to retreat so completely from the inaugural ideal of John F. Kennedy ("We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty . . .") as to stop any clandestine effort to help our friends in other countries to help themselves?

LONDON SUNDAY TIMES

15 Sep 1974

# The night they grilled the CIA

By Henry Brandon  
Washington



Colby: survival lesson

THE Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby, proved yesterday that in his days as an undercover agent he had learnt how to survive alone in hostile territory. He spoke at a conference on the CIA and covert activities, hosted on Capitol Hill by Senators Edward Brooke (Republican, Massachusetts) and Phillip Hart (Democrat, Michigan); it was as if General Sir Walter Walker had come to address a TUC meeting.

Mr Colby faced a hostile panel of well-known critics of the CIA, including seven former members of the agency like Daniel Ellsberg, and also an obviously hostile audience that consisted mostly of 300 young "new Left" CIA-haters. He not only defended the CIA's role, after two days of speeches by critics, but also sought to promote a legislative proposal for the equivalent of an official secrets act to protect "good secrets."

Questions about the CIA's activities in the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, which surfaced as the result of a congressional "leak," Mr Colby fended off by saying that he would answer them only in executive session of the appropriate congressional committees. However, he claimed that the CIA's operations in covert action are taken only as directed by the National Security Council and

that "they are frankly and regularly reported to the appropriate committees, and they require only a small proportion of our effort and time."

When Mr Colby said the CIA had no connection with the military coup that overthrew Allende, but that agency "looked forward to a change in the government there by democratic means," the generally good-natured audience broke into laughter. He added that he had reread his secret testimony of last April which leaked out here earlier in the week, and found that he had not used the phrase "destabilise the Allende government" which he was quoted as having used in describing the application of clandestine funds that had been authorised by the "Forty Committee" of the National Security Council.

When asked how much specific

information Congress is given about covert actions, Mr Colby said it was "made aware at appropriate times of various major actions," and when asked whether the American ambassadors in Chile were kept informed of covert activities there, he replied that such information is primarily given to the Under Secretary of State and that ambassadors are informed on a "need-to-know basis."

He refused to say whether those ambassadors to Chile who had testified before Congress that the US to their knowledge maintained a "hands-off" policy had lied. He insisted, however, that all major efforts and money spent in Chile were known to several committees of Congress and that therefore the CIA, in the end, remains accountable to the voters.

Asked whether there would now be a conflict of interest between Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller and his enterprises in Latin America—which the questioner claimed had been used as cover for intelligence operations—Mr Colby, who always maintained a truly stiff upper lip however insulting or indiscreet the question, replied that this was, "No useful subject for discussion."

To a question about whether the CIA intended to intervene to prevent Greece from leaving NATO, Mr Colby replied that Greece's action had no immediate adverse effect on the security of the US and furthermore that

covert actions have no impact on current activities.

Daniel Ellsberg congratulated Mr Colby on the CIA's participation in getting the famous secret speech of Mr Khrushchev in 1955, and then seemed to place his own feat of leaking the Pentagon Papers in the same category. Mr Colby recalled that when President Nixon introduced him to Mr Brezhnev on his visit to Washington and the Russian leader asked the CIA director whether he was a dangerous man, he replied that he was not, and that "the more the US and Russia know about each other the safer we will be."

When asked how many people he had killed in connection with Operation Phoenix in Vietnam, Mr Colby eagerly replied, "none," and added that the majority were killed in military combat or police action. His interest was to capture the Viet Cong, he said, because a dead man could not impart information.

In his speech, Mr Colby sought to shift the emphasis from covert operations because, he said, the CIA's predominant role now is concerned with information and analytical responsibilities. Though he had to endure some strong language—such as being called an "assassin"—he was also given credit by some, like the Director of the Centre for National Security Studies, who said: "What a wonderful thing that you came to face your critics."

NEW YORK POST  
10 Sept. 1974

## Double-Standard Diplomacy

A few weeks back, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded a special inquiry by warmly reaffirming their approval of the nomination of Henry A. Kissinger as Secretary of State. Last spring, it has now been revealed, there was another kind of confirmation hearing. It confirmed suspicions that the Central Intelligence Agency had done its best—or worst—to bring down the Allende government in Chile.

The proceedings, as we noted yesterday, featured closed-door testimony by CIA Director Colby that the CIA was given authority to invest more than \$3 million between 1970 and 1973 to overthrow Allende—who died a year ago, assertedly by his own hand, after a ruthless military coup. Colby, a specialist in covert CIA operations, explained that they had been approved by an intelligence board headed by Kissinger.

To Rep. Harrington (D-Mass), that information immediately suggested Congressional probing. While Kissinger has often objected that there should be no U. S. interference in Soviet "internal affairs"—such as policy on emigration—he apparently holds different views

about American intervention in Chile. But Harrington, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has been unable so far to secure any commitment to investigate from either his group or its Senate counterpart.

That is hard to understand, even though the Secretary has been treated by Congress as a sacrosanct personage for some time. Allende frequently charged that he was a CIA target—and he was evidently correct. Many of the most prominent members of his government still suffocate in the junta's jails. And anxious speculation is inevitable about how many other governments are deemed by the CIA and the intelligence board headed by Kissinger to be appropriate subjects for U. S. financed subversion.

The issue is not whether the Allende regime was beyond reproach; it is, among other things, whether we have a double standard under which freely-elected governments are subject to our covert sabotage while despotisms are considered beyond even moral remonstrance. Are these topics taboo for the Fulbright and Morgan committees? Who has a clearer duty to investigate them?



## Meddling in Chile by the CIA

William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has denied all over again that the CIA had any connection with the military coup that toppled Chile's Marxist government a year ago. As far as we know, there is no evidence to the contrary. It now seems clear, however, that the agency did intervene repeatedly in Chilean politics.

Congress has the right and the responsibility to pin down once and for all what did happen, and to initiate appropriate action against any Administration officials who are found to have deliberately misled Congress as to the nature and extent of U.S. involvement.

In secret testimony before a House subcommittee last April, according to Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), Colby described a number of clandestine operations in Chile over the past decade. Some were public knowledge already; some were not.

Harrington, who has read the still-secret transcript, says Colby confirmed that the CIA spent \$3 million in 1964 to support the candidacy of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei against that of Dr. Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate. Frei won.

In 1970, when the next presidential race was thrown into the Chilean Congress because none of the three candidates won a majority, the CIA was authorized to spend \$350,000 in bribes to prevent Allende from being chosen president. Colby is said to have indicated, however, that the plan was ultimately dropped as "unworkable." In any event, Allende became president.

Colby is described as testifying that, after Allende took office, the CIA was authorized to spend \$5 million for "destabilization efforts" and support for anti-Allende forces.

Allende's Communist-Socialist government committed so many blunders on its own that the military coup in September, 1973, was probably inevitable, even if the CIA's clandestine anti-Allende campaign had never taken place.

It seems self-evident, however, that the United States has no right to interfere in the politics of a democratic country, even if there is reason to fear that the election of a given leader will be injurious to U.S. interests.

Even more worrisome is the possibility that responsible officials deliberately misled Congress in earlier public hearings on the matter.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of a Senate subcommittee that held hearings on possible CIA involvement in Chile, has properly announced that if a review of the testimony indicates that Congress was lied to, he will refer the matter to the Justice Department for possible perjury prosecutions.

As the Idaho senator said, the habit of deceiving Congress on sensitive foreign policy issues cropped up during the Vietnam war. And if it's still going on, "It's a habit the Congress is going to have to break."

NEW YORK TIMES  
15 September 1974

### KISSINGER CALLED CHILE STRATEGIST

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14—Secretary of State Kissinger personally directed a far-reaching Nixon Administration program designed to curtail economic aid and credits to Chile after the election of President Salvador Allende Gossens in 1970, well-informed Government sources said today.

These sources said that after the election of Dr. Allende, Mr. Kissinger, who was then serving as President Nixon's adviser on national security, took charge of a series of weekly interagency meetings at which Administration officials worked out a policy of economic sanctions—or "retaliation," as one source put it—against Chile.

#### Covert C.I.A. Activities

The Nixon Administration repeatedly denied that there was any overt program of economic sanctions against Chile, publicly stating that the Chilean Government's inability to get loans and credits after Dr. Allende's election was a reflection of its

poor credit risk.

There was no immediate comment from Mr. Kissinger.

The Secretary of State has been under increasing criticism from Congress since it was revealed last week that the United States had authorized more than \$8-million for clandestine activities by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Allende Government from 1970 to 1973. The funds were approved by the 40 Committee, a high-level panel headed by Mr. Kissinger that is in charge of overseeing the C.I.A.'s covert activities.

Although he is Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger remains as President Ford's national security adviser and thus still heads the 40 Committee.

The sources emphasized that Mr. Kissinger's economic activities against the Allende Government were distinct from his involvement in clandestine C.I.A. operations, although both programs were controlled by him with great secrecy.

Mr. Kissinger's decision to become personally involved in the economic reprisals against the Chilean Government angered a number of high-level State Department officials, who considered his action to be a sign of mistrust toward the department, the sources said.

"The whole purpose of the

meetings in the first couple of months after the election was to insure that the various aid agencies and lending agencies were rejiggered to make sure that [Allende] wasn't to get a penny," said one well-informed source.

Over the next two years, the Chilean Government was denied dozens of loans by the World Bank, a multinational loan agency over whose activity the United States has virtual veto power, and by the Export-Import Bank, a United States Government agency. In addition, Chile's short-term line of credit with private banks fell from \$220-million in 1971 to less than \$40-million a year later.

In a speech on Dec. 4, 1972, to the United Nations, Dr. Allende complained of "large-scale external pressure to cut us off from the world, to strangle our economy and paralyze our trade in our principal export, copper, and to deprive us of access to sources of international financing." The Allende Government was overthrown in a bloody coup d'etat 10 months later in which the Chilean leader died.

The most explicit Administration denial of such economic pressure came during hearings last year on Chile before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, in which John M. Hennessy, then an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, had the following exchange with Sen-

ator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the subcommittee chairman:

Senator Church: "So the position of our Government on the state of the economy in Chile was such that Chile was not credit-worthy, and that no further loans should be made owing to the general condition of the economy. Is that correct?"

Hennesy: "That is correct."

A number of sources characterized the Nixon Administration's curtailment of credit and aid to Chile as a political decision that was initiated shortly after Dr. Allende formally took office in November, 1970.

"There was a range of alternatives being considered," one source recalled. "The options ranged from a marine-type invasion to massive infusions of money. When Allende became President, everybody breathed a sigh of relief because we hadn't done anything."

"Once he was President, then there was set in motion a carefully planned program led by Kissinger," the source added. "He personally chaired—for maybe as long as 10 or 12 weeks—a working staff group dealing with economic sanctions. It was our understanding that the President was extremely concerned about Allende and Henry was showing him that he was on top of it."

The New York Times's sources include former Nixon Administration officials who were involved in the decision-making on Chile after the elec-

tion of Dr. Allende. Other information was supplied by Congressional officials who have had access to all of the sworn testimony on Chile.

The sources said that the working group included officials at the assistant-secretary level from the State Department, the Pentagon and the Treasury Department as well as Mr. Kissinger and other National Security Council aides. During that period, sources said, a formal National Security Council Decision Memorandum ruling out economic aid to Chile was issued.

Normally, the interagency unit would have been under the chairmanship of the Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. But, the sources said, the Assistant Secretary at that time, Charles A. Meyer, had fallen into disfavor with the White House because of his resistance at meetings of the 40 Committee to some of the clandestine C.I.A. activities authorized against the Allende Government.

"It was a big blow to the State Department," another source said. "It was a Kissinger group."

"It stuck in my mind because Kissinger, in effect, became a Chilean desk officer," the source added. "He made sure that policy was made in the way he and the President wanted it."

BALTIMORE SUN  
19 September 1974

*Joseph Kraft*

## Wider Abuses than Chile Justify Fuss over CIA

The fuss over the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile is not really about that agency or that country.

It emerges chiefly from a deep general suspicion of the instruments of national security. If he truly wants to heal the country, President Ford will have to go out of his way to assuage this suspicion.

Two major questions ought to be asked at all times about the CIA. The first engages the role of the agency in making and unmaking foreign governments by the black arts of sabotage and subversion.

That issue seems to be central to the present stir over Chile. The case grew out of a letter written by Representative Michael J. Harrington (D., Mass.) and leaked to the press. The letter purported to summarize testimony to a House subcommittee by William E. Colby, director of the CIA.

According to the letter, Mr. Colby testified that the agency spent \$8 million between 1970 and 1973 to help the opposition to the Popular Front government of President Salvador Allende. The letter said the funds were used in order to achieve the "destabilization" of the regime. The implication was that the CIA arranged the coup that overthrew Dr. Allende last year.

In fact the word "destabilization" was not used by Mr. Colby in his testimony. It is hardly thinkable that so small a sum—for \$8 million is virtually nothing in the modern intelligence game—could have caused the fall of the Chilean government.

President Ford said at his news conference what his informed sources also say—

that the money was used only to sustain democratic newspapers and political leaders.

It is as clear as it can ever be in this sort of murky business that the CIA did not play a significant role in the Chilean coup.

The second big question turns on the responsiveness of the CIA to the elected leadership in the White House and Congress. Everybody agrees that in Chile the CIA was obedient to the wishes of the Nixon administration.

What is in doubt is the question of keeping Congress informed. Several high officials—including the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, and former CIA director, Richard Helms—denied in testimony before various elements of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had fomented the Chilean coup.

Technically, those statements appear to have been accurate. Moreover, it is traditional that black-bag operations of the agency are not revealed to the regular legislative committees of Congress but to a special watchdog committee.

Even if they did not tell the strict truth about such operations to the Foreign Relations Committee, in other words, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Helms and the others were operating within established guidelines.

However, if the particulars of the Chilean case do not justify the fuss, the general atmosphere of the past few years does. Throughout the Vietnam war, Congress and much of the country were systematically deceived about the operation of the CIA and its security policy.

Over and over again in the Watergate case, President Nixon and those around him invoked the term "national security" as the justification for covering up common crimes.

Many intelligent and well-meaning people have come to believe that the whole apparatus of national security is bogus—a cover for something illegitimate and improper. That is why the apparent improprieties of the CIA in Chile have excited such attention.

If President Ford is to end what he has called the long national nightmare, he will have to soften these feelings. Unfortunately, he seems not to understand the depths of the doubts about national security. Thus when questioned about Chile at his news conference Monday night, he gave a national security response straight out of the 1950's: "Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelli-

gence field to implement foreign policy and to protect national security."

The same lack of understanding entered into the blunder committed in the pardoning of President Nixon. The administration theory was that the curse would be taken off the pardon by the amnesty for Vietnam war resisters.

Mr. Ford evidently did not realize that the opposition to Vietnam rested on deep general doubts about national security actions—not on the relatively trivial issue of the draft dodgers.

The point of all this is that the country is seriously and deeply divided on fundamental issues of national security. President Ford is going to have to take account of those divisions. He will have to try to understand the other side. Otherwise, he will end up, as his two predecessors did, limping out of the White House.

NEW YORK TIMES  
19 September 1974

## FORD TO BRIEF FIVE ON C.I.A. ACTIVITIES

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18—Secretary of State Kissinger announced today that he and President Ford would personally brief five House and Senate leaders tomorrow on the scope of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert operations.

"We will put it before them in detail and ask them, 'What do you want,'" Mr. Kissinger said aboard Air Force One as it returned here from New York, where President Ford addressed the United Nations.

Administration officials said that the President had decided to brief the Congressional leaders after his strong defense of all C.I.A. covert activities in his news conference Monday night. The President publicly confirmed then that the agency had been involved in clandestine efforts in Chile, but he depicted them as having been aimed only at aiding newspaper and politicians opposing President Salvador Allende Gossens, who, Mr. Ford said, was attempting to suppress criticism.

The White House's announcement followed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's announcement yesterday that it had authorized a full-scale study into what has been called misleading testimony in the Senate about the C.I.A.'s role in Chile. Targets of that inquiry are known to include, Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence; John M. Hen-

high-level State Department officials, and Mr. Kissinger himself, who testified about United States involvement in Chile during his Senate confirmation hearings last fall.

Those invited to the briefing tomorrow, Mr. Kissinger said were the Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana; the Senate Republican leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania; Speaker of the House Carl Albert of Oklahoma; the House Democratic leader, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. of Massachusetts, and the House Republican leader John J. Rhodes of Arizona.

Administration officials said that Mr. Kissinger and President Ford were confident that covert operations—such as those in Chile—could be defended on national security grounds. If these operations were dropped, these officials insisted, an "overwhelming case" could be made that peril to the security of the United States would be increased.

One high-level official, asked whether such beliefs on the part of Mr. Kissinger and President Ford amounted to an endorsement of United States intervention in foreign countries, replied that the question was a philosophical one worth debating.

Concern over lack of effective Congressional oversight has been repeatedly expressed by ranking Senate and House members since newspaper disclosures last week that the C.I.A., despite prior disclaimers, had been authorized by Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon to spend more than \$8-million between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it more difficult for Mr. Allende, a Marxist, to govern.

The Chilean President was overthrown last year in a military coup d'état in which he died.

Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida, re-

WASHINGTON POST

19 September 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

# Kissinger or Schlesinger?

In affirming on Tuesday that Henry Kissinger would still wear two hats as both Secretary of State and director of the National Security Council (NSC), President Ford was postponing the ultimate choice between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

Although Mr. Ford denied published reports that his transition team recommended that Mr. Kissinger be stripped of his NSC hat, the President did not divulge confidential recommendations from intimate advisers. They had been urging the appointment of a new NSC director, ending Kissinger's unprecedented control over global policy and perhaps even reducing him to roughly the same level as Schlesinger. Accordingly, these same advisers believed (perhaps hoped) that cutting Kissinger down to human size would result in his abrupt resignation.

This showdown has been postponed, but there seems little chance that Kissinger and Schlesinger can coexist in the Ford administration into next summer. Furthermore, despite Tuesday's assurance from the President, Ford insiders believe it is Schlesinger rather than Kissinger who may ultimately survive.

Even if they agreed on policy, confrontation between Kissinger and Schlesinger would have been inevitable. Never before have two such brilliant intellectuals simultaneously held the Cabinet portfolios for state and defense. "Here are two egomaniacs," contends one high official who knows them both well. Two smart egomaniacs, which makes it worse."

But the fact is that they most certainly do not agree. Schlesinger believes Kissinger's detente diplomacy concedes too much to Moscow on all fronts—SALT, mutual force reductions, the European Security Treaty. Contending that detente is not so fragile a flower, he would take a much harder bargaining line.

It was therefore predictable that Schlesinger would grow restive with total domination of national security policy by Kissinger, wearing both his NSC and State Department hats. But President Nixon, obsessed by Watergate, never even approached the problem. Kissinger reigned supreme.

Mr. Ford's accession seemed to confirm that supremacy. As Vice Presi-

dent, Mr. Ford sought a personal relationship with Kissinger while privately expressing doubts that the pipe-smoking, donnish Schlesinger could sell defense budgets on Capitol Hill. Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's old deputy temporarily kept on as chief of staff by President Ford, felt that diplomatic strategy in negotiating with Moscow was no business of the Secretary of Defense.

The impression of Schlesinger's impending doom was confirmed by Mr. Ford's first weeks in office. Intimates reported him displeased by Schlesinger's professorial style of exposition. White House staff papers gave the President the totally erroneous impression that the Pentagon brass distrusted Schlesinger because he had never worn the uniform. The President was not happy about Schlesinger's publicly revealing his precautions against a military takeover during the Nixon-Ford transition.

But within the past week or so, the climate has changed. Key Ford aides now defend Schlesinger and urge his retention. His position is certainly not hurt at the White House by Haig's imminent departure. Moreover, Schlesinger's friends have this long-range view: Mr. Ford is essentially a congressional bargainer without Nixon's Wilsonian world vision; as such, he in time will be attracted by Schlesinger's insistence on tit-for-tat bargains with

the Kremlin.

Finally, Kissinger's perceived indispensability has been sharply eroded by the Cyprus crisis and the Chilean revelations. Newsmen last Tuesday morning were stunned when told by Rep. Albert Quie of Minnesota, a close congressional ally of Mr. Ford's, that Kissinger should go. But Quie's view is increasingly prevalent in congressional cloakrooms. Accusations that he masterminded Central Intelligence Agency intervention in Chile has energized bitter, simultaneous campaigns against him from both left and right.

Preoccupied by the Nixon pardon and Vietnam amnesty, Mr. Ford has not addressed the important disagreements over detente policy between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Nor does he have to decide between them immediately.

But following the Chilean revelations, Ford insiders began urging that Kissinger's authority be diluted by the appointment of a new NSC director. The threat to Kissinger's supremacy posed by this recommendation was unsettling, obviously to President Ford and less obviously even to some officials who disagree with Kissinger on policy. Contending that there is no alternative to Kissinger as possible Mid-eastern peacekeeper in the coming months, they want the status quo retained.

Even some of these officials, however, believe the long-term coexistence of Kissinger and Schlesinger is impossible. Within no more than six months, they believe, the President must choose between them. While it would not have been credible just a month ago, it is by no means certain today that the choice will be Henry Kissinger.

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THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974

## Out into the open

### THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE

By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.  
*Alfred A. Knopf; London: Jonathan Cape. 419 pages. £3.95.*

The recent revelations that the CIA spent large sums of money between 1970 and 1973 in efforts to overthrow the Allende government in Chile will not have come as a surprise to those few people who followed the events there with care and patience. In addition to these specialists, there is a huge number of casual readers who might have been surprised if they had not read, or heard about, this recent popular account of some of the CIA's activities, written by a veteran of 14 years' service in the agency in association with a former member of the American foreign service.

Published in July in the United States this book has already had considerable influence. It has provoked a major court decision on the right of American government agencies to withhold information, and it has been largely responsible for the Administration's asking for new legislation to tighten up and clarify laws covering not only the security of information but also means of enforcing them in cases where individuals such as Daniel Ellsberg and—it must be added—Messrs Marks

and Marchetti themselves see fit to make public information that they have agreed to keep secret.

But the book was not written so much about the system of classifying information as about an issue that is fundamental to the intelligence establishment of the United States: that the CIA, originally established to co-ordinate the intelligence activities of the various branches of government—the State Department, military services, FBI, National Security Agency (NSA) and the rest—has been forced out of this role, and has concentrated on its mission of clandestine operations, and that such operations have included unethical meddling in the affairs of foreign governments.

This charge is true. The so-called intelligence community is huge and compartmented and not well managed. In fact, according to the authors, it is hardly managed at all. They also make the fair point that the NSA's communications interceptors and code-breakers and the mammoth Defense Intelligence Agency have most of the money and power and that neither wishes to be co-ordinated by the CIA, whose political machinations abroad are well known and well documented. Having made this point early on, the authors suggest in the last chapter that the cure can be found in separating the co-ordinating functions of the CIA

nished his call today for more effective control over the Central Intelligence Agency after a series of hearings that ended today before his inter-American affairs subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Fascell said he was "deeply distressed" that he and his colleagues had not been fully informed of the agency's activities in testimony given earlier this year by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
19 September 1974

## The CIA: Chile and elsewhere

By Charles W. Yost

from operations. This makes good sense.

Between, however, the initial exposition of the problem and the proposed cure, the book is a rambling and disjointed account of some of the CIA's clandestine adventures and a lot of boring material about internal organization, policies and procedures. It is not a history of the CIA. The authors would be the first to confirm this, as they consistently make the point that the CIA and the whole American intelligence community are so compartmented that no one knows what is going on, and that, in effect, a lot of time is spent rediscovering the wheel. Although the individual accounts of clandestine operations are sometimes interesting, there is not much here which is really new: the Bay of Pigs (the war which was the undoing of Allen Dulles, arguably the best director the CIA ever had), Air America and the secret war in Laos, Che Guevara in Bolivia and the attempt to overthrow Sukarno are all rehashed at length.

The most intriguing parts—and the main feature of the book—are the deletions ordered by a federal court judge (identified by the word "delete" and a gap in the page the size of the deleted material) and the words that the CIA asked to have deleted but which the authors refused to delete and which are now printed in bold-face type. Although it initially gives the reader a sense of being in on something novel to read these bold-type sentences, not much is given away here, either. In fact, one is left with a sense of incredulity that there could have been any dispute at all over many of them. Surely, one hopes, there is more substance to the passages that the judge deleted. Or could the whole thing be a gigantic CIA hoax designed to get Congress to tighten up the security laws? Unlikely as this may seem, if one believes even a fraction of the escapades and hare-brained ideas the book attributes to the CIA's clandestine branch, such an operation is not entirely incredible. This is not the best book written about the CIA; but, because of its legal and legislative ramifications, it could turn out to be the most important one.

New York

Is it not high time that the United States Government, Congress, and people drew some operative conclusions from the repeated and embarrassing public predicaments in which the CIA has involved them over the past 15 years?

The most recent debate on the subject arises from the avowal by the director of the agency that it did expend considerable sums in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power and, after he had nevertheless acceded, to weaken or undermine him.

I have not had an opportunity to examine the record sufficiently to judge whether, as claimed, other witnesses misled congressional committees on this point, though there certainly is prima facie evidence that they were not wholly candid. I should myself, however, support the U.S. Government's contention that, whatever the CIA may or may not have done in Chile, it did not "overthrow" Allende.

Allende was overthrown by Chileans. He never at any time had the support of the majority of the people. He was overthrown because he and his more radical adherents alienated, frightened, and ultimately radicalized in the opposite sense the unconverted majority, particularly its most powerful element, the military.

It is necessary to make this point in order to clarify the broad issue — whether admitted CIA activities in Chile, even if they played no substantial part in the overthrow of Allende, were in the national interest of the U.S. I would argue that they were not.

American and other Western spokesmen have for the past half century been pointing out that, while the Marxist revolutions in the Soviet Union and elsewhere were no doubt directed to noble ends, the atrocious means so often employed grossly distorted and even vitiated those ends. Yet since the onset of the cold war the U.S. has taken a leaf out of the Communist book and too often resorted to means so shabby we dare not avow them. In the long run this does not pay.

Ignoble means debase and demoralize the actors, corrupt and brutalize those acted upon and, in so doing, transform and disintegrate the end itself. This is as true for democrats as for Communists.

The consequence of a quarter century of "dirty tricks" by the CIA, that is, the U.S. Government, has been to make the agency throughout the world a symbol for unscrupulous intervention in other people's internal affairs and hence often to undermine, rather than to serve, the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

We see how it is almost universally believed in Greece that the CIA inspired the July 15 coup in Cyprus which set in train the subsequent

disasters. I believe this is a mistaken judgment, because upsetting the status quo was so obviously counter to U.S. interest. But the fact it is plausible to suppose that the CIA might have inspired the coup if it had been in the U.S. interest lends color to the accusation.

A New York Times story last week quotes a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Delhi to the effect that the recent revelations about CIA activities in Chile have confirmed the worst suspicions of the Indians about that agency and caused Indira Gandhi to wonder whether the Indian Government may not be the next target for elimination. This is hardly the image of its foreign policy and practice the U.S. Government should wish to see widely held around the world.

Supporters of CIA activities of this kind think of themselves as "hard-nosed" realists. The Bay of Pigs is one instructive example and Gordon Liddy's little operation at Watergate is another.

The fact is the "dirty tricks" conducted by agents of the U.S. Government very rarely serve the national interest of the United States, even if one interprets these interests in strictly "cold-war" terms. Experience has shown that they cannot be adequately "controlled" within the executive branch, because it is so often the controllers, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs and perhaps of Chile, whose perceptions and judgments are at fault.

Vietnam has tragically demonstrated the limitation on the capacity of the U.S. to determine the structure of an alien society even by a massive injection of armed force. How much less likely that America could hope to do so by clandestine operations. The U.S. can, no doubt, occasionally contribute to the rise or fall of a particular government or politician, but over the longer run indigenous forces, which it cannot control, will determine whether this superficial change has any lasting effect.

In referring at a public meeting in Washington last week to proposals that CIA abandon its covert action programs, director William Colby said: "In light of current American policy, it would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States."

While the triple use of the word "current" is ominous, this statement is mildly reassuring. It is to be hoped that the President and Secretary of State will be persuaded that, in the broader perspective, these "dirty tricks" do more harm than good to the national security and should be phased out.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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Christian Science Monitor

12 Sept. 1974

# Remodeling the CIA

## more cloak, less dagger

From red wigs at the Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in to bumbling armies in Laos, the CIA has been getting a bad press lately. Here a longtime capital newsman and seasoned observer of the intelligence and 'dirty tricks' agency comments on how the spy agency could be overhauled.

By Benjamin Welles

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The spies may not all be in from the cold — but the canaries are starting to sing.

The trickle of critical "exposes" about the Central Intelligence Agency by ex-employees or associates is becoming a flood. Each book seems to generate another, as America's spies go public for the good of their souls, their pocketbooks, or both.

In recent years — apart from Wise and Ross's "The Invisible Empire," an excellent journalistic work — there have appeared Patrick MacGarvey's "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," J. Fletcher Prouty's "The Secret Team," and Alfred McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

Just out is "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, the most authoritative to date. Now looming over the horizon is still another expose; this one planned by Philip B. F. Agee, who spent many years under-cover in Latin America until in 1969 he quit the CIA, apparently much disillusioned, to retire to England. His British publishers, Penguin, are said to have been asked to cut several passages by British intelligence — working, presumably, at the behest of their American counterparts.

"This publicity is unprecedented," said an intelligence specialist here. "The CIA seems unable to hold cover on anything these days. It must really be bothering them."

So it appears. Six months ago the new CIA director William F. Colby, a trim ex-Princetonian with a quarter-century experience in clandestine operations, sent up for White House approval draft amendments to the 1947 National Security Act (which created the CIA). If passed by Congress — which now seems increasingly unlikely in today's reaction to Watergate — the legislation would impose 10-year jail terms and \$10,000 fines on anyone violating what the CIA calls "secrecy."

### Exposes preferred to denials

Under Mr. Colby's proposals all book, magazine, newspaper, radio, and television exposure of the CIA or its sister intelligence agencies could be blocked or ligated to death. That is, all but what the CIA wants put out, such as pictures of Director and Mrs. Colby on the recent cover of a nationally syndicated Sunday supplement.

In an article inside, Mr. Colby explained how he

was refurbishing the CIA's image, especially by cutting back on "dirty tricks" overseas. Independent and authoritative reports suggest that if dirty tricks abroad are diminishing, the CIA itself is not. At this moment it is expanding its overseas operations, especially in politically wobbly Portugal and Spain, and currently pressing the State Department for more "cover slots" (embassy jobs that provide a legitimate diplomatic cover for CIA agents).

The Agency's bid for censorship power came to light in June, when the agency unsuccessfully sought court orders that would virtually have gutted the Marchetti-Marks book prior to publication. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Va., threw out all but a handful of CIA-demanded deletions and let the book be published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. But the CIA's struggle to control everything written about it continues.

The struggle points up increasing skepticism in Washington over official declarations of what is legitimate "national security" — as distinct from what is merely convenient secrecy to cover up government blundering or illegality.

In this climate of skepticism, especially among young Americans, the nation seems avid for exposes of the CIA and of other government intelligence agencies: Defense Department intelligence, the code-cracking National Security Agency, the spy satellite National Reconnaissance Office. Wary of what their leaders tell them, many Americans seem to be finding the confessions of the spy masters credible and far more interesting than official denials.

What has gone wrong? Two of the many potential criticisms of the CIA come principally to mind. First, the agency has undoubtedly been damaged by revelations in the Watergate hearings of its pliant obedience to White House orders of questionable legality and morality. Second, there is mounting concern about the CIA's size, cost, and contribution to the nation's higher interest.

It is not without significance that the ultra-suspicious Nixon administration placed under former CIA director Richard M. Helms two successive deputies — Gen. Robert Cushman, U.S.M.C., and Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, U.S. Army — each of whom had been personally attached to Mr. Nixon when he was Vice-President. Their political loyalty to Mr. Nixon was unquestioned.

It was General Cushman who, on John Ehrlichman's telephoned instruction in 1971, made available to E. Howard Hunt the false wigs and other spy claptrap used for the burglary of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. It was Mr. Helms, himself, who ordered CIA tapes and memoranda destroyed one week after receiving a request from Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D) of Montana in January, 1973, that all "evidentiary materials" of possible usefulness to the Watergate investigation be preserved.

"The nation must to a degree take it on faith," Mr. Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971 "that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service."

Sen. Howard H. Baker (R) of Tennessee, deputy chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee, raised, in a 43-page report recently issued, many disturbing questions indicating CIA involvement in a wide range of domestic skulduggery — in flat violation of Congress's intent in 1947 when it created the CIA for overseas spying and strong-arm activities and specifically barred it from such actions inside the U.S.

Over the years successive presidents seem to have flouted Congress's ban and have begun using the CIA for domestic political purposes through a series of top-secret (even from Congress) National Security Council Intelligence directives. Only the President and a handful of top aides, including the

Director of Central Intelligence, ever see these.

Defense lawyers for Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez, two of the CIA-subsidized "burglars" caught and sentenced in the Watergate affair and subsequently charged also with having participated in the Ellsberg break-in, have demanded CIA files. They claim that these will show "compelling parallels" between the Watergate, Ellsberg, and "previous" operations.

This reference to "previous" actions suggest to CIA-watchers here the curious break-ins, still officially "unresolved" by the FBI or any other U.S. law enforcement agency, at Chilean diplomatic premises in Washington and New York in 1971 and 1972. At that time the Nixon administration was at serious odds with the then leftist Chilean government headed by Salvador Allende Gossens.

More important than the CIA's unquestioning obedience to questionable White House directives on Watergate, however, is the larger question: How well is the CIA serving the true national interest? The U.S. unquestionably needs swift intelligence. Does it get it from the CIA?

Marchetti and Marks, in their book, make a strong case for reorganizing the agency. With its \$750 million annual budget and its 16,000 employees it is supposed to, but cannot possibly ride herd on all the other intelligence agencies in the federal government.

The CIA director, with sub-cabinet rank and that \$750 million budget, cannot and does not control the intelligence operations of the Defense Department, whose Secretary has full cabinet rank and an annual budget exceeding \$80 billion. As one recent Defense Secretary told this writer, "If Helms had ever come to my office and told me how to spend my intelligence funds I'd have told him to get ... out of here!"

Presidential directives and Mr. Colby's assertions notwithstanding, the CIA spends about 12 cents of the annual U.S. intelligence dollar (\$750 million out of \$6 billion). So long as the Pentagon controls the spending of 80 percent (\$4 billion out of the total \$6 billion) it will rule the roost. Power in Washington means control of "resources" — and compared with the Pentagon's the CIA's are limited.

The CIA at the start had a real function. In 1948, at the beginning of the Cold War, President Truman needed a "strong arm" group to spy on and counter Soviet machinations in war-shattered Western Europe, Greece, Iran, Korea, and elsewhere. He selected a former OSS man, Frank G. Wisner, and told him to create such a group and to report directly and solely to Secretary of State Marshall and Defense Secretary Forrestal.

Mr. Wisner's team, code-named the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination), unquestionably helped the visible NATO forces block Soviet ambitions in Western Europe through a combination of brains, brawn, and enormous secret slush funds.

During the Korean war, however, Mr. Wisner's clandestine operators were merged with the fast-expanding CIA, and, ever since Allen Dulles became CIA chief in 1952, the mystique of "covert" action has dominated the agency. Successive directors — Dulles, McCone, Helms, now Colby — have tended to favor the agency's clandestine action role rather than that originally foreseen by Congress, namely that of objective intelligence evaluation.

Even today two-thirds of its employees (about 10,000) and half its budget (about \$375 million) belong to the clandestine side of the house.

And what are the "operators" doing? In the 1960's they ran secret air forces in the Congo, a secret army of 30,000 anti-Communist guerrillas in Laos, otherwise took the field with questionable efficacy in Cambodia and Vietnam. But now, with the U.S. leaving Indo-China, what is their function? "Buy-

ing" Third World politicians? Subsidizing newspapers and trade unions in Latin America, Africa and Asia? If so, under what rules and what watchdog?

The U.S. needs intelligence on troop deployments and missile developments in the U.S.S.R. and China, its only potential military rivals. But spy satellites and electronic interception already provide 98 percent of such information. Human agents are supposed to discern an enemy's intentions as distinct from his capabilities.

But since the Russians detected Col. Oleg Penkovsky spying for the British and the Americans and shot him in 1962, intelligence experts concede that the CIA has derived virtually nothing of national importance from spies in the Communist world. What it gets principally is information passed on by Communist-bloc politicians, much of which is gossip and hearsay.

Bureaucratic momentum carries the CIA along, senior senators and congressmen who have the power to impose reforms have neither the time to probe nor the inclination. There are no votes or campaign contributions here; it is easier to look the other way.

"Control" over the CIA, which the agency touts endlessly in self-justification, is a fiction. The CIA is the President's secret arm, and no President inheriting such awesome power is likely to give it up.

### Watchdog panel recommended

Only he and his intimate aides can find out what it is doing, and so long as the CIA follows their orders — rightly or wrongly — the nation and Congress will remain essentially in the dark.

The PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), a watchdog panel of 12 or more distinguished citizens, spends two days a month in Washington purportedly examining CIA and other intelligence agency functions; far too little to know the facts. The OMB (Office of Management and Budget) reviews the CIA's secret yearly budget, but OMB is the President's instrument.

True "control" over the CIA could nonetheless be assured by creating an independent panel of, say, 6 to 12 retired judges plus academics, industrialists, scientists, and such consumers of intelligence material as ambassadors, generals and admirals, preferably recently retired, too. The key word here would be "independent."

Such men, free from bureaucratic loyalties and from all ambition but service to their country, could hew through agency propaganda to the sinew of national usefulness. It could be done, if any current or future president wanted it done.

In six months to a year such a group would know what to recommend: scrapping or keeping various functions. Certainly the CIA's intelligence evaluation function is vital. So is counterespionage, a highly subtle technique — which the FBI performs at home — but which CIA experts perform abroad in close liaison with friendly intelligence services.

A case might be made for continuing and expanding CIA research and development — especially to help monitor SALT or other disarmament agreements on which world peace may largely depend if the "balance of terror" is slowly dismantled.

But what seems long overdue is a ruthless pruning of the clandestine services now in their 26th year: overstaffed, overfunded, and increasingly out of tune with America's mood.

Only the President of the U.S., in the last resort, can remold the CIA. He can abuse it, as Mr. Nixon did in the Watergate and Ellsberg cases, or he can use it as Congress intended and as the national interest demands: a supreme tribunal sifting through the oceans of intelligence that lap the shores of the U.S. daily and then passing the conclusions to the decisionmakers.



NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1974

# C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes In Chile That Beset Allende

## Intelligence Sources Report That Money Was Distributed to Help Truck and Taxi Drivers to Prolong Crises

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 — The Central Intelligence Agency secretly financed striking labor unions and trade groups in Chile for more than 18 months before President Salvador Allende Gossens was overthrown, intelligence sources revealed today.

They said that the majority of more than \$7-million authorized for clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile was used in 1972 and 1973 to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti-Allende strikers and workers.

William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, had no comment when told of The Times's information.

In testimony today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Kissinger asserted that the intelligence agency's involvement in Chile had been authorized solely to keep alive political parties and news media threatened by Mr. Allende's one-party minority Government. The clandestine activities, Mr. Kissinger said, were not aimed at subverting that Government.

Among those heavily subsidized, the sources said, were the organizers of a nationwide truck strike that lasted 26 days in the fall of 1972, seriously disrupting Chile's economy and provoking the first of a series of labor crises for President Allende.

Direct subsidies, the sources said, also were provided for a strike of middle-class shopkeepers and a taxi strike, among others, that disrupted the capital city of Santiago in the summer of 1973, shortly before Mr. Allende was overthrown by a military coup.

At its peak, the 1973 strikes involved more than 250,000 truck drivers, shopkeepers and professionals who banded together in a middle-class movement that, many analysts have concluded, made a violent overthrow inevitable.

The Times's sources, while readily acknowledging the intelligence agency's secret support for the middle classes, insisted that the Nixon Administration's goal had not been to force and end to the Presi-

dency of Mr. Allende. The sources noted that a request from the truckers union for more C.I.A. financial aid in August, 1973, one month before the coup, was rejected by the 40 Committee, the intelligence review board chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger.

Nonetheless, the sources also conceded that some agency funds inevitably—as one high official put it—"could have filtered" to the truckers union thereafter.

"If we give it to A, and then A gives it to B and C and D," the official said, "in a sense it's true that D got it but the question is—did we give it to A knowing that D would get it?"

The official added that it was "awfully hard" to maintain control over local field operatives, particularly when large sums of cash were involved.

A number of sources also explained that the Central Intelligence Agency, by using the Chilean black market, was able to increase the basic buying power of the \$7-million estimated to have spent on clandestine efforts between 1970 and 1973. The unofficial exchange rate, sources said, was as much as 800 per cent higher than the official rate, indicating that the C.I.A.'s cash could have had a local impact of more than \$40-million.

### Informers Inside Parties

The sources depicted the general involvement of the intelligence agency with the labor unions and trade groups as part of a broad effort to infiltrate all areas of Chile's governmental and political life. The sources said that by the end of the Allende period, the agency had agents and informers in every major party making up Mr. Allende's Popular Unity coalition.

One troubling failure during the latter part of Mr. Allende's power, the sources said, was the agency's inability to infiltrate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, or the M.I.R., the major revolutionary group outside the Allende coalition.

At his news conference Monday night, President Ford declared his support for the C.I.A. involvement in Chile and said that it had been authorized because "there was an effort being made by the Allende Government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press, and to destroy opposition political parties."

In fact, The Times's sources

agreed, less than half the money made available for clandestine activities in Chile was provided for the direct support of the allegedly threatened politicians, newspapers and radio-television stations referred to by Mr. Ford.

### Official Defends Activities

One official, with first-hand knowledge of the decision-making on Chile, strongly defended the intelligence agency's involvement with trade unions and organized strikes.

"Of course, the agency tries to support the people who believe in its aim," he said. "In the taxicab driver strike, our goal is to make sure that he [the driver on strike] is not going to fold. The strike money was used to supply subsistence for people who believed in what you do."

"You've got to understand what was going on," the official added.

"The intelligence reports coming to us were frightening. Allende would send Popular Unity representatives into a business and claim that the worker were complaining about high profits."

"Then they'd take over the books and raise the taxes 50 per cent," he said. "It was a very brutal policy."

"So our idea was to prevent this from working and money was the way to go," the official said. "What we really were doing was supporting a civilian resistance movement against an arbitrary Government. Our target was the middle-class groups who were working against Allende."

"The whole point of this is that covert action provides a 1 per cent impetus for something that the people want anyway," he said. "In a civilized country, the C.I.A. can only make a marginal input. It takes a lot of money and—this is most important—you don't do it unless you're told to [by higher authority in Washington]."

### Aid to Publicize Unrest

Some financial support for newspaper and radio stations was needed in Chile, the official explained, because "it wouldn't have been good to have strikes if nobody knows about it."

Most of the funds invested for propaganda purposes, the official said, went to El Mercurio, the main opposition newspaper in Chile. "It was the only serious political force among the newspapers and television stations there," he said.

"As long as you don't make it sound like we were trying to start a coup, it'll be all right," the official added. "You've got to understand that he [Allende] was taxing them [the middle-class] to death."

The official noted that the policy toward Chile, authorized by the 40 Committee, had been the subject of intense debate in the Nixon Administration. One concern, he said, was that intervention would serve to polarize further the classes in Chile. "And if Allende decided to bear down and destroy the middle class," the

official added, "some of us thought it might result in a dictatorship of the left or the right—and that wasn't such a good idea."

### Military Coup Unexpected

The official described the Administration's policy in Chile as a failure. "We were not looking for a military takeover," he declared.

A different opinion about the ultimate goals of the Administration's policy was provided in an interview by a source who served a number of years in Chile.

"The people within the Embassy, 'felt that they were engaged in a kind of warfare,' 'people either were with you or against you when it came to Allende.'"

"There were a lot of people in Santiago on the far right who were essentially dedicating their lives to the overthrow of Allende—it was like a holy war," the source said. "These people were increasingly seen at the Embassy in 1972 and 1973."

At the time, he added, "just putting some resources at their disposal alone would be enough."

In testimony Monday before a House subcommittee investigating the activities in Chile, Richard R. Fagen, a professor who did research in Chile in 1972 and 1973, said he had been approached by an American Embassy official in Santiago and urged to aid in covert gathering of information on left-wing groups.

Mr. Fagen, who teaches political science at Stanford University, testified that the request had been coupled with an offer to help him exchange personal money "through the black market channels used by the Embassy."

All of the sources interviewed by The Times insisted that the policies regarding the clandestine financing of trade groups and unions had been established and approved by the 40 Committee.

Edward M. Korry and Nathaniel M. Davis, successive ambassadors to Chile during the Allende regime, frequently reported to Mr. Kissinger, then former President Nixon's national security adviser, through confidential channels, the sources said. Reports with less sensitive information were forwarded through the normal State Department channels to Washington, the sources said.

They added that most, if not all, of the C.I.A.'s direct strike subsidies for unions and trade groups were initiated in 1972, after Mr. Davis, a specialist on Eastern Europe, was assigned as Ambassador.

A number of sources further told The Times that Mr. Colby, contrary to many published accounts, had fully briefed two Congressional subcommittees about the intelligence agency's financing of union and trade groups during the Allende regime.

During those briefings, which were before the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Mr. Col-

by sought to emphasize, the sources said, that the C.I.A. began to pull back on its clandestine commitments in Chile late in the spring of 1973, when there were almost weekly reports of an impending coup.

#### Link to Military Severed

At one point in the spring, the sources said, the agency did formally break its direct relations with the Chilean military, which was known to be plotting against President Allende. Although direct contact was eliminated, the sources said, the agency continued to maintain a liaison role for in-

telligence purposes.

There was concern in the C.I.A. a reliable source said, about "getting involved with people who were shorter-term people than we were."

"Our goals were longer term," he said, in an allusion to the official Ford Administration position now that the agency's objective had been to prevent the possible establishment of a one-party Government by Mr. Allende.

Questions about the United States' clandestine role in promoting the 1973 truck strike have repeatedly been raised by supporters of President Allende,

who lost his life in the coup.

In an interview in Mexico City last year, Mr. Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi de Allende, charged that the United States "had a great responsibility in what happened."

She asserted that the truck strike, which involved about 50,000 workers, had been financed by American money. "What were they living on if they were not working?" she asked. "They had to be financed from outside."

In August, 1973, a newspaper in Santiago, *Ultima Hora*, accused the United States of

having financed both the truck strike in the fall of 1972 and a strike then in progress. Mr. Davis, then the Ambassador, refused to comment.

After the coup, the State Department formally denied any financial involvement in the 1973 truck strike or the other work stoppages and protests in Chile, declaring that "such suggestions are absurd."

Jack B. Kubisch, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, refused to answer in public when queried about such financing, during a House hearing after the Allende coup.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974

## C.I.A.'s Covert Role: Ford's Defense Runs Against Current Trend

By CLIFTON DANIEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 —

President Ford helped revive a dying issue last night. That issue was whether it was proper for a democracy, using its intelligence agencies to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

#### News

**Analysis** Mr. Ford, at a news conference, seemed to answer the question affirmatively. He acknowledged that the United States had made an effort to preserve an opposition press and opposition political parties in Chile during the rule of a Marxist President, Salvador Allende Gossens, who died in a military coup in September, 1973.

President Ford justified the effort, which was made during the Nixon Administration, by saying that it was "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest."

"I am reliably informed," Mr. Ford said, "that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purpose."

His response was presumably considered in advance. He had every reason to expect a question on the subject because of the recent disclosure that the Nixon Administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to spend \$8-million on covert activities in Chile between 1970 and 1973.

Indeed, Mr. Ford may have had the help of those who authorized those expenditures in framing his reply. In any event, he chose to defend the behavior of the old Administration rather than chart a new policy for his own.

His response was presumably considered in advance. He had every reason to expect a question on the subject. Last week it was disclosed that the Nixon Administration had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to spend \$8-million on covert activities in Chile between 1970 and 1973. Those activities were approved by the so-called 40 Committee, whose chairman was and is Secretary of State Kissinger.

Mr. Ford possibly may have had the help of those who authorized those expenditures in framing his reply. In any event, the President chose to defend the behavior of the old Administration rather than chart a new policy for his own.

#### Cold-War Rhetoric Seen

Another kind of reply was possible. The President might have said that he was not responsible for past activities of the C.I.A., but would be responsible for its future behavior, and would accordingly review its policies and plans.

He did promise to meet with the Congressional committees that review the covert actions of the agency to see whether they might want to change the review process. Those committees, however, are not noted in Washington for vigor and skepticism.

Mr. Ford himself was a member of one of them for nine years when he was a Representative from Michigan.

His reversion last night to the reason and rhetoric of the cold war, however mildly expressed, led to speculation that his mind was still set in that mold.

"If it was good enough for Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, then it's good enough for Ford," one of the President's friends remarked today.

"That's the way he thinks."

Even in an Administration that has been dedicated to openness and candor, President Ford was judged in Washington to have spoken with remarkable frankness.

"It is the first time in my memory that a President has come out flatly and said, 'We do it, the other side does it, and we do it,'" said Prof. Richard N. Gardner, a specialist in international law at Columbia University, speaking from New York.

Secret C.I.A. operations such as the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953 and President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and later operations in Laos have been identified when they became too big and notorious to be con-

However, none has ever been acknowledged as readily and fully as the Chile operation, although the acknowledgment was low-keyed.

It came, oddly, when such activities seemed to be going out of style. Eighteen months ago the Nixon Administration let it be known that the clandestine operations of the C.I.A. were being curtailed.

—M1 Just last week, William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, said it was "clear that American policy today is different from when it was confronting worldwide Communist subversion in the nineteen fifties or Communist insurgency in the nineteen sixties."

"As a result," Mr. Colby told the Ford for Peace conference in Washington, "C.I.A.'s involvement in covert action is very small indeed."

Abandoning covert action entirely "would not have a major impact on our current activities or the current security of the United States," Mr. Colby acknowledged.

However, the capacity for such action may be needed in case of some new threat, he added, and it would be a mistake to "leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and

sending the Marines."

There was a conspicuous difference in tone between Mr. Colby and President Ford, his new boss, but both seemed to take it for granted that the United States had the right to intervene in the affairs of other countries in its own interest.

When Mr. Ford was asked what international law gave the United States the right to "destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country," the President declined to talk about law, but said, "it's a recognized fact that historically, as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved."

Commenting on that, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is a high-ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said today:

"It seems he declared that the United States respects no law other than the law of the jungle in its dealings with foreign countries. He equates us with the Russians. I thought there was a difference, and the difference is what it's all about."

LONDON OBSERVER  
8 Sept. 1974

# CIA/THE UNDERCOVER EMPIRE

In our final excerpts from 'The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence' (Cape £3.95), VICTOR MARCHETTI and JOHN D. MARKS unveil the commercial secrets of the Central Intelligence Agency—which tried first to veto their book, and then to censor it. After a battle in the American courts, 171 CIA cuts were restored and published in black type (including those below). Blank spaces in the book indicate the remaining 168 deletions (including those identified below as • • •).

AMONG the most secret weapons of the Central Intelligence Agency have been, for years, the 'proprietary corporations' or, simply, 'proprieties'—ostensibly private institutions and businesses which are in fact financed and controlled by the CIA. From behind their commercial and sometimes non-profit covers, the Agency is able to carry out a multitude of clandestine activities.

The best-known were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both established in the early 1950s, and their corporate structures served as something of a prototype for other Agency proprietaries. Each functioned under a cover provided by a board of directors made up of prominent Americans, but CIA officers in the key management positions made all the important decisions.

Often the weapons and other military equipment for an operation—like the covert intervention in the Congo in 1964—are provided by a 'private' arms dealer. The largest such dealer in the United States is the International Armament Corporation, or Interarmco, which has its main office and some warehouses on the waterfront in Alexandria, Virginia. Advertising that it specialises in arms for law-enforcement agencies, the corporation has outlets in Manchester in England, Monte Carlo, Singapore, Pretoria, and several Latin American cities. Interarmco was founded in 1953 by Samuel Cummings, a CIA officer during the Korean War. Although it is now a truly private corporation, it still maintains close ties with the CIA.

Direct CIA ownership of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and direct involvement in Interarmco, are largely past history now. Nevertheless, the Agency is still very much involved in the proprietary business.

Incredible as it may seem, the CIA is the owner of one of the

biggest—if not the biggest—fleets of 'commercial' airplanes in the world. Agency proprietaries include Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport, Rocky Mountain Air, Southern Air Transport, • • • and several other air charter companies around the world.

Air America was set up in the late 1950s to accommodate the Agency's rapidly growing operations in South-east Asia. As US involvement deepened in that part of the world, other Government agencies also turned to Air America to transport their people and supplies. In fact, Air America was able to generate so much business in South-east Asia that eventually other American airlines took note of the profits to be made.

One private company, Continental Airlines, made a successful move in the mid-1960s to take some of the market away from Air America. Pierre Salinger, who became an officer of Continental after his years as President Kennedy's press secretary, led Continental's fight to gain its share of the lucrative South-east Asian business.

Rather than face the possibility of unwanted publicity the CIA permitted Continental to move into Laos, where since the late 1960s it has flown charter flights worth millions of dollars annually. And Continental's best customer is the CIA itself.

But even with Continental flying in Laos, the Agency was able to keep most of the flights for its own Air America which, before the ceasefire in Vietnam, was flying 125 planes of its own, with roughly 40 more on lease. It was one of America's largest airlines, ranking just behind National in the total number of planes. Now that the US military forces have withdrawn from the Vietnamese theatre, the role of maintaining a significant American influence has reverted largely to the CIA—and Air America is finding its services even more in demand. Even the International Supervisory and Control Commission, despite the membership of Communist Poland and Hungary, has signed a contract with the CIA proprietary to support its supervision of the Vietnam ceasefire.

Perhaps the CIA's most out-of-the-way proprietary was located in Katmandu, Nepal. It was established to provide air support for Agency-financed and directed tribesmen who were operating in Chinese-controlled Tibet. As the Tibetan operations were cut back and eventually halted during the 1960s, this airline was reduced in size to a few planes, helicopters, and a supply of spare parts. Still, up to the late 1960s, it flew charters for the Nepalese Government and private organisations in the area.

The CIA's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Staff back in Largs, Virginia, believed that the airline's usefulness as an Agency asset had passed, and the decision was made to sell it off.

But for the CIA to sell a proprietary is a very difficult process. The Agency feels that it must maintain the secrecy of its covert involvement, no matter how moot or insignificant the secrecy, and it does not want to be identified in any way, either before or after the actual transaction.

Although the boards of directors of the air proprietaries are studded with the names of eminently respectable business leaders and financiers, the companies' operations were actually for a long time in the hands of one rather singular man, George Doole, Jr. Until his retirement in 1971, Doole's official titles were president of the Pacific Corporation and chief executive of Air America and Air Asia; it was under his leadership that the CIA air proprietaries blossomed.

Doole was known to his colleagues in the Agency as a superb businessman. He had a talent for expanding his airlines and for making them, functionally if not formally, into profit-making concerns. In fact, his proprietaries proved something of an embarrassment to the Agency because of their profitability.

Doole's empire was formally placed under the CIA's Directorate of Support on the Agency's organisation chart, although many of its operations were supervised by the Clandestine Services. But so little was known inside CIA headquarters about the air proprietaries, which employed almost as many people as the Agency itself (18,000), that in 1965 a CIA officer with extensive Clandestine Services experience was assigned to make a study of their operations for the Agency's top officials.

This officer spent the better part of a year trying to assemble the relevant data, and became increasingly frustrated as he proceeded. He found that the various proprietaries were constantly trading, leasing, and selling aircraft to each other; that the tail numbers of many planes were regularly changed; and that the mixture of profit-making and covert flight made accounting almost impossible. He finally put up a huge map of the world in a secure Agency conference room and used flags and

pins to try to designate what proprietaries were operating with what equipment in what countries. Finally, Richard Helms, then Deputy Director, was invited to see the map and be briefed on the complexity of the airlines. A witness described Helms as being 'aghast.'

In 1968, the CIA's Executive Committee for Air met to deal with a request from George Doole for several million dollars to 'modernise' Southern Air Transport. Doole's justification for the money was that every major airline in the world was using jets, and that Southern needed to follow suit if it were to continue to 'live its cover.' Additionally Doole said that Southern should have equipment as effective as possible in the event the Agency had to call on it for future contingencies in Latin America.

Previous to Doole's request, the Agency's Board of National Estimates had prepared a long-range assessment of events in Latin America. This estimate had been approved by the Director and sent to the President at the White House as the official analysis of the intelligence community. The estimate strongly implied that continued open US intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations would only make matters worse and further damage the American image in that region.

At the meeting, Doole was asked if he thought expanding Southern's capabilities for future interventions in Latin America conformed with the conclusions of the estimate. Doole remained silent, but a Clandestine Services officer working in paramilitary affairs replied that the estimate might well have been a correct appraisal of the Latin American situation, but that non-intervention would not necessarily become official American policy. The Clandestine Services man pointed out that over the years there had been other developments in Latin America—in countries such as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic—where the Agency had been called on by the White House to take action against existing political trends; and that the Director (and the Clandestine Services and Doole) also had a responsibility to be ready for the worst contingencies.

In working to strengthen Southern Air Transport and his other proprietaries, Doole and the Clandestine Services were following one of the basic maxims of covert action: Build assets now for future contingencies. It proved to be persuasive strategy, as the Director personally approved Doole's request and Southern received its several million dollars for jets.

So if the US government decides to intervene covertly in the internal affairs of a Latin American country, Doole's planes will be available to support the operation. These CIA airlines stand ready to drop their legitimate charter business quietly and assume the role they were established for: the transport of arms and mercenaries for the Agency's 'special operations.' The guns will come from the CIA's own stockpile, and from

the warehouses of Interarmco and other international arms dealers. The mercenaries will be furnished by the Agency's Special Operations Division, and, like the air proprietaries, their connection with the Agency will be 'plausibly deniable' to the American public and the rest of the world.

THE same technological explosion which has affected nearly every other aspect of modern life has also drastically changed the intelligence trade.

A report on clandestine activities in Latin America during the 1960s by the CIA Inspector General, for example, revealed that a good part of the intelligence collected by the Agency in that region came from audio devices. In quite a few of the Latin nations, the report noted, the CIA was regularly intercepting the telephone conversations of important officials and had managed to place bugs in the homes of many key personnel, up to and including cabinet ministers. In some countries allied to the US, the Agency shares in the information acquired from audio surveillance conducted by the host intelligence service, which often receives technical assistance from the CIA for this very purpose—and may be penetrated by the CIA in the process.

The Agency's successes with bugs and taps have usually been limited to the non-Communist countries, where relatively lax internal security systems do not deny CIA operations the freedom of movement necessary to installing eavesdropping devices.

In technical espionage, America's first experience came in the form of radio intercepts and code-breaking. In 1952 the President, by secret executive order, established the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept and decipher the communications of both the nation's enemies and its friends and to ensure that US codes were secure from similar eavesdropping. The NSA, though placed under the control of the Defence Department, soon established an independent bureaucratic identity of its own—and at present has a huge budget of well over a billion dollars per annum and a work-force of some 25,000.

Although the NSA engineered some success against the Eastern European countries and Communist China in its early days, for at least the last 15 years it has been completely unable to break into the high-grade cipher system and codes of these nations. Against such major targets, the NSA has been reduced to reading comparatively unimportant communications between low-level military components and the equally inconsequential routine exchanges between low-grade bureaucrats and economic planners. This is far short of learning the Soviet Union's or China's most vital secrets.

As with so many other parts of the American intelligence apparatus, the NSA has had considerably more success operating against the Third World countries and even

what is reportedly the largest bank of computers in the world and thousands of cryptanalysts, the NSA has had little trouble with the codes and ciphers of these nations.

Sometimes the Agency may conduct a physical attack on another country's communications system: a clandestine operation to steal a code book or cipher system, the suborning of a communications clerk, or the planting of an audio device in an embassy radio room. Within the CIA's Clandestine Services, a special unit of Foreign Intelligence (espionage) Staff specialises in these attacks.

Numerous foreign embassies in Washington are already wiretapped, but by the FBI. This wiretap programme, like some of the NSA intercept operations, also provides information about Americans. In co-operation with the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (a Bell subsidiary), FBI agents regularly monitor the phones in the offices of all Communist Governments represented in Washington; on occasion, the embassies of various non-Communist countries have their phones tapped, especially when their nations are engaged in negotiations with the US Government or when important developments are taking place in these countries.

And it is not only foreign embassies which are kept under surveillance. The State Department long ago recognised that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which supposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.

When, in 1968, the Ambassador to Iran, Armin Meyer, ran into trouble with the CIA station chief in Teheran, Meyer switched his communications with the State Department in Washington to one of these 'secure' channels. But the CIA had none the less figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington; and the CIA Director received a copy of each interception. Written on top of every cable was a warning that the contents should be kept especially confidential, because the State Department was unaware that the CIA had a copy.

American embassies abroad have suffered, of course, from bugging. But today the likelihood of the KGB eavesdropping on the activities in an embassy code room is extremely remote. Most State Department communications overseas are handled by the CIA. The machines and other equipment are cushioned and covered to mute the sounds emanating from them. The rooms themselves are encased in lead and rest on huge springs that further reduce the internal noise. Resembling large camping-trailers, the code rooms now are normally located deep in the concrete basements of embassy buildings. Access to them by sound-sensitive devices is, for all practical purposes, impossible.

The official justification for all the technology—the wiretaps and audio devices, and satellite flights—is to gather intelligence to help

protect the national security of the U.S. Sometimes, the machinery is justified. One of the finest hours for the CIA and the intelligence community was produced by the Cuban missile crisis; although the last National Intelligence Estimate, prepared by the CIA a little over a month before President Kennedy went on nationwide television to announce the Cuban 'quarantine,' declared that it was unlikely that the Soviets would install nuclear-tipped missiles on the island. The fact remains that the CIA and the other intelligence agencies did discover—from U2 spy planes, and communications intercepts—the missiles in time for the President to take action, and they presented the facts to Kennedy with no policy recommendations or slanting which could have limited his options. This was how the intelligence process was supposed to work.

The basic reason that the CIA analysts were able to monitor the Soviet arms build-up more closely than the other intelligence agencies, which had essentially the same information available, was the more refined technique that the CIA had developed, including a special analytical tool known as 'crate-ology'—a unique method of determining the contents of the large crates carried on the decks of the Soviet ships delivering arms. With a high degree of accuracy, the specialists could look at aerial photographs of these boxes, add information about the ship's embarkation point and Soviet military production schedules and deduce what the crates contained.

More often, though, besides supplying information, the CIA has a profound effect on the actual planning and carrying out of American foreign policy. Even the White House has not imposed close

control of the Agency. One executive organisation set up to control it is the 40 Committee. The ubiquitous Dr Kissinger chairs this committee, just as he heads the three other principal White House panels which supervise the intelligence community. The committee is supposed to meet once a week, but its non-CIA members from the State Department and the Pentagon have so many responsibilities in their own departments that meetings are frequently cancelled.

Nor is the 40 Committee an effective watchdog when it does meet. According to one veteran intelligence official, it 'was like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get \$5 million out of the 40 Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy.'

The 40 Committee fails to keep close watch on secret reconnaissance activities, is ineffective in monitoring the CIA's covert activities, and is totally in the dark on classical espionage operations. President Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger were unquestionably aware of its shortcomings and did little to change things.

For six years it was Nixon and Kissinger who ultimately determined how the CIA operated, and if they did not want to impose closer control, then the form of any control mechanism was meaningless. The fact remains that both men believed in the need for the US to use clandestine methods and 'dirty tricks' in dealing with other countries, and the level and types of such operations obviously coincided with their views of how America's secret foreign policy should be carried out.

As long as the CIA remains the President's loyal and personal tool to be used around the world at his and his top adviser's discretion, no President is likely, barring strong, unforeseen pressure, to insist that the Agency's operations be brought under closer outside scrutiny. Congressional oversight has been generally limited to voting the CIA more than enough money for its needs, without seriously questioning how the funds would be spent.

To be sure, four separate subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services committees were responsible for monitoring the CIA, but their supervision was minimal or non-existent.

So the time has come, in our view, to demysticise the intelligence profession, to disabuse people of the idea that clandestine agents somehow make the world a safer place to live in, that excessive secrecy is necessary to protect the national security.

These notions simply are not true. The CIA and other intelligence agencies have merely used them to build their own covert empire.

The US intelligence community performs a vital service in keeping track of and analysing the military capability and strengths of the Soviet Union and China, but its other functions—the CIA's dirty tricks and classical espionage—are a liability for the country, on both practical and moral grounds.

The best solution would be not simply to separate the Clandestine Services from the rest of the CIA, but to abolish them completely. This would deprive the Government of its arsenal of dirty tricks, but the republic could easily sustain the loss—and be better for it.



# GENERAL

BALTIMORE SUN  
15 September 1974

## Impasse at strategic arms talks points to need for rethinking

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — When the strategic arms limitation talks resume Wednesday, there doubtless will be the customary moment of excitement and optimism in Geneva. But if appearance is to fit reality, the opening flourishes quickly will fade into stalemate.

By usual standards that would be a discouraging prospect. Indeed it is, in the broad sense that equitable agreement is not in sight. The opportunities on the face of it are enormous, because in their primary purpose, that of limiting the power of nuclear power to destroy each other, the Soviet-American negotiations are at a new beginning.

Still, in the views of a disparate group of theoreticians, stalemate may be a good thing in the circumstances. They all agree on the merits of arms control in the abstract. Their judgments of what ought to be done, however, vary greatly.

### Rethinking in order

What they do agree on is that any arrangement that might grow out of current conceptions on both sides most likely would be ill-advised and that rethinking is in order.

The reasons for doubt range widely across arms control ideology. One school holds that the United States is not prepared to compromise enough; another that Washington has been too soft with the Russians and must get tougher. All are frustrated by awareness that none of the arms control measures now in effect has limited the overall destructive power of nuclear arsenals substantially, if at all.

There is frustration, but more necessary optimism, in the official position of the administration. U. Alexis Johnson, the chief U.S. negotiator, will not be carrying an empty briefcase in Geneva. With some agony the administration has scraped together a credible holding position for Mr. Johnson, though it does not have a larger design for the talks.

If there is to be substantial progress in this second round of what has become the SALT II it will not come until

long after Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, visits Moscow at the end of October. Nor is there much reason to be optimistic about the results then. The U.S. is limited by internal debate in what it can offer. Nothing the Soviet Union has done lately suggests it might make the kind of compromises the U.S. could accept.

Given the more urgent crises of Watergate and the economy, the bleak situation at the arms talks has escaped wide public attention.

Another for the lack of public interest is that earlier accords have been oversold, partly for cosmetic reasons, partly because some of the negative dynamics of limited arms control only now are becoming clear. The ballyhoo that accompanied the modest arms-control record of the Moscow summit talks in July provides a case history of oversell.

Former President Nixon returned on July 3 and stopped breathlessly at Loring Air Force Base in Maine to inform Americans of the results.

"In the field of arms limitation," he said, "three of the agreements we reached are of special note."

He cited the restrictions on underground testing of nuclear warheads, the confinement of each country to one defensive missile complex instead of the two agreed on earlier and plans to seek "a new agreement to cover the period until 1985" on restriction of offensive weapons.

In fact the two sides, from experience with cost and likely effectiveness, adopted the further limitation on defensive rockets with mutual relief.

The agreement to limit underground tests indeed was pioneering in the sense that it was the first time such restrictions have been imposed. But it would not take effect until 1976—and rapid testing can be expected in the meantime.

It would forbid only tests of warheads more powerful than 150,000 tons of TNT. And it has faded into a sort of limbo since the return from Moscow.

The reasons for its disappearance reach back to a comparison of the Soviet Union's Moscow only in principle. For

the agreed restrictions applied only to military tests. Nuclear testing for peaceful purposes would be permitted—a course the Soviet Union plans to follow and the U.S. does not—with terms to be negotiated later.

Several things about this dimmed the glamour of the underground test limitation. For one thing, the 150-kiloton ceiling on the size of tests exceeded anything either government might be expected to test in the near future. Dr. Kissinger conceded that the ceiling was directed at "the next generation of weapons."

For another, it became quite clear that Congress and the public might not take kindly to Moscow's popping off so-called peaceful nuclear explosions while the U.S. sat and watched. A nuclear explosion is a nuclear explosion, with potential military application no matter what it is called, by all accounts. Although Moscow indicated it would permit outsiders to observe the tests, Soviet willingness to allow any real monitoring was regarded as at best doubtful.

The result has been that the underground test agreement has been shelved without going to Congress pending agreement on so-called peaceful explosions. That agreement, in most observers' views, will be a long time coming.

Mr. Nixon left his greatest gap in his explanation of the state of negotiations on offensive rockets and warheads. Instead of bringing a new agreement to succeed the five-year accord of 1972 "significantly closer," as he said, the discussions in effect left deadlock.

The underlying reason is obvious. Offensive weapons are now more than ever the ultimate determinant of the strategic balance. The interim agreement of 1972 left Moscow with the prospect of superiority in numbers of rockets and power of warheads. It left the U.S. with a lead in technology and above all in numbers of warheads—the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRV's—to be placed on each rocket.

What had become clear before the summit, and was reinforced by the talks, was that the Soviet Union had no intention of

stopping until it had reached superiority in MIRV's as well. The best Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger could get in Moscow was agreement to back up, leapfrog the current impasse, and try to head off the arms race at some greater order of magnitude.

At his briefings in Moscow Dr. Kissinger agonized over the consequences of failure. Given the prospects of Soviet MIRV deployment, he said, the two nations had only 18 months to two years to impose controls before the arms race degenerated into an unmanageable interplay of increasing numbers.

"And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

The answers at home vary enormously. Finding something approaching a consensus is an essential first step toward dealing with Soviet intransigence. At the moment a consensus seems especially remote.

Former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, who says he may run for President again, suggests the U.S. could initiate safely some "limited acts of unilateral restraint" to tempt the Russians. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, the former chief of naval operations, warns that the Soviet Union is nearing a significant margin of strategic superiority and that detente is merely "a central element of the Soviet political offensive." The admiral wants to expand weapons programs, not cut them back.

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), a potential presidential candidate, who is increasingly powerful in strategic affairs, is one who believes Dr. Kissinger is dangerously resolved to reach agreement for its own sake. The senator would link American trade concessions and the export of technology to the Russians to rigidly specified strategic compromise on their part.

"With any future SALT agreement I think we should take a very firm stand," he says. "We should not subsidize their military-industrial complex into the 1980's with a highly destabilizing effect on world peace."

In Senator Jackson's view the U.S. is yet to be applied." In fact, he says, "you



can have a good detente or a bad one, and my judgment up to now is obvious; it's a bad one."

Even within the executive branch there are substantial though still vaguely defined differences. Dr. Kissinger clearly favors linkage in the general sense of weaving a skein of economic, political, and military agreements. But he also appears to believe that agreements feed upon each other and grow, and thus he will settle for less than the hard, fixed terms demanded by Senator Jackson.

#### Precise balance

The Secretary of State's counterpart in the Defense Department, James R. Schlesinger, appears to come down more closely to the Jackson view, at least on the arms limitation talks alone.

From what is known of his differences with Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of Defense demands precision in the balance of forces. Lacing it, he is inclined toward a change in nuclear targeting strategy, a position with possibly more political than military consequences.

For almost a decade the avowed strategic policy of the United States has been "mutual assured destruction." It recognized that neither nuclear power would be allowed by the other to achieve decisive nuclear superiority. Therefore, by this concept, each need maintain only that power necessary to discourage a nuclear attack, and each would do so by holding cities and populations hostage to a retaliatory strike.

If the prevalent interpretation of Mr. Schlesinger's views is correct, the U.S. is moving to target more of the Soviet weapons system directly, on the grounds that Moscow, by insisting on strategic superiority, is seeking the power of nuclear blackmail. Targeting never has been totally selective, of course, and the political perception of change—both at home and in Moscow—may be as important as the reality.

#### varying judgments

These varying judgments all contribute to uncertainty about how the U.S. will proceed when SALT II gets down to substance. They all are held by one constituency or another.

Senator Jackson's view is especially important, representing not only his own considerable power, but also the dominant view of Congress, which historically favors major weapons programs.

The senator was the author of the congressional injunction

in the wake of the first round of the arms talks against any treaty that leaves the U.S. in a position of strategic "inferiority." To the extent that the administration challenges that congressional sentiment, the eventual results of the second round will face rough going on Capitol Hill.

Outside the government there are grave doubts about the arms limitation talks from a quite different perspective. Their most measured presentation comes from many of the so-called defense intellectuals, teachers and former officials whose dedication to arms control is passionate. In their judgment, limited agreements in one area of arms control unhappily have tended to speed up competition in others.

#### "Exacerbating factor"

"It can be plausibly argued," says George Rathjens, professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "that continuing negotiation ... may be an exacerbating factor in the Soviet-American arms competition ... Under the circumstances, a question must be raised as to whether continuing with SALT is desirable."

He made his point in the publication, *Arms Control Today* before Mr. Nixon left office. But he says he sees no reason to change it now.

"I don't see any chance of the Soviets coming around unless we take a very tough line on linkage," he says. "We would have to be very tough in factoring in trade and technology and I don't think this fits the mood of Congress, the White House or the Department of Defense."

The judgment of Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, comes closer to that of Senator Jackson. "My concern," he says, "is that in our eagerness to make progress in detent we have allowed our central strategic interests to erode, mainly in Western Europe and Japan."

Mr. Cline, now director of studies at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes Dr. Kissinger erred in the judgment that Moscow's need for technology and trade could be exploited to American benefit.

#### Little practical effect

"I'm sure they feel in the light of the world economic situation that time is on their side and they might not have to make any concessions at all," he says. "I've not seen any agreement where creative action on our part caused the

Russians to forgo any major development (if doing so) would limit them and benefit us."

Moscow, Mr. Cline says, is "feeling us out. And perhaps we ought to feel ourselves out for a while. A year ago I favored some rather strong self-limiting offer on deployment of MIR, but now I'm more inclined to think we would just hurt ourselves."

Underscores the extent to which the current state of the strategic arms talks grows out of previous agreements. It also demonstrates once again how closely linked the arms negotiations are to the overall pattern of political and economic relations.

It has become more and more apparent that the pattern of agreements, while creating an atmosphere of controls, has had little practical effect in reducing the arms race. The limited test ban treaty of 1963 had the eminently desirable effect of ending nuclear pollution in the air by the great powers.

#### Credible balance

It also was thought that limiting tests would prevent the deployment of bigger warheads because nations would not commit untested devices. But now there is some uneasy retrospective thought that the restriction may have contributed to the U.S. and Soviet decisions to develop MIRV's—using smaller, already tested warheads. And MIRV, of course, is now the main problem.

Other weaknesses in previous agreements are apparent. The nations that might have been expected to go nuclear simply refused to sign the nonproliferation and test ban agreements. Thus China and France—and now India—continue to test in the open air.

The interim limitations on offensive rockets imposed by the 1972 agreements were tailored to what the U.S. and U.S.R. already had planned for the five-year period. They left a credible balance of U.S. sophistication in MIRV's and submarine missiles against numbers of Soviet rockets and mightier warheads. But Moscow moved faster than the Americans had estimated; they could, and now the first Soviet MIRV's will be fixed to rockets in the field within a year.

Under the temporary agreement the U.S. was restricted to 1,000 land-based launchers and up to 710 rockets aboard nuclear submarines. The Russians would be permitted 1,410 land-based missiles and 950 aboard submarines.

American negotiators felt protected by the thousands of extra warheads already being installed on rockets, a figure that could reach 10,000 or more by 1980. But now, given Soviet technological progress, Moscow might also deploy at least that many—with greater explosive power—by the same time, with the capacity to field thousands more.

#### Reappraisals of record

Figures like these also have caused some reappraisals of the past record. In a recent study Mr. Rathjens, Abram Chayes of Harvard University, and J.P. Ruina, professor at M.I.T. and formerly a government adviser on nuclear weapons, worried that some agreements merely had forced development into other areas. But politically, they concluded, the exercises had been useful.

"Even the least important of the efforts has served to bring the superpowers together at times when communications were difficult ..." they wrote. "Moreover, the several arms control efforts may actually have operated to some degree as vehicles for bringing about change."

Time has shown that nations can tolerate a high degree of raw inferiority in simple military terms, as long as they can convince an opponent that attack would bring unacceptable retaliation.

#### Will to act

Moscow is inferior at the moment, but clearly could retaliate against a theoretical U.S. attack. Yet no one has yet figured out a workable balance of these elements of weapons and political will. It is equally certain that the U.S. never will permit Moscow to reach similar superiority.

The will to act, and the other side's perception of it, are corollaries of force, and that throws the strategic debate open to a whole range of political considerations, domestic and external.

# Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST  
16 September 1974

## Envoy Recall Angers U.S. Athens Staff

By Jim Hoagland  
Washington Post Foreign Service

**ATHENS, Sept. 15**—The departure of Ambassador Henry Tasca in diplomatic disgrace this week has embittered members of the U.S. embassy and intelligence communities here.

Embassy staff and Central Intelligence Agency members who felt close to the controversial Tasca see his removal by the State Department as part of an effort to shift the blame for the sharp deterioration of Greek-American relations from Washington to the field.

Diplomats who previously seemed to idolize Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger are privately expressing to friends a strong new bitterness toward their chief and his top lieutenants over their handling of the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis.

Tasca's unceremonious recall to Washington and leaks to the Washington press corps detailing the alleged unresponsiveness of Tasca and the CIA here to directives from Washington have given rise to the scapegoat theory.

The behind-the-scenes dispute centers on American actions just prior to and after the Greek-backed coup that deposed Cyprus' president, Archbishop Makarios, on July 15, triggering the Turkish invasion of the island five days later.

Some U.S. officials in Greece are especially incensed by newspaper accounts from Washington that portray Kissinger and his chief deputy, Jo-

seph J. Sisco, in a favorable light, while suggesting that Tasca and the local CIA, which acted as the embassy's liaison with the now-toppled Greek junta, did not act on orders to head off the coup.

The CIA's version of what happened in July is still shrouded by the secrecy that covers the agency's work. But Americans and Greeks intimately involved in those crucial days have confided to friends, and it is possible to put together from authoritative sources an intelligence community version of the pre-coup activity.

This version establishes the coup as having been planned and carried out almost entirely by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, the dominant figure of the junta, and Greek army officers on Cyprus. Ioannides' mishandling of the coup and his failure to tell other officers on the junta about it destroyed his authority and led to the junta's collapse after the Turkish invasion, according to this account.

It also maintains that Ioannides artfully deceived the CIA about the coup. The agency is

apparently prepared to accept the responsibility for a major intelligence failure, but not for playing any role in the coup or for failing to respond adequately to warnings from Washington.

The agency reportedly was aware that the junta had had a plan for deposing Makarios in readiness since it seized power in 1967.

New warnings were raised in June after Makarios demanded that the junta withdraw 650 Greek army officers stationed on the island, and on June 19, according to this account, Ioannides personally informed a CIA liaison officer that he was considering moving against the archbishop.

But he reportedly stressed that he had not come to a decision. Ioannides is said to have discounted the chances of strong Turkish reaction to Makarios' projected downfall, and added that he was sounding out the Turkish military command on this.

On July 4, at Tasca's embassy Independence Day celebration, the agency was reportedly informed by a Greek liaison officer speaking for Ioannides that the general had "almost decided against" any move against Makarios. On July 11, Ioannides is said to have personally informed an agency member that he had decided "to cut the bastard loose," i.e., to withdraw the officers and let Makarios sink or swim on his own.

The agency is said to have accepted these assurances and was reportedly caught by surprise when the coup occurred. Also surprised, according to this account, was the Greek general staff. Other junta members were shocked and

dismayed when they learned that the coup was in progress on the morning of July 15.

In the aftermath of the coup and the junta's decision to turn over power to a civilian government, Tasca and the embassy were repeatedly ignored by Washington.

Kissinger secretly issued an invitation to new Premier Constantine Karamanlis to visit the United States to discuss the crisis without consulting or informing the embassy, according to American diplomatic sources.

The Greeks disclosed the invitation and their pointed rejection of it at the same time. American diplomats now say this was a predictable response that could and should have been avoided, since relations were already declining rapidly.

"Many of us here can see the reasons behind Kissinger's policy toward Greece during this period and don't really disagree with it," one intelligence analyst here told a friend. "But there were certainly palliatives that could have been used. Sometimes we seemed to be deliberately antagonizing the Greeks."

"Kissinger seemed much more comfortable with the military government than Tasca ever did," said a member of Tasca's staff, "although the ambassador always took the rap for our closeness to the junta. He does feel that he has been shafted."

The Greeks do not seem to have been pacified by the appointment of Jack Kubisch as Tasca's replacement. The Greek press has said that Kubisch comes "from the same barrel of smelly sardines" as Tasca.

NEW YORK TIMES  
18 September 1974

## SENATORS SEEKING TO BAR TURKEY AID

Say Use of U.S. Equipment  
in Cyprus Compels Halt

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17

More than 20 Senators plan to seek Senate approval tomorrow of an amendment urging President Ford to cut off military aid to Turkey because of what they describe as the illegal use of United States equipment during Cyprus crisis.

In advance of the effort to attach a sense-of-the-Congress resolution to the pending Export-Import Bank Act, Mr. Ford has been urged by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to continue the

WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1974

## Tito Sees CIA Role In Makarios Ouster

Reuter

**BELGRADE, Sept. 13**—Yugoslav President Tito accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of organizing the Cyprus coup and of intending to kill President Makarios.

"This coup d'etat was organized by the CIA, Greek military junta and NATO," Tito said in a speech published here today.

"Makarios was to be killed because Cyprus was a non-aligned country and Makarios was one of the founders of the nonaligned policy. He was to be removed and Cyprus turned into a NATO base," Tito told a north Slovenian town meeting.

He also said that while Yugoslavia backed Turkey's first invasion of Cyprus, it disapproved of the second Turkish action on the island when it

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 September 1974

## Rifts and Soviet Pressure Worry NATO

By DREW MIDDLETON

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which celebrated its 25th anniversary in April in a confident mood, now is beset by serious political and military problems.

According to authoritative sources in Europe and Washington, there are these major problems:

¶The Soviet Government is pressing Norway for the establishment of joint Norwegian-Soviet rule of the Spitsbergen island group north of Norway in the Arctic Ocean—an action that would further weaken NATO's position in a strategically important area.

¶Cuts by the Netherlands in her defense budget and a review of defense spending in Britain have raised fears that alliance forces in Central Europe will be weakened.

¶The opposition by the Netherlands to the proposed appointment of Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. to replace Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has created a command problem.

¶The withdrawal of Greece from the military sector of the alliance has opened a gap in the alliance's radar network that military sources believe could have serious consequences in any future Middle East crisis.

### The Most Serious Problem

The situation in northern Norway has deteriorated to the point where senior officers regard Soviet pressure in the future for a demilitarization of the North Cape area, now held by a small Norwegian force, as "probable rather than possible."

Western officers believe that the methodical extension of Soviet sea and air power into the Norwegian and Baltic Seas has already seriously weakened the alliance's position on the northern flank, regarded as the key to strategic control of the North Atlantic and the main sea lanes between North America and Europe.

All Soviet nuclear-missile submarines are based at Murmansk and must pass between Spitsbergen and Norway's North Cape into the Atlantic. Under present arrangements their passage can be detected by the alliance.

Although Norwegian Government officials believe there is a possibility that oil will be found on the sea bed around Spitsbergen, it is generally believed that the Russians want joint rule of the islands as much for strategic as for economic reasons.

The consequence of joint rule, NATO officials say, would be to bar access to the island by the United States and other signers of the 1920 treaty that established Norwegian sovereignty there.

### Dutch Cuts Criticized

The Dutch defense cuts, announced July 9, will be fully effected by 1977. At that time the Netherlands will have 16 mobilized battalions instead of the present 22. Reductions also are planned in the number of fighter aircraft in the air force and in the Nike missile force now in West Germany.

The alliance's Defense Planning Committee has told the Dutch Government that these changes will have "adverse effects on the defense capability

of the alliance" and that other allies would have to increase military and financial contributions to compensate for the cuts.

The British Defense Ministry is now near the end of a detailed examination of military spending intended to reduce the outlay for arms and men.

British officials say that reductions will not affect the contribution to NATO. But alliance officers believe that sizeable cuts will inevitably reduce the forces in West Germany since a reduction of British garrisons outside Europe alone will not constitute major savings for the weakened economy.

### Haig Called Inexperienced

Opposition to General Haig's appointment, according to alliance sources, has more to do with his inexperience in dealing with the allies and in commanding large units than his having been President Nixon's chief of staff.

American and other NATO officers concede that inexperience may be a valid criticism of General Haig. But they point out that he is a thoroughly trained soldier and that in World War II many American officers who had never commanded a unit in action larger than a battalion had successfully commanded armies.

The gap in the alliance's radar network caused by the Greek withdrawal would be extremely serious in the event of a crisis in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek section of the network covers the Bulgarian frontier and the most direct air routes from Soviet bases in central Europe to the Middle East.

aid program on policy grounds, even if the law could be interpreted to mean that aid should be suspended, State Department officials said.

Mr. Kissinger's position, arrived at after a long legal and policy review at the State Department, is that a cut in aid to Turkey might ruin chances for persuading the Turks to make compromises in the Cyprus dispute, and would raise long-term questions for other countries about the value of accepting United States aid.

### Amendment Not Binding

The sponsors of the amendment, led by Senators Thomas F. Eagleton, Democrat of Missouri, and Adlai E. Stevenson 3d, Democrat of Illinois, believe they will receive overwhelming support for their measure, which would not be binding on President Ford.

Moreover, the Senators said that the amendment would probably be dropped in conference with the House because the House version of the Export-Import Act does not contain such an amendment and would probably be ruled by the House as not germane to the legislation.

But the Senators, who represent a broad spectrum of political views, have been angered by what they regard as stalling tactics by the State Department in refusing to acknowledge publicly legal questions involved in the continuing aid to Turkey.

They are seeking the vote as an expression of their concern, a Senate aide said.

The dispute stems from the military action by the Turkish forces last month to increase the territory they occupy in Cyprus, reported now to be about 40 per cent of the island.

Mr. Eagleton, in a statement earlier this month, called on Mr. Ford to suspend aid to Turkey because sections of foreign assistance and military sales acts ruled out military aid if a country used United States-supplied equipment for purposes other than those specified. He said that Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus could not be justified.

### U. S. Security Is Key Issue

State Department lawyers, according to department officials, reported after long analysis of the laws, that the military aid could be continued if the President used a waiver authority, and asserted that such aid was in the national security interests of the United States.

But Mr. Kissinger, after reading the opinions, decided that the broad policy intention of foreign aid was to strengthen United States security and that any decision now on the aid issue would be a setback to efforts for Cyprus peace talks.

If the United States announced that such aid was in the national interest, this would only further infuriate the Greeks, Mr. Kissinger believes. If it cut the aid, the Turks would be angered.

A policy of saying nothing was decided upon.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
29 August 1974

## Intelligence gap 'let in Bonn spy'

By JOHN ENGLAND  
in Bonn

A FAILURE of communication within West German counter-espionage favoured Günter Guillaume, whose alleged spying for East Germany caused the scandal which forced Herr Brandt to resign as Federal Chancellor.

The failure allowed Guillaume to penetrate the Bonn Chancellery, an investigating Parliamentary committee was told in Bonn yesterday.

Herr Johann Gottlieb Hermermann, a former department chief with the Office for the Defence of the Constitution, who was responsible for giving Guillaume security clearance in 1970, testified that documents that could have exposed Guillaume were not filed centrally.

He did not have grounds to reject Guillaume for Chan-

cellery service, he added. Nor did checks with state security services in West Berlin and Hessen reveal anything against Guillaume.

Before his arrest last April Guillaume had been a personal aide of Herr Brandt for 10 months. He is now under legal investigation on suspicion of espionage.

Herr Hermermann told the committee that the department with in his service responsible for watching Left-wing radicals had four documents about the East Berlin publishing house for which Guillaume worked before "fleeing" to West Germany in 1956.

These documents were not in a central file, however, and he knew nothing of their existence. He assured the committee he was not influenced in his decision to clear Guillaume by approaches from any political party.

The all-party investigating committee is seeking to discover

how Guillaume slipped past West German security to obtain a post on Herr Brandt's staff.

As the committee began its second day of public hearings yesterday, it was reported that the conservative weekly magazine, *Quick*, in its issue today, would link Herr Herberich Wehner, the Social Democratic faction leader, with the Guillaume affair.

The *Quick* report was said to claim that Herr Wehner was suspected of having told Herr Honecker, the East German leader, more than a year ago that Guillaume's spying activities had been uncovered by West German intelligence.

The magazine based its claim on "research, documentation and combined statements from former agents of the West German counter-espionage service."

Social Democratic party spokesman later dismissed the report as "sensational rubbish and 'smear journalism'."

NATIONAL REVIEW  
13 SEPT 1974

EN ROUTE to the airport, to cover the arrival of left wing firebrand Andreas Papandreou, son of the former prime minister George Papandreou, I watched a mob of young men burn an American-built car despite the protests of its owner, a Greek. This was just one of many such anti-American acts in the fortnight following the Cyprus fighting. A sampling: *Item*. The beating of three Sudanese, who had been taken for American Negroes. The left wing paper *Athinaiiki*, reporting the incident, said the people were right to beat up "anyone resembling an American." *Item*. Dave Tonge, the BBC's man in Greece, thrusting a mike into a crowd of rampaging Papandreou youths and urging them to yell "Kissinger murderer" for the audience back in Britain. *Item*. Stories in the leftist press urging taxi drivers not to pick up Americans, instructing the state-controlled radio not to play American music, inciting mobs to destroy American property, attack American dependents. *Item*. *Avgi*, the Communist daily, saying flat out that former strongmen George Papadopoulos and Demetrios Ioannidis were paid agents of the CIA and that Kissinger personally ordered Ioannidis to kill Makarios. *Item*. On the day after the murder of U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies in Nicosia, *Apogevmatini*, the largest afternoon paper in Athens, reporting that a U.S. Marine guard had caused the riot and subsequent death of the Ambassador by "provoking the crowd with taunts and finally by shooting at it."

Now the case of *Apogevmatini* is particularly interesting, and illustrative of the Greek press. Until very recently it was very pro-American; until July 23 it was an ardent supporter of the military regime. The flipflop came overnight. One day it was extolling the Americans, the next it was explaining in great detail how Henry Kissinger had plotted to start a war between the two communities on Cyprus in order to effect a partition of the island that would net the U.S. two bases on Cyprus, one on the Turkish and one on the Greek side.

The wave of anti-Americanism fanned by the domestic press was made easier by something we Greeks call *filotimo*. The closest English word to *filotimo* is pride, but the word means more. It can be used in Greek to mean pride in a job well done, but also when one is lying in order to save face.

## LETTER FROM ATHENS

# The Anti-American Campaign

TAKI THEODORACOPULOS

On the surface there was little for the Greeks to be ashamed of in the conduct of the Greek Cypriots, who defended themselves courageously against overwhelming odds: they were fighting off Phantom jets and tanks with World War II-vintage rifles. Rather than swallow this defeat and explain the failure of the government to aid the Cypriots, all sorts of alternative explanations were advanced: the U.S. Sixth Fleet prevented Greek troopships from leaving for Cyprus; Greece was told she would have to fight both Turkey and the United States if she moved to help the Cypriots; Henry Kissinger is a murderer; etc.

And to make the story even more persuasive and the U.S. even more villainous, it turned out suddenly that it was the Americans, not the junta that had kept the brave people of Greece captive for seven long years when, in fact—except for certain elements among the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals—there had been little or no overt resistance to the Colonels.

The government of Constantine Karamanlis calls itself a government of national salvation and encompasses all political factions except the Communists and, at least at this writing, Andreas Papandreou himself, although five members of his party are in the cabinet. Papandreou, who rushed back to Greece from Canada where he had been teaching in a university for some years, has failed to give his followers direction. He has concentrated his vitriol in attacks on the Karamanlis government as a puppet of the United States, CIA, NATO, imperialism, Kissinger, whatever. But he has offered the country no alternative. Despite his vacillation, Papandreou is believed to have the support of about 10 per cent of the population, mainly because of his father's name. The late George Papandreou, head of the Center Union Party, was a great orator, a consummate politician, a demagogue.

Caught in the virulent anti-Americanism that Papandreou and everyone

else is exploiting, has been U.S. Ambassador to Athens Henry Tasca, who was recalled a week ago. Tasca denies published stories that he had worked to bolster the regimes first of the colonels and then of the generals, and says he has the cables to prove it. "When history is written," he told me, "I will be exonerated from the charges against me." If he was such a supporter of the military, he asks, how come that on the day that General Ioannidis stepped down five dissident politicians, including Evangelos Averoff, the defense minister, called on him to congratulate him for his efforts in behalf of Greek freedom? Averoff, incidentally, says there is no truth in the reports that the ouster of Archbishop Makarios was engineered by the United States. Ioannidis decided on that step alone, he says, and when the Americans found out what he was up to, they did their best to dissuade him.

THE DANGER now is that the Communists and the leftists may try to move out the street mobs against the Karamanlis government. Karamanlis himself, as wise as he is courageous, is trying not to be stampeded. He has stood up against pressures to go to war with Turkey. He has promised elections within two to six months. He has managed to dismantle most of the infrastructure of the military government, quietly and efficiently. He seems ready to negotiate with Turkey not only over Cyprus but also over the disputed Aegean oil rights. But in order to take the steam out of the mounting campaign against America and NATO he took Greece out of the NATO alliance.

The American bases in Greece remain in danger as Karamanlis—the only leader capable of neutralizing the Communists—is jockeyed by popular outcry into anti-American positions. □

Mr. Theodoracopoulos is NR's correspondent in Athens.

NEW YORK TIMES  
8 September 1974

## Democracy in Trouble

By James Reston

DUBLIN—A political journey across Western Europe these days is a depressing and expensive business. Inflation has produced doubt and anxiety about the institutions of liberal democracy. Not since World War II have the free nations been so dependent on one another—so much at the mercy of events beyond their borders—or at the same time so stubbornly nationalistic and preoccupied with their own internal struggles.

Ireland is only the most dramatic and tragic symbol of this narrow and separatist mood. Geographically and economically, it is bound, north and south, and linked to Britain and Europe, but it is also separated by history and religion. And the crowning paradox: It is engaged in a religious war among unbelievers, tyrannized by a minority of extremists on both sides.

Two powerful but contradictory forces seem to be in conflict in Europe today. Its old empires are gone. Separated one nation from another, it is weak. Divided within each nation, it is weaker still. But united, it has the people, brains, and resources to stand in the forefront of the coming age alongside the United States, the Soviet Union and the emerging power of China and Latin America.

This, however, is not the way Europe is going today. Looking from west to east, Ireland is hating the British Army in Ulster, but fearing that the withdrawal of that army for financial reasons in London, might lead to a disastrous civil war.

Portugal is finally abolishing her African empire, but she is run by a weak and distracted government and confronted by a well organized Communist party.

Spain is also trying to make the transition from the authoritarian government of General Francisco Franco to a monarchy—also opposed by a strong Communist party, which has kept its organization and discipline ever since the Civil War of the Thirties.

France, almost by accident and the shrewdness of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, just missed a popular front government of Socialists and Communists under Francois Mitterrand, but it will take all of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's intelligence and style to establish the peaceful revolution of reform he has proclaimed.

Italy is broke and in such a political tangle that even political leaders in Germany and France now suggest that maybe a coalition government in Rome, including the Communists, might not be a bad idea.

Greece has made such a mess of things that she has come to the verge

DUBLIN

of war with Turkey over Cyprus, and, like France, she has pulled her troops out of the NATO alliance.

Meanwhile, Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, the stabilizing influence between East and West in the Balkans, is coming to the end of his days. The last of the old generation of World War II leaders—Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in China, Franco in Spain, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Haile Selassie in Ethiopia—are all on their way out.

Accordingly, the question is what the new leaders of the world—President Ford in Washington, President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris, Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn, Premier Tanaka in Japan, and Prime Minister Wilson or Edward Heath in Britain—will do about this critical transitional period in world history.

For the moment, they are doing very little about it. Like the Irish, they are preoccupied with the narrow and immediate political and economic problems at home, and the more they try to solve world problems by national political tactics, the deeper they get into trouble.

Fortunately, in Europe there is another force at work in the universities, in the newspapers and particularly among the rising young generation. The teachers, the reporters and the students are more mobile now than ever before. They see a different coming age. They talk not about separation of the nations and generations but about integration.

Even some politicians in Europe are beginning to think beyond the divisions of the present to the possibility of unity in the future. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing in France and Mr. Schmidt in Germany are searching for new answers to new economic and political problems. The Republic of Ireland, for example, has a brilliant young foreign secretary, Garret Fitzgerald, who is risking his political position by arguing publicly for a unified Ireland.

"I believe the time has come," he wrote, "for all Irish politicians who genuinely believe in a united Ireland, so organized that people from both communities will feel equally at home within it, to speak out and to lead the people of Ireland towards this goal. We may find that some of our people reject this lead, and that in the process existing political structures become cracked or even shattered; this is the price we shall have to pay if called upon to do so."

In the short run the outlook in Europe is bleak, but there is a rising new generation and it is beginning to emphasize not separation but integration.

NEW YORK TIMES  
8 September 1974

## When Italy's Communists Rule, They Do It Right

By PAUL HOFMANN

BOLOGNA—The Italian Communist party, which has renewed its effort to become part of the national governing coalition, could produce substantial evidence that when it gets a mandate it knows what to do with it. This ancient city is the center of the region called Emilia-Romagna, and the elected Communist officials who run both city and region do it more efficiently and less corruptly than officials in most of the rest of the nation.

Bologna was extolled as "la Fascistissima" (the most Fascist) by Mussolini, who was born in the nearby Romagna area. But since the collapse of Fascism at the end of World War II, Bologna has had Communist mayors.

Emilia-Romagna is one of Italy's 20 units of limited selfgovernment. With a population of 1.5-million, Emilia-Romagna is the largest Communist-run territory in Europe outside the Soviet bloc. Many of its inhabitants and other Italians have the impression today that the "Red Region" is on its way to becoming a state within the state.

This is due in part to continuous close cooperation between the local Communist party apparatus and the new regional authorities. Emilia-Romagna seems also to be developing its own foreign policy, sending delegations to Socialist countries and playing host to prominent leftwingers from all over the world.

### A Curb on Immigration

Bologna itself has a population of fewer than 600,000. The municipal authorities are discouraging immigration because they think further growth would impair the quality of its life. The historic center of Bologna, with its archways and well-restored palaces and churches, is a model of urban upkeep. The streets are better swept and the transit system works better than those of most Italian cities.

Bologna's citizens can get the many certificates that Italian bureaucracy requires from a computerized system at some handy "Little City Hall." The leftwing city fathers see to it that new zoning regulations and other community affairs are discussed by the people in neighborhood meetings, as if to say, see how democratic we are?

In these grassroot consultations, Communist officials usually show great competence and a degree of flexibility. They yield on local issues, like neighborhood renewal whenever they sense they have a majority against them.

While Bologna looks outwardly well-scrubbed, it has also been remarkably free so far of the city hall scandals that occur in other Italian centers. Critics of the local government blame it for packing the city and regional administrations with Communist party members, and for wasting funds on prestige projects. None of Italy's 19 other regions publishes so much self-congratulatory literature as does Emilia-Romagna.

Industrialists, business owners and other well-heeled Bolognesi have long learned that it pays to maintain good relations with the Communist rulers,

# Far East

NEWSDAY  
28 AUG 1974

## CIA Puts on a Civic Guise in Laos

By Arnold Abrams

Newsday Special Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The onset of peace in Laos has not ended Central Intelligence Agency involvement in this country's internal affairs.

After running a so-called secret war for nearly a decade, CIA personnel have turned to a new field here: civic action. They are using programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development as a cover for their covert operations. An influx of CIA funds earlier this year, according to reliable sources, was responsible for the implementation of several major civic programs in northern Laos, where Meo hill tribesmen are concentrated.

Those tribesmen formed the bulk of a tough guerrilla army that was paid, trained, supplied and advised by CIA paramilitary personnel. By sponsoring civic action programs for Meos, the agency retains influence over an important segment of the populace in a strategic area of Laos.

The tribesmen's leader is Gen. Vang Pao, who reaps substantial financial benefits from the civic programs. With CIA assistance, the flamboyant Gen. Vang Pao has become chicken farmer Vang Pao; the transformation took place at Long Cheng, the Meo leader's long-time base and the former CIA field headquarters.

Once dominated by the rattle of gunfire and the roar of American aircraft, Long Cheng now is noisy with the sound of cackling chickens. An initial CIA expenditure of more than \$25,000 started operations on Vang Pao's poultry farm, where some 2,500 chickens are housed and raised prior to being sold in a nearby market serving several thousand Meos.

Sources close to the project estimate that Vang Pao makes about \$1,000 monthly profit from his chicken sales (the average per capita income in Laos is about \$60 a year). His customers also benefit, however, because CIA-sponsored chickens are sold at below-normal rates.

Aside from chicken-raising, other CIA-funded civic projects in Laos include a cattle breeding program and the establishment of farm supply centers that provide agricultural commodities for Meo farmers at reduced price. The projects' total costs, according to knowledgeable sources, have exceeded \$100,000.

The projects are administered by the Agricultural Development Organization, nominally under Laotian government control but dependent upon American funds. When U.S. budgetary cutbacks threatened to eliminate or curtail ADO operations, sources report, an infusion of CIA money in February put the organization back in business.

Six American agricultural experts presently super-

vise ADO projects; all six reportedly are genuine civic action workers, not CIA operatives. "These men are my employees in the purest sense," said Charles Mann, director of USAID in Laos. "They have no other professional concerns." When asked about the source of ADO's funds, however, Mann replied, "no comment."

The American agricultural experts prefer to ignore the source of their programs' funds. "I'm not happy about where that money comes from," one said, "but I am concerned with civic development, and I care a great deal about the Meos. The source of our funds, and the motives behind them, mean less to me than what we are doing for these people."

Another American worker, close to Vang Pao, also is willing to overlook the substantial profits compiled by the Meo chieftain, who runs northern Laos like a feudal lord.

"At first this bothered me," he said, "but after a while you come to realize that this is the system—and it works. Vang Pao can be called a dictator, but he is basically a benevolent one, and his profits are not excessive by local standards."

Less willing to overlook CIA involvement in Laos, however, is Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee on refugees. Long opposed to the agency's use of humanitarian programs as a "cover," Kennedy recently declared that the CIA's present effort "raises troubling questions over the course of U.S. policy toward Laos."

He said: "Despite our country's general public support for the cease-fire agreement and the new government, several indicators suggest that the intent of some of our remaining presence in Laos can only help to perpetuate old relationships and the division of that country."

There were 216 American military men serving in Laos as Army and Air Force attaches at the time of the cease-fire in February, 1973. Now there reportedly are about 30. The U.S. has cut back because the Vientiane government and pro-Communist Pathet Lao have formed a coalition government and peace accords required the withdrawal of all foreign troops.



WASHINGTON POST  
14 September 1974

## 'Enough' Self-Burnings, Thieu Tells His Backers

By Philip A. McCombs  
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Sept. 13—President Nguyen Van Thieu this week asked Vietnamese to stop burning themselves to death, "even for the noble cause" of supporting his government against the Communists.

The appeal comes after five such suicides in two months by persons who police say were anti-Communist patriots.

Each immolation has been followed by massive government publicity extolling the self-burners as anti-Communist "martyrs" and "torches for peace."

Self-burnings by monks during the early 1960s provided a significant focus for anti-government sentiments that eventually toppled President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Now that the Thieu government has its own martyrs, observers say, it has removed from the hands of its political opponents a potentially powerful symbolic weapon.

This coincides with gathering political unrest here. Militant Buddhists are organizing, a mass Catholic demonstration against corruption was recently crushed by police in Hue, and a newspaper publisher has publicly threatened to burn himself to protest press censorship.

There is no proof to support the widespread rumors here that the government planned the five burnings in advance, but it clearly exploited them with exceptional skill.

Pamphlets and posters depicting the burnings as he-

roic acts have been plastered throughout the country. There have been ceremonial funerals, radio and television broadcasts and public speeches.

The Vietnamese typically view the burnings with a mixture of skepticism and awe.

"It takes a lot of guts to burn yourself," said an officer. "You get fame, a good burial, and the government makes your family rich," said a cab driver. A soldier said, "I think maybe they really did it for peace. The government is a liar just like the Communists, but maybe a little less so."

Three of the five were disabled veterans; the other two were a monk and a common laborer. All died but the monk, who is in a hospital, but unable to talk.

Sources within the Vietnamese Disabled Veterans' Association, a private group, said members have been encouraged to burn themselves and offered large sums of money for their survivors. They said that association officials would like to have a total of 10 burnings by members, to make the government indebted to the association.

"They told me, 'Go ahead and burn yourself, we'll make your family rich,' said one association member. "I said I couldn't because I'm a Catholic."

Association president Nguyen Dinh denied, however, that officials of his group encourage burnings, although he added, "The association has to accept and admire these acts."

There are several common features in the five self-immolations.

Each poured gasoline over himself and lit a match. The laborer did this in an obscure village, but the other four did in front of politically important buildings in Saigon.

All left behind articulate and carefully planned anti-Communist and pro-peace statements in letters and notebooks, according to police. They all tossed such documents in the ground just before burning themselves, police said.

In each case, police seized the relevant documents before anyone else could see them and then released copies of handwritten letters and texts to the press, saying they were copies of the actual statements left by the suicides.

"Down with the Communist aggressors!" said a typical statement—this one by "the second torch for peace," Cpl. Phan Van Lua, 33, who was missing a leg and was listed by the army, as 80 per cent disabled.

"You are the Communist from the north," said the text of one of his letters released by the government, "and you have continuously sent troops into the south of Vietnam to cause death and misery to the innocent people."

Another is a moving letter to his sons which says, "Oh, my sons, my heart is broken! I leave you to call for unification of the nation... My sons, whenever you miss me, just send letters to the radio station..."

In Lua's hamlet, a few miles north of Saigon, Lua's wife said in an interview, "I don't know why he did it... in 12 years of marriage he never talked about politics with me, only about money matters and the problems of taking care of the kids."

She said the government gave her \$700 after her husband's death—an enormous sum in Vietnam and more than is normally given, to war widows.

As she spoke, half a dozen laborers outside her mother's small straw-and-wood house were busily building a new brick one. Lua's wife said she is buying it with part of the \$700.

In at least two other cases, relatives and acquaintances said the self-burners had been apolitical all their lives. In another case, the family declined to talk at all.

The laborer, Nguyen Phu Niem, 58, left letters condemning Communist aggression, the government news agency said. It quoted from one.

It also said that Niem wrote his employer complaining about low pay, but the agency did not quote that letter.

President Thieu's appeal this week said, "The significance of the five peace fighters' extraordinary deeds has been acknowledged and esteemed by the people at home and of the world."

"The sound of the alarm bell has been listened to attentively by everybody. I think that is enough."

sources of questionable reliability. The always active rumor factories of Saigon are also in full operation.

It is known, however, that severe belt-tightening orders went out to the major military commands within the past seven days. It appears the orders were timed to coincide with Sept. 1—a local Buddhist holiday during which military activity would have normally declined without attracting attention.

At any rate, some of the effects are now clearly visible—notably the almost total absence of warplanes above the normally busy South Vietnamese airfields.

While the official government spokesman contended Wednesday that nothing unusual was taking place, he admitted he had no reports of combat sorties.

## Critical Drop in U.S. Aid All but Grounds S. Vietnam's Air Force

BY GEORGE McARTHUR  
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON — A critical drop in American aid has forced the South Vietnamese government into a crash belt-tightening program that has grounded most of the air force, cut ammunition expenditure in some cases by 80% and sharply limited many other activities.

Neither the South Vietnamese nor the Americans will comment officially on the new program.

Privately, however, a ranking South Vietnamese official confirmed

that "the situation is very serious and we can't say how long it will go on."

He added that with the fighting continuing in some areas at a level rivaling Hanoi's 1972 offensive, some South Vietnamese commanding officers were "mad as hell" at the critical decline in American aid.

In the absence of any official announcements, details of the new South Vietnamese posture have emerged piecemeal, sometimes from

Privately, a South Vietnamese officer confirmed that orders from the Joint General Staff, presumably with the backing of President Nguyen Van Thieu, had virtually grounded all but the most important combat sorties.

The officer said the entire fleet of South Vietnamese A1-E Skyraiders had been grounded. These old propeller planes which can carry up to 5,000-pound bomb loads have been the air force workhorses, and about 100 of them are normally on call daily.

In addition, combat strikes by the more numerous jet fleet require clearance from one of the commanders of the south's four major military regions.

An official said there was no indication how long the present stringent restrictions would last.

An American official at the big Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside Saigon said that on Tuesday not one single combat flight was made from the base. He said that all planes were grounded and that in addition crews removed all the ammunition and bombs from every plane. This may have been part of a nationwide inventory of ammunition ordered by air force headquarters.

In addition to the restrictions on combat sorties, it is understood that similar limits have been placed on all helicopter flights—both for liaison and troop movements. The daily limitations on helicopter time is so severe that anything more than small and short-range

troop movements by air are virtually ruled out. Similarly, routine cargo flights by fixed-wing planes have been sharply cut—through the precise size of the cut is unknown.

The crux of the new restrictions is evidently Saigon's deep concern over gasoline and ammunition. These are, by far, the largest items in the U.S. military aid program.

It was possible that the South Vietnamese were ordering the severe belt tightening now in order to build up some reserve stocks in the event of some genuinely major Communist military attacks. Some American officials insisted that there were now adequate stocks of ammunition and gasoline on hand—but they would not be more precise.

Whatever the situation, word was passed through

the U.S. mission that there would be no comment at all.

Technically, American military aid to South Vietnam is now being given under a "continuing resolution" of Congress since the regular aid bill was not voted by the end of the fiscal year in June.

The new military aid bill, however, has been pared to \$700 million as it now stands—about half the amount requested by the Administration.

It is possible that the difficulties now surfacing are caused by the need to cut military spending sharply in South Vietnam to conform to the \$700 million bill which now appears certain of passage.

WASHINGTON POST  
03 September 1974

### Some Would Risk Communist Rule

# Refugees Charge Saigon Impedes Return Home

By Philip A. McCombs  
Washington Post Foreign Service

DANANG, South Vietnam, Sept. 2—Many war refugees are eager to return to their old homes even though it may mean living under Communist control, and some of them have been forcibly prevented from doing this by government police measures.

There are also many refugees who would rather remain on the government side than come under Communist control. It is impossible to determine how many fall in each group.

Under the Paris cease-fire agreement signed in January 1973, there is supposed to be free movement between the two sides. In fact, very little of this has taken place.

If it had, a large number of people might have been expected to return to homes now in Communist-controlled areas.

During the American involvement in the war, large numbers of people were loaded on trucks and helicopters and taken to refugee camps when the allies swept through large areas to "pacify" them.

By moving the people out, the allies could assume that anyone still in the area was the enemy, who could be killed.

The government has now been resettling the dislocated people in government-controlled areas, but many people seems to have a different idea

about where they would like to live.

"If the government would allow me to go back home I'd go immediately," said one woman, who was holding her baby as she talked in a refugee camp in Quangngai Province, about 75 miles south of here on Vietnam's central coast. Her home is now in Communist hands.

"We can't return because our native village is controlled by the other side and the government won't let us," explained another woman standing nearby.

They spoke about reprisals by government soldiers against those who might try to go back.

"If we went back, the government would have to guarantee us that there wouldn't be any arrests and that we wouldn't be disturbed by government soldiers," said the first woman.

"No more shooting at us and capturing us," put in a man. Asked if they meant they didn't care whether they lived under government or Communist control, the group of about 50 refugees gathered around said, "Right, right," they just wanted to go home.

An old man recalled how, long ago, they left home. "The Americans used helicopters, and they forced us on board," he said. "We went with just our bare hands, couldn't carry any kind of property with us."

The people said they had been flown to the refugee camp where they still live in

Quangngai Province. Fighting has been heavy there for the past month as Communist forces press down to the coast from their mountain base areas.

For the first year or so, the people said, they had U.S. and government assistance. But that stopped and they had to support themselves by buying tea from mountain tribesmen and selling it in city markets.

The current fighting has made this impossible, and now they said they would like to go home, where they could farm.

There were no government officials around during the interview, which may account for the unusual candor. Usually officials are present and one can never be sure how much refugees' anti-Communist statements are affected by this presence. In some cases people voice genuine anti-Communist sentiments even when officials are not present.

Another example of people wanting to return to areas not controlled by the government is the village of Hoaphung, near the beach three miles southwest of Danang.

"There are a thousand people in my village and 90 percent of them are pro-Vietcong," said the young village chief dejectedly.

He was interviewed in Dan-

ang, where he lives because it is too insecure in the village for him to spend nights there. He goes to the village office every other day, sharing the dangerous job with other village officials who also live in Danang.

The chief, Nguyen Mui, 29, said he was dejected because one day last month, 80 families in the village tore down their houses and carted them to rebuild in a nearby Vietcong-controlled area.

They told him, the chief said, that they would prefer to live there because it was their home ground, from which they had been removed in the late 1960s when the Americans were pacifying and bulldozing the area.

Though they were not moved far from their home ground, the place they moved to had poor soil and they were crowded.

After this happened, Mui said, he was accused by his boss, the district chief, of being pro-Vietcong, which he says he is not. He said the district chief ordered him to use "any suitable measures" to get the people back.

"I was ordered to have my cadres go in and destroy all the houses that the people tore down and rebuild in the new area," said Mui.

He said he didn't like to do that, because "All the village chiefs before me applied military measures to suppress the people but I'd rather apply social-welfare measures that make the people like me."

The problem was finally resolved last week, when the dis-

trict chief decided that the people could be controlled in their new location by moving a platoon of airborne troops into the area.

Mui said that one of the first things the troops did in the area last week was to ar-

rest four persons thought to have led the people in tearing down their houses and relocating them.

He said the sudden move by the 80 families was "part of a Vietcong campaign to destroy all the refugee camps and get

the people to return to their native hamlets."

Now that the airborne troops are in his village, Mui said the district chief told him to "explain to the people the situation so as to help keep them from falling into the Communist scheme of aggression."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

10 September 1974

## Conservative priests blast corruption in Thieu regime

By Daniel Southerland  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

A number of conservative Roman Catholic priests have strongly attacked President Thieu's government lately for massive corruption among officials and military men.

They contend that unless Mr. Thieu reforms his government, he doesn't stand a chance against the Communists.

Three hundred priests, many of them refugees from the Communist North, have banded together to make sure that their voices are heard. A few months ago, they decided to go public and issue a manifesto "against corruption, injustice, and social decadence."

The priests claim to have the support of some of South Vietnam's Roman Catholic bishops, but decline to reveal the names of any high-level supporters in the Catholic hierarchy.

Catholics make up only about 10 percent of South Vietnam's population but they wield influence far out of proportion to their numbers. President Thieu is a Catholic by conversion.

In their manifesto, the dissident priests declared that power and leadership in South Vietnam are "for the most part . . . based on corruption."

"Under the protection of influential officials, narcotics dealers, gangsters, gamblers, prostitutes, and smugglers have become a true menace to a society plagued with purse-

snatching, fraud, rape, and other unthinkable crimes," said the manifesto. "Few people feel themselves safe."

Corruption is not the priests' only theme. They have also been protesting against restrictions on the freedom of speech in South Vietnam. In their manifesto, they point out that under the Thieu government "helpless citizens may be accused of assisting or conniving with the Communists, while others who utter any unpleasant truth about the administration may be charged with 'weakening the fighting spirit of the armed forces.'"

None of the accusations is particularly new. Corruption and injustice have been the targets of countless protesters throughout the long Vietnam war. But it is unusual for so many conservative priests to be going on the attack in such a vocal way.

Recently two of the leaders among the group of 300 issued a statement in which they referred to the Thieu government as an "oppressive and traitorous regime." These were strong words indeed.

The two priests urged the Catholic leadership in South Vietnam to disassociate itself from the Thieu government and to stop accepting favors from the government.

The chief motivation of the 300 priests seems to be, quite simply, fear of a Communist take-over. Left-leaning Vietnamese priests often say that a coalition government which includes the Communists but excludes President Thieu is the only solution

for South Vietnam. But the conservative priests do not advocate that kind of compromise — not yet anyway. Many remain as hawkish as they ever were. But they fear that corruption will sabotage the chances of any anti-Communist regime surviving in South Vietnam.

### Regimes compared

"It was corruption that led to the downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek government in China," said one of the priests who signed the manifesto.

The priest, who happens to be an admirer of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem, declared that corruption now is "100 times worse" than it was under the Diem regime.

The priest asked that his name not be published, because he feared retaliation from the Thieu government. But at the same time he said that he doubted Mr. Thieu would take strong action against any of the 300 priests who signed the manifesto.

"I do not think that Thieu would dare act like President Park Chung Hee [of Korea]," the priest said, referring to the arrests of Christian dissidents in South Korea.

"Thieu is not strong like Park," he said. Mr. Thieu has given little indication so far of what his attitude is toward the priests who are demanding an end to corruption.

But he is not likely to be happy with their criticism because, as one Vietnamese Catholic put it: "If the left-wing priests talk about corruption, Thieu can always say that their criticism is exaggerated. But what does he say when the right-wing priests start talking about it?"

# Western Hemisphere

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, Sept. 18, 1974

## Did the Chilean Press Need CIA Help?

By EVERETT G. MARTIN

In his press conference this week President Ford was asked about recent disclosures that the Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to spend some \$9 million to "destabilize" the government of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende. The President admitted that the CIA gave support, presumably in the form of money, to opposition news media and political parties.

Specifically, the President said: "In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy opposition political parties."

"And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

He concluded: "I think this is in the best interest of the people of Chile and certainly in our best interest."

This interference in the internal affairs of another nation is a staggering admission for the President to make, and his conclusion is, at the very best, questionable.

There isn't any doubt, however, that the opposition news media had been pushed to the wall by the Marxists. The President's statement gives part of the explanation of how it managed to survive at all.

Except for a very few cases, Chile's news media have always been wildly partisan in political matters. News stories generally were polemics and thoroughly unreliable as sources of balanced, accurate information. To read the government and opposition press on any given day was like reading about events in two different countries. The result was that most readers bought the paper that said what they wanted to hear; there was none of the cross-fertilization of ideas that might take the heat out of an issue.

Where opposition newspapers and magazines were concerned, the Allende forces did very little overtly to curtail their right to print what they wanted. But the evidence indicates a clear attempt to strangle them economically by cutting off their revenue.

The Chilean government and state-owned industries were the largest single group of advertisers. It wasn't surprising in such a polarized situation that they stopped advertising in opposition media. As the Marxists through one means or another took control of the banks and private industry, government hold over advertising became overwhelming. The worsening economic situation and scarcities exacerbated the situation until publications appeared with virtually no visible means of support.

Then there was the Marxist attempt to take over the paper company, known familiarly as the Papelera, that supplied 65% of the newsprint. Falling in an effort to buy the firm's shares and to agitate the 51,000 workers to seize the plants, the government tried to force it into bankruptcy,

which means automatic government control. Denied anything but insignificant price increases at a time when costs were tripling, Papelera was soon losing thousands of dollars a day. Only when chaos threatened as crowds took to the streets supporting the company did the government back off in a moment of political compromise.

Newspapers in smaller towns came under more direct attack than the big dailies of Santiago. An editor's life was threatened in Rancagua by mobs of leftists, and workers seized control of papers in other cities. In Talca after workers seized the paper, the supreme court ruled it was illegal; but the government refused to obey the court order to end the occupation. "It's not socially possible to obey the court," a Socialist Party member reasoned at the time.

But newspapers actually reach relatively few people in Chile. Much more important as a mass media is the radio, and closures of radio stations by the Allende government got to be a common occurrence.

Once a Santiago station was closed because it reported that two miners were shot to death during a copper strike. The report was slightly wrong. Only one miner died; the other was critically wounded. For this, the government declared the station had endangered national security. The supreme court again ordered the station reopened; but the government minister involved refused. The court then ordered his arrest, and the Marxists countered with a threat to start impeachment proceedings against the entire court for upholding bourgeois laws against the will of the people.

Government television and radio stations, on the other hand, once caused rioting in the streets with a false report that rightwing forces were about to attack the army. This abuse went unpunished.

Television was another area where the government's actions were overt.

The University of Chile had a station in Santiago that was staffed entirely with extreme leftists broadcasting pure Marxist propaganda. The student body voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to expell the leftists and change to a neutral format; but when the school's administration,

which was bound by law to obey the referendum, tried to take control, the leftists rejected them by force.

The police wouldn't act, and President Allende ordered university officials to continue the Marxists on the payroll. Then the school tried to set up a second station, but the police raided it and smashed the equipment.

The Catholic University ran into similar repression when it tried to set up a second channel to serve the southern city of Concepcion with a format that attempted to be non-partisan.

At first the government claimed that the station's signal would interfere with radio reception at the Concepcion airport, which was patently not the case. The university defiantly went ahead with its plans; so the government set up jamming equipment to interrupt its programs. In the ensuing controversy, the priest who ran the university's television network was even held in jail for a short period.

It was genuinely a question how long some elements of Chile's opposition media could hold out as the pressure against it mounted near the end of the Allende administration. It might be easy to rationalize why the CIA thought it should step in with support money. It is something that no doubt we shall eventually learn we are doing in other countries. But does that justify such intervention in Chile's internal affairs?

And was it even necessary?

The opposition forces demonstrated time and again through various by-elections and the 1973 congressional elections that they were the majority. It seems a kind of arrogance for Washington planners to think that the Chilean majority would let its protesting voice disappear entirely from print and from the airwaves even if established publications and stations collapsed by the dozens.

One might also ask where is the CIA's concern for an opposition press in Chile now that the military junta which deposed the Allende government has effectively silenced all opposition?

Fortunately, no disclosures so far indicate that the U.S. government was involved in the actual coup against the Allende government, but the records should be laid bare to make sure.

In the Chilean case, President Allende's own actions in subverting the democracy, in smuggling arms from Cuba to set up a clandestine army and in wrecking the country's economy were more than adequate to "destabilize" his government.

But what if it had turned out differently? What if he hadn't done those self-destructive things and finally through progressive programs had earned the allegiance of a majority of Chileans? How then could President Ford claim that the CIA's actions were "in the best interests of the people of Chile"?

Mr. Martin, a member of the Journal's New York bureau, covers Latin American affairs and was in Chile during the coup.

THE ECONOMIST SEPTEMBER 14, 1974



## The Pinochet way

Was the Chile disaster inevitable? Probably. Is it permanent? Not necessarily

What has happened in Chile since Salvador Allende was overthrown a year ago this week is a lesson in the way soldiers who believe they are the saviours of their country find themselves becoming dictators. President Pinochet has promised to release some political detainees, and the "state of internal war" was lifted on Wednesday, but there are few guarantees of political freedom under the stern provisions of the state of siege that is still being enforced in Chile. The political parties have been banned or suspended; the press—once the most outspoken in Latin America—is muzzled by military censors; and there are few indications that the junta has any thought of restoring the parliamentary system in a form western democrats would recognise.

Some of the officers who stand behind President Pinochet maintain that censorship, arbitrary detention, trial by court martial and the rest of the paraphernalia of repression were necessary because the country was in a state of civil war. But for a powerful faction within the junta the argument runs deeper: the country must be "cleansed" of old-style politics so that a new, and permanent, authoritarian system can emerge. These men are not like Turkey's generals in 1960. They do not see their job as the laying down of new political rules so that a multi-party system can take over again from them later on. They appear to be working towards a no-party system.

The repression in Chile is documented in a new 80-page report published by Amnesty International this week. Some of its evidence is dubious—including a Newsweek report published in October last year that was later shown to be fallacious, and a number of quotations from anonymous foreigners now outside Chile. But the rest of the report is one of Amnesty's more credible documents, and builds up a damaging case for the junta to answer. The problem is not so much the abuse of law as the absence of law. There is no appeal against the verdict of military tribunals, no respect for habeas corpus, and the lack of central control makes it possible for provincial garrisons or military intelligence services to deal with opponents as they see fit without consulting a higher authority. The result, in the first month after the coup, was a series of prisoners shot "while trying to escape" or just disappearing without trace. Amnesty suggests a figure of 7,000 for the number of political prisoners today; as many people may have died. It is also fairly plain that the use of torture has been widespread, although (as Amnesty concedes) the junta now seems to be trying to stop it. Neither the torture nor the "unofficial" executions can be justified even if one accepts the junta's thesis that the left in Chile is secretly planning a violent uprising—and since there has not been a single guerrilla incident of any importance since the immediate aftermath of the coup, that is no longer easy to swallow.

These things gave the British Government its reason

for instructing Britain's ambassador in Chile not to attend the junta's anniversary celebrations on Wednesday, even though that gesture would have looked a lot more plausible if British ambassadors did not turn up at similar occasions when other governments congratulate themselves on far bloodier conquests of power. But historians, as distinct from politicians out to score a point, will still want to make two observations about what has happened in Chile.

The first is that it was the marxist left, not the armed forces, that broke down Chile's democratic institutions. Before Allende was overthrown he had been censured by a vote of almost two to one in the lower house of Chile's parliament for violating the country's constitution. It was Allende's own left-wing supporters who had set up paramilitary groups and drawn up their plans, almost certainly with his knowledge, to seize total power. The junta is caught up in a series of events that was begun by the Allende regime. That cannot excuse its excesses, but it does help to explain them. The alternative to the Pinochet regime was not democracy for Chile: it was the imposition of a totalitarianism of the left.

### The surviving corners of freedom

The other point is about what sort of government it is that now runs Chile. Its enemies like to call it a totalitarian regime, but it is not. The word totalitarian was coined to apply to those governments—most notably the communist ones—which set out to bring almost every aspect of life under the control of the ruling party. The junta in Chile is not quite like that. Its government is an authoritarian one, and a very tough specimen of the breed, but it has not sought to impose its ideas on the totality of public life. Politics have been abolished, but men can still pursue their economic activities with a certain degree of independence; there remains a good deal of freedom in the world of culture and religion; people still have the right to travel in and out of the country. These things matter, because they mean that some centres of power and influence and independent opinion can still exist outside the reach of the government's arm. Such a country is not a totalitarian one, because the rudiments of pluralism survive.

The distinction is important for Chile. The corners of freedom that can still be found even within an authoritarian state give men the possibility to recover the other freedoms they have lost. These fragments of freedom tend to expand as the regime gains more confidence in itself; there is less intrusion into people's lives in Spain today than there was 20 years ago—or than there is in Chile now. There is more hope of recovering political freedom than there is in a totalitarian regime where one centre of power commands everything. The Chileans are not one of the world's more repressible peoples. Those members of the present junta who believe they can stamp their ideas on Chile forever will discover that.

NEW YORK TIMES  
16 September 1974

### Swedish Premier Calls Chilean Leaders 'Crooks'

STOCKHOLM, Sept. 15 (UPI) — Premier Olof Palme yesterday described the military government of Chile as "despicable crooks." Newspapers speculated today

that the two nations might break off diplomatic relations.

Mr. Palme, speaking at a demonstration against Chile's military regime, said that "sooner or later the regime of blood in Chile will vanish in total degradation and humiliation, despised by the entire demo-

cratic world."

Relations between the two nations have been strained since Sweden's Ambassador to Chile, Harald Edelstam, was expelled in December.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340007-3 49